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Global climate governance struggles with many contentious issues, often made visible in the 
annual climate meetings arranged by the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate 
Change (UNFCCC). When these issues are delegated to climate organizations within the 
UNFCCC system and operationalized into climate practices they are often translated. Climate 
organizations often take on a technical role, making the contentiousness of climate issues 
invisible. The thesis investigates one of the major organizations within the UNFCCC, the 
Green Climate Fund (GCF). The aim of the thesis is to make the contradictions, ambiguities 
and conflicts around the operationalization of different issues in the GCF visible with the 
help of immanent critique, and to analyse how the GCF management of these contradictions, 
ambiguities and conflicts influence the aspects of global climate finance governance issues 
that become emphasized or subordinated.  
The thesis consists of four studies examining the operationalization of different issues in 
the GCF. Study 1 focuses on what factors influence the design of the GCF stakeholder ar-
rangement and how it affects the possibility of different stakeholders to engage actively in 
the GCF. The GCF makes a clear commitment to support the active engagement of diverse 
stakeholders.  It is argued that the arrangement actually privileges private sector stakeholders. 
Study 2 examines conflicts around the interpretation of the GCF governing principle trans-
formational change. Some actors in the GCF try to connect transformational change to a 
financialization of the GCF, while others oppose such development. It is argued that finan-
cialization might contradict country ownership, another important principle in the GCF. 
Study 3 investigates the GCF understanding of climate vulnerability. The analysis shows how 
the GCF emphasis on dominant logics such as science and market logics reduce the aspects 
of climate vulnerability that become visible in the GCF, and how the principle of transfor-
mational change is implicated in this. The aspects of vulnerability that become visible in the 
GCF are those that can be managed through calculative logics, while moral and political 
dimensions become invisible. Study 4 explores the inclusion of indigenous peoples in GCF 
through an analysis of the development of the GCF Indigenous Peoples Policy. GCF em-
braces the ‘traditional knowledge’ of indigenous peoples but indigenous peoples find it dif-
ficult to introduce a more holistic view of nature, while western science dominates knowledge 
production. The analysis also shows that the use of this policy in the GCF is limited, despite 
protests from indigenous peoples’ representatives. 
 
 iv 
 Altogether, the studies show that the dominant logics discussed in previous research such as 
science and market logics play a big role in the GCF. What these dominant logics bring for-
ward are aspects of climate finance issues that are manageable through calculative logics, 
while perspectives and interests that are not easily compatible with these logics become sub-
ordinated – often the political dimensions of climate finance governance. This goes against 
the GCF portrayal of itself as an inclusive organization that is responsive to a variety of per-
spectives and interests. 
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Global climate governance struggles with many contentious issues, often made visible in the 
annual climate meetings arranged by the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate 
Change (UNFCCC). When these issues are delegated to climate organizations within the 
UNFCCC system and operationalized into climate practices they are often translated. Climate 
organizations often take on a technical role, making the contentiousness of climate issues 
invisible. The thesis investigates one of the major organizations within the UNFCCC, the 
Green Climate Fund (GCF). The aim of the thesis is to make the contradictions, ambiguities 
and conflicts around the operationalization of different issues in the GCF visible with the 
help of immanent critique, and to analyse how the GCF management of these contradictions, 
ambiguities and conflicts influence the aspects of global climate finance governance issues 
that become emphasized or subordinated.  
The thesis consists of four studies examining the operationalization of different issues in 
the GCF. Study 1 focuses on what factors influence the design of the GCF stakeholder ar-
rangement and how it affects the possibility of different stakeholders to engage actively in 
the GCF. The GCF makes a clear commitment to support the active engagement of diverse 
stakeholders.  It is argued that the arrangement actually privileges private sector stakeholders. 
Study 2 examines conflicts around the interpretation of the GCF governing principle trans-
formational change. Some actors in the GCF try to connect transformational change to a 
financialization of the GCF, while others oppose such development. It is argued that finan-
cialization might contradict country ownership, another important principle in the GCF. 
Study 3 investigates the GCF understanding of climate vulnerability. The analysis shows how 
the GCF emphasis on dominant logics such as science and market logics reduce the aspects 
of climate vulnerability that become visible in the GCF, and how the principle of transfor-
mational change is implicated in this. The aspects of vulnerability that become visible in the 
GCF are those that can be managed through calculative logics, while moral and political 
dimensions become invisible. Study 4 explores the inclusion of indigenous peoples in GCF 
through an analysis of the development of the GCF Indigenous Peoples Policy. GCF em-
braces the ‘traditional knowledge’ of indigenous peoples but indigenous peoples find it dif-
ficult to introduce a more holistic view of nature, while western science dominates knowledge 
production. The analysis also shows that the use of this policy in the GCF is limited, despite 
protests from indigenous peoples’ representatives. 
 
 iv 
 Altogether, the studies show that the dominant logics discussed in previous research such as 
science and market logics play a big role in the GCF. What these dominant logics bring for-
ward are aspects of climate finance issues that are manageable through calculative logics, 
while perspectives and interests that are not easily compatible with these logics become sub-
ordinated – often the political dimensions of climate finance governance. This goes against 
the GCF portrayal of itself as an inclusive organization that is responsive to a variety of per-
spectives and interests. 
  
Keywords: global climate governance, climate finance, contradictions, conflicts,  





























Abstract ................................................................................................................................. iii 
List of Studies ....................................................................................................................... vii 
Abbreviations ...................................................................................................................... viii 
Förord [acknowledgements] .................................................................................................. ix 
1. Introduction ........................................................................................................................ 1 
1.2. Aim and research questions ......................................................................................... 3 
2. Global climate finance governance .................................................................................... 4 
3. The case – the Green Climate Fund ................................................................................. 11 
3.1. The rationales for a new fund .................................................................................... 11 
3.2. Green Climate Fund ambitions and aims .................................................................. 13 
3.3. Procedural arrangements ........................................................................................... 13 
3.3.1. The Green Climate Fund and the Conference of the Parties .............................. 14 
3.3.2. The Green Climate Fund Board and Co-chairs .................................................. 15 
3.3.3. The Green Climate Fund Secretariat, sub-units and mechanisms ...................... 16 
3.3.4. Donors and other resource providers .................................................................. 17 
3.3.5. Accredited entities and national designated authorities ..................................... 19 
3.3.6. Accredited observers .......................................................................................... 20 
4. Previous research .............................................................................................................. 21 
4.1. The organization of global climate governance ........................................................ 21 
4.2. Democracy and legitimacy ........................................................................................ 22 
4.3. Public-private-partnership ......................................................................................... 23 
4.4. Relations between the Global South and the Global North ....................................... 24 
4.5. Market logics and the private sector .......................................................................... 25 
4.6. Civil society ............................................................................................................... 25 
4.7. Science and technology ............................................................................................. 26 
4.8. Conceptual ambiguities ............................................................................................. 27 
 
 vi 
4.9. Research on the Green Climate Fund ........................................................................ 27 
4.10. Concluding remarks on previous research .............................................................. 29 
5. Analysing contradictions, ambiguities and conflicts in climate governance ................... 31 
5.1. Overarching framework – immanent critique ........................................................... 31 
5.2. The Green Climate Fund in the light of immanent critique ...................................... 35 
6. Methods and material ....................................................................................................... 40 
6.1. Documents ................................................................................................................. 40 
6.1.1. Green Climate Fund documents ......................................................................... 41 
6.1.2. Transitional Committee documents .................................................................... 42 
6.1.3. Other external documents ................................................................................... 43 
6.2. Interviews .................................................................................................................. 43 
6.3. Analysing data ........................................................................................................... 44 
6.3.1. Coding and interpretation ................................................................................... 45 
7. The studies ........................................................................................................................ 47 
Study I .............................................................................................................................. 47 
Study II ............................................................................................................................. 48 
Study III ............................................................................................................................ 49 
Study IV ........................................................................................................................... 51 
8. Conclusion ........................................................................................................................ 53 
Sammanfattning på svenska [Summary in Swedish] ........................................................... 56 
Appendix A .......................................................................................................................... 65 
Appendix B ........................................................................................................................... 68 













Abstract ........................................................................................................................... iii 
List of Studies ....................................................................................................................... vii 
Abbreviations ...................................................................................................................... viii 
Förord [acknowledgements] .................................................................................................. ix 
1. Introduction ........................................................................................................................ 1 
1.2. Aim and research questions ......................................................................................... 3 
2. Global climate finance governance .................................................................................... 4 
3. The case – the Green Climate Fund ................................................................................. 11 
3.1. The rationales for a new fund .................................................................................... 11 
3.2. Green Climate Fund ambitions and aims .................................................................. 13 
3.3. Procedural arrangements ........................................................................................... 13 
3.3.1. The Green Climate Fund and the Conference of the Parties .............................. 14 
3.3.2. The Green Climate Fund Board and Co-chairs .................................................. 15 
3.3.3. The Green Climate Fund Secretariat, sub-units and mechanisms ...................... 16 
3.3.4. Donors and other resource providers .................................................................. 17 
3.3.5. Accredited entities and national designated authorities ..................................... 19 
3.3.6. Accredited observers .......................................................................................... 20 
4. Previous research .............................................................................................................. 21 
4.1. The organization of global climate governance ........................................................ 21 
4.2. Democracy and legitimacy ........................................................................................ 22 
4.3. Public-private-partnership ......................................................................................... 23 
4.4. Relations between the Global South and the Global North ....................................... 24 
4.5. Market logics and the private sector .......................................................................... 25 
4.6. Civil society ............................................................................................................... 25 
4.7. Science and technology ............................................................................................. 26 





Abstract .... . i
List of Studies . v
Abbrevi tio s ......................  v ii
Förord [acknowledgements]  ix
1. Introduction ............................... 1
1.2. Aim and research questions ..... 3
2 Global climate finance governance . .. 4
3. The case – the Green Climate Fund 
1 Th  rationales for a new fund .................. 1
2 Green Clim te Fund ambitions and aims 
3.3. Procedural arrange ents ............................................................. 3
3.3.1. The Green Climate Fund and the Conference of the Parties .............................. 14 
3.3.2. The Green Climate Fund Board and Co-chairs .................................................. 15 
3.3.3. The Green Climate Fund Secretariat, sub-units and mechanisms ...................... 16 
3.3.4. Donors and other resource providers .................................................................. 17 
3.3.5. Accredited entities and national designated authorities ..................................... 19 
3.3.6. Accredited observers .......................................................................................... 20 
4. Previous research ......................................................
1 The rg niz tion of global climate governance 1
2 Democracy and legitimacy 2
3 Public-priva e-partnership .................................................. 3
4 Relations between t  Global South and the Global North 4
5 Market logics and the private sector 
6 Civil society .................. 5
7 Science and technology 6





stract ..... . 
List of Studies  v
Abbrevi tio s .  v ii
Förord [acknowl dgements]  ix
1 Introdu t on ............................... 1
1.2. Aim and research questions ..... 3
2 Global climate finance governa ce .. 4
3. The case – the Gr en Climate Fu d
1 Th  rationales for a new fund 1
2 Green Clim te Fund ambitions and aims 
3.3. Procedural arrange ents ............................................................. 3
3.3.1. The Green Climate Fund and the Conference of the Parties .............................. 14 
3.3.2. The Green Climate Fund Board and Co-chairs .................................................. 15 
3.3.3. The Green Climate Fund Secretariat, sub-units and mechanisms ...................... 16 
3.3.4. Donors and other resource providers .................................................................. 17 
3.3.5. Accredited entities and national designated authorities ..................................... 19 
3.3.6. Accredited observers .......................................................................................... 20 
4. Previous research ......................
1 The rg niz tion of global climate governance 1
2 D mocracy and legitimacy 2
3 Public-priva e-partnersh p ............... 3
4 Relations between t  Global South and the Global North 4
5 Market logics and the private sector 
6 ivil society .................. 5
7 Science and technology 6






List of Stud es  v
Abbrevi tio s .  v ii
Förord [acknowl dgements]  ix
1 Introdu t on ...............................
1 2 Aim nd res arch questions ... 3
2 Global climate finance governa ce .. 4
3. The case – the G e  Clima e Fu d
1 Th rationales for a new f 1
2 Green Clim te Fund ambitions and aims 
3.3. Procedural arrange ents ............................................................. 3
3.3.1. The Green Climate Fund and the Conference of the Parties .............................. 14 
3.3.2. The Green Climate Fund Board and Co-chairs .................................................. 15 
3.3.3. The Green Climate Fund Secretariat, sub-units and mechanisms ...................... 16 
3.3.4. Donors and other resource providers .................................................................. 17 
3.3.5. Accredited entities and national designated authorities ..................................... 19 
3.3.6. Accredited observers .......................................................................................... 20 
4. Previous research .....................
1 The rg niz tion of global climate governance 1
2 D mocracy and legitimacy 2
3 Public-priva e-partnersh p 3
4 Relations be wee  t  Global South and the Global North 4
5 Mark t logics and the private sector 
6 ivil society .................. 5
7 Science and technology 6





Abstract ................................................................................................................................. iii 
List of Studies ....................................................................................................................... vii 
Abbreviations ...................................................................................................................... viii 
Förord [acknowledgements] .................................................................................................. ix 
1. Introduction ........................................................................................................................ 1 
1.2. Aim and research questions ......................................................................................... 3 
2. Global climate finance governance .................................................................................... 4 
3. The case – the Green Climate Fund ................................................................................. 11 
3.1. The rationales for a new fund .................................................................................... 11 
3.2. Green Climate Fund ambitions and aims .................................................................. 13 
3.3. Procedural arrangements ........................................................................................... 13 
3.3.1. The Green Climate Fund and the Conference of the Parties .............................. 14 
3.3.2. The Green Climate Fund Board and Co-chairs .................................................. 15 
3.3.3. The Green Climate Fund Secretariat, sub-units and mechanisms ...................... 16 
3.3.4. Donors and other resource providers .................................................................. 17 
3.3.5. Accredited entities and national designated authorities ..................................... 19 
3.3.6. Accredited observers .......................................................................................... 20 
4. Previous research .............................................................................................................. 21 
4.1. The organization of global climate governance ........................................................ 21 
4.2. Democracy and legitimacy ........................................................................................ 22 
4.3. Public-private-partnership ......................................................................................... 23 
4.4. Relations between the Global South and the Global North ....................................... 24 
4.5. Market logics and the private sector .......................................................................... 25 
4.6. Civil society ............................................................................................................... 25 
4.7. Science and technology ............................................................................................. 26 
4.8. Conceptual ambiguities ............................................................................................. 27 
 
 vi 
4.9. Research on the Green Climate Fund ........................................................................ 27 
4.10. Concluding remarks on previous research .............................................................. 29 
5. Analysing contradictions, ambiguities and conflicts in climate governance ................... 31 
5.1. Overarching framework – immanent critique ........................................................... 31 
5.2. The Green Climate Fund in the light of immanent critique ...................................... 35 
6. Methods and material ....................................................................................................... 40 
6.1. Documents ................................................................................................................. 40 
6.1.1. Green Climate Fund documents ......................................................................... 41 
6.1.2. Transitional Committee documents .................................................................... 42 
6.1.3. Other external documents ................................................................................... 43 
6.2. Interviews .................................................................................................................. 43 
6.3. Analysing data ........................................................................................................... 44 
6.3.1. Coding and interpretation ................................................................................... 45 
7. The studies ........................................................................................................................ 47 
Study I .............................................................................................................................. 47 
Study II ............................................................................................................................. 48 
Study III ............................................................................................................................ 49 
Study IV ........................................................................................................................... 51 
8. Conclusion ........................................................................................................................ 53 
Sammanfattning på svenska [Summary in Swedish] ........................................................... 56 
Appendix A .......................................................................................................................... 65 
Appendix B ........................................................................................................................... 68 








List of Studies 
 
Study I 
Bertilsson, J. (Manuscript). Organising stakeholder involvement in global climate govern-
ance: the effects of resource dependencies and institutional logics in the Green Climate Fund. 
(revised and re-submitted to Environmental Values) 
 
Study II 
Bertilsson, J., & Thörn, H. (2021). Discourses on transformational change and paradigm shift 
in the Green Climate Fund: the divide over financialization and country ownership. Environ-
mental Politics, 30 (3), 423-441. 
 
Study III 
Bertilsson, J. (Manuscript). Managing vulnerability in the Green Climate Fund (submitted to 
Climate and Development) 
 
Study IV 
Bertilsson, J. & Soneryd, L. (Manuscript). Indigenous peoples and inclusion in the Green 



















CO2  Carbon dioxide  
COP  Conference of the Parties 
CSO  Civil society organizations 
GEF  Global Environment Facility 
IPCC  Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change 
IPP   Indigenous Peoples Policy 
NDA  National designated authority 
ODA  Official development assistance 
OECD  Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development  
PPP  Public-private-partnership 
UNDP  United Nations Development Programme 
UNEP  United Nations Environment Programme 
UNFCCC United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change 





















List of Studies 
 
Study I 
Bertilsson, J. (Manuscript). Organising stakeholder involvement in global climate govern-
ance: the effects of resource dependencies and institutional logics in the Green Climate Fund. 
(revised and re-submitted to Environmental Values) 
 
Study II 
Bertilsson, J., & Thörn, H. (2021). Discourses on transformational change and paradigm shift 
in the Green Climate Fund: the divide over financialization and country ownership. Environ-
mental Politics, 30 (3), 423-441. 
 
Study III 
Bertilsson, J. (Manuscript). Managing vulnerability in the Green Climate Fund (submitted to 
Climate and Development) 
 
Study IV 
Bertilsson, J. & Soneryd, L. (Manuscript). Indigenous peoples and inclusion in the Green 



















CO2  Carbon dioxide  
COP  Conference of the Parties 
CSO  Civil society organizations 
GEF  Global Environment Facility 
IPCC  Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change 
IPP   Indigenous Peoples Policy 
NDA  National designated authority 
ODA  Official development assistance 
OECD  Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development  
PPP  Public-private-partnership 
UNDP  United Nations Development Programme 
UNEP  United Nations Environment Programme 
UNFCCC United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change 























Att skriva en avhandling är en utmaning och att ta mig genom den här resan hade självklart 
varit omöjlig utan alla människor som funnits runt mig, både i anknytning till avhandlings-
arbetet och vid sidan av.  Jag vill börja med att tacka mina handledare, Håkan Thörn och 
Linda Soneryd. Håkan, du har handlett mig ända sedan min masteruppsats och din vilja att 
göra saker ännu lite bättre har drivit på mitt arbete och hjälpt mig att utvecklas. Linda, du har 
lärt mig vikten av god planering och hur man får saker gjorda. Jag är inte på din nivå än men 
jag lär mig så sakteliga. Jag vill tacka er båda för det stöd ni gett mig, framförallt under det 
sista året som varit intensivt, och jag tackar för ert tålamod när jag ibland gett mig ut på 
irrfärder.  
  Jag vill tacka de personer som kommenterat på avhandlingsarbetet under dess olika sta-
dier och som alla bidragit med konstruktiva förslag. Jag vill tacka Mattias Wahlström och 
Doris Lydahl som kommenterade mitt PM, jag vill tacka Göran Sundqvist som var kommen-
tator på mitt-seminariet och jag vill tacka Kerstin Jacobsson och Monika Berg som var kom-
mentatorer på slutseminariet. Jag vill också rikta ett allmänt tack till alla andra kollegor som 
på olika sätt och i olika sammanhang bidragit till att ge näring åt mina tankar. Det är i dessa 
utbyten med kollegor som vi växer. I detta sammanhang vill jag också passa på att tacka 
doktorandkollektivet. Att dela erfarenheter med en grupp människor som genomgår samma 
sak har varit ett stort stöd och samvaron vid gemensamma kurser, doktorandinternat och 
andra informella träffar har gett mig många roliga minnen. Jag kommer sakna det. 
  Jag vill tacka de personer i olika formella positioner på institutionen som hjälpt mig lösa 
de utmaningar som uppstått under vägen, framförallt Anna Peixoto och Cecilia Hansen 
Löfstrand vars stöd har betytt mycket. Jag vill också tacka all administrativ personal som ser 
till att min och andras tillvaro på institutionen fungerar varje dag. 
       Jag vill tacka för det stöd jag fått från olika stiftelser, vilket har varit väldigt betydelse-
fullt i genomförandet av avhandlingsarbetet. Det gäller stipendier från Adlerbertska Stipen-
diestiftelsen, Forskraftstiftelsen Theodor Adelswärds minne, samt Kungliga och Hvitfeldtska 
stiftelsen.  





Jonas Bertilsson,  




    1 
1. Introduction 
 
I was sitting in a lounge area at COP 24, the UNFCCC (United Nations Framework Conven-
tion on Climate Change) climate meeting in Katowice in December 2018, overhearing two 
people next to me discussing their experiences of the meeting so far. One of them said, and I 
am paraphrasing: it is peculiar, so many people, so many events, and still so little being done. 
This statement is telling and encapsulates what many participants experience at these annual 
climate meetings. However, this ineffectiveness if you like must be understood in relation to 
the complexity of the issue. It is argued that the particular problem structure of climate change 
makes it “one of the most ‘wicked’ problems of world politics today” (Biermann, 2015, p. 
516). The stakes are high for nation states as it challenges inter alia economic systems, de-
velopment and food production. The high costs of managing climate change lead to conflicts 
over burden-sharing and other distributive issues: who is most responsible, who will pay, 
who needs resources the most, will the resources come from public or private sources, what 
should the resources be spent on etc. These tensions and conflicts have made the “global 
climate regime tedious and fragile” (Biermann, 2015, p. 516).  
Global climate governance is obviously characterized by many contentious issues that 
are difficult to agree on (Roberts & Weikmans, 2017). This is particularly noticeable in cli-
mate meetings arranged by the UNFCCC. The climate organizations mandated by the UN-
FCCC to manage climate issues, such as the climate funds that are the focus of this thesis, 
are still expected to operationalize climate actions in a satisfying way (Feist, 2017; Graham 
& Thompson, 2015; Hall, 2017) while facing the contradictions and conflicts that underlie 
these contentious issues. Tensions may also increase with rising demands, especially from 
the Global South and civil society organizations, for a more inclusive form of governance 
that recognizes different perspectives and experiences in the development and execution of 
climate actions. These demands originate from negative experiences of top-down governance 
by major development organizations such as the World Bank and the International Monetary 
Fund, which to a large degree dictated what actions were deemed necessary in the so-called 
developing countries. The expansion and recognition of more perspectives and experiences 
are potentially accompanied by more contradictions, ambiguities and conflicts that affect the 
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by major development organizations such as the World Bank and the International Monetary 
Fund, which to a large degree dictated what actions were deemed necessary in the so-called 
developing countries. The expansion and recognition of more perspectives and experiences 
are potentially accompanied by more contradictions, ambiguities and conflicts that affect the 
work of climate organizations.    
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The existence of contradictions, ambiguities and conflicts does not mean that everything 
floats. The operationalization of climate funds still slowly materializes in working papers, 
working groups, decision basis, guidelines, templates, and practices. What will guide this 
operationalization and what aspects should be emphasized in climate finance governance are 
not objectively stated, e.g., aspects emphasized by developed and developing countries are 
not always compatible with each other (Feist, 2017). This means that some aspects will be 
prioritized and others subordinated in operationalization processes. However, this is usually 
not made explicit as it would reveal the power relations shaping these prioritizations and it 
could jeopardize the support of the many different actors that are involved in this complex 
and fragmented climate governance (Pattberg & Zelli, 2015). The often implicit ‘negotia-
tions’ about which aspects are more important are situated in a context where an existing 
climate agreement or governing framework is to be operationalized, which means that actors 
take on a more technical role, making the contentiousness of climate issues invisible. Feist 
describes this phenomenon in relation to the Green Climate Fund (GCF): “The COP [Con-
ference of the Parties] gave general guidance, but highly consequential decisions were still 
to be taken at the Board meetings” (2017, p. 97) and “despite the outwardly technical nature 
of the GCF negotiations – tasked with the Fund’s operationalization – the issues actually 
discussed were inherently political” (2017, p. 60). The postponing of politically sensitive 
issues may also continue within these organizations and create an ongoing conflict, even 
though it is not always clearly visible (Bracking, 2015; Bruun, 2017). Feist argues that “In-
stead, actors are assumed to consciously or unconsciously rationalize policies that are aligned 
with their interests and ideas by bolstering them with knowledge and lessons” (2017, p. 30). 
This may be understood as depoliticized strategic action where “Politics wears the mask of 
knowledge” (Torgerson, 1986, p. 39, cited in Feist, 2017, p. 31).  
Building on these insights, this thesis examines which aspects get highlighted, and which 
aspects become subordinated in the operationalizations of the Green Climate Fund; what po-
litical dimensions these aspects carry; the role of power relations in shaping the operational-
izations; and who benefits and who loses from this? What this thesis contributes are not spe-
cific ways to solve conflicts, rather it is a contribution to the question of how to make them 
explicit. It is about making the contradictions and conflicts, and the political aspects of these 
contradictions and conflicts, visible in governance processes that appear to ‘just happen’, 
almost imperceptibly through small operational steps, which nevertheless ultimately result in 
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a governance complex that affects the living conditions of numerous people in the Global 
South.  
Through analyses of the GCF, it is also possible to say something about global climate 
governance in general. What patterns in global climate governance are produced, reproduced, 
or challenged in the GCF through the management of contradictions and conflicts in the op-
erationalization of the fund? The reliance on dominant logics such as science & technology 
and market logics are well known and often discussed in research and in the general debate 
around global climate governance. Developments toward more inclusive governance that 
recognizes other perspectives and experiences is another important debate. Climate funds are 
central to climate change actions and climate funds will most definitely influence and be 
influenced by global climate governance structures, as is also discussed in the thesis. 
 
1.2. Aim and research questions 
The aim is to analyse the making of global climate finance governance and to make visible 
the tensions and conflicts related to these processes. More specifically the aim is to examine 
how the GCF handles tensions and conflicts in the management of various issues in the GCF, 
and what structural patterns the GCF is producing, reproducing, or challenging in global cli-
mate governance through these processes. 
 
The overarching research questions are: 1) What contradictions, ambiguities and conflicts 
can be identified in the GCF? 2) How are contradictions, ambiguities, and conflicts managed 
by the GCF? 3) How does this management shape the representation of issues in the GCF; 
what aspects become prominent or subordinated?  
 
To clarify, I understand contradictions as things which are logically incoherent. Ambiguity 
refers to different interpretations and portrayals of a phenomena, e.g., an ambiguous concept 
can be experienced as unclear or fuzzy. Conflicts in this thesis are both those conflicts that 
precede the GCF, e.g., conflicts of interest between the Global North and the Global South 
regarding climate management, and conflicts that may appear as a result of such attempts to 




The Governance of Global Climate Finance 
 2  
The existence of contradictions, ambiguities and conflicts does not mean that everything 
floats. The operationalization of climate funds still slowly materializes in working papers, 
working groups, decision basis, guidelines, templates, and practices. What will guide this 
operationalization and what aspects should be emphasized in climate finance governance are 
not objectively stated, e.g., aspects emphasized by developed and developing countries are 
not always compatible with each other (Feist, 2017). This means that some aspects will be 
prioritized and others subordinated in operationalization processes. However, this is usually 
not made explicit as it would reveal the power relations shaping these prioritizations and it 
could jeopardize the support of the many different actors that are involved in this complex 
and fragmented climate governance (Pattberg & Zelli, 2015). The often implicit ‘negotia-
tions’ about which aspects are more important are situated in a context where an existing 
climate agreement or governing framework is to be operationalized, which means that actors 
take on a more technical role, making the contentiousness of climate issues invisible. Feist 
describes this phenomenon in relation to the Green Climate Fund (GCF): “The COP [Con-
ference of the Parties] gave general guidance, but highly consequential decisions were still 
to be taken at the Board meetings” (2017, p. 97) and “despite the outwardly technical nature 
of the GCF negotiations – tasked with the Fund’s operationalization – the issues actually 
discussed were inherently political” (2017, p. 60). The postponing of politically sensitive 
issues may also continue within these organizations and create an ongoing conflict, even 
though it is not always clearly visible (Bracking, 2015; Bruun, 2017). Feist argues that “In-
stead, actors are assumed to consciously or unconsciously rationalize policies that are aligned 
with their interests and ideas by bolstering them with knowledge and lessons” (2017, p. 30). 
This may be understood as depoliticized strategic action where “Politics wears the mask of 
knowledge” (Torgerson, 1986, p. 39, cited in Feist, 2017, p. 31).  
Building on these insights, this thesis examines which aspects get highlighted, and which 
aspects become subordinated in the operationalizations of the Green Climate Fund; what po-
litical dimensions these aspects carry; the role of power relations in shaping the operational-
izations; and who benefits and who loses from this? What this thesis contributes are not spe-
cific ways to solve conflicts, rather it is a contribution to the question of how to make them 
explicit. It is about making the contradictions and conflicts, and the political aspects of these 
contradictions and conflicts, visible in governance processes that appear to ‘just happen’, 
almost imperceptibly through small operational steps, which nevertheless ultimately result in 
Introduction 
    3 
a governance complex that affects the living conditions of numerous people in the Global 
South.  
Through analyses of the GCF, it is also possible to say something about global climate 
governance in general. What patterns in global climate governance are produced, reproduced, 
or challenged in the GCF through the management of contradictions and conflicts in the op-
erationalization of the fund? The reliance on dominant logics such as science & technology 
and market logics are well known and often discussed in research and in the general debate 
around global climate governance. Developments toward more inclusive governance that 
recognizes other perspectives and experiences is another important debate. Climate funds are 
central to climate change actions and climate funds will most definitely influence and be 
influenced by global climate governance structures, as is also discussed in the thesis. 
 
1.2. Aim and research questions 
The aim is to analyse the making of global climate finance governance and to make visible 
the tensions and conflicts related to these processes. More specifically the aim is to examine 
how the GCF handles tensions and conflicts in the management of various issues in the GCF, 
and what structural patterns the GCF is producing, reproducing, or challenging in global cli-
mate governance through these processes. 
 
The overarching research questions are: 1) What contradictions, ambiguities and conflicts 
can be identified in the GCF? 2) How are contradictions, ambiguities, and conflicts managed 
by the GCF? 3) How does this management shape the representation of issues in the GCF; 
what aspects become prominent or subordinated?  
 
To clarify, I understand contradictions as things which are logically incoherent. Ambiguity 
refers to different interpretations and portrayals of a phenomena, e.g., an ambiguous concept 
can be experienced as unclear or fuzzy. Conflicts in this thesis are both those conflicts that 
precede the GCF, e.g., conflicts of interest between the Global North and the Global South 
regarding climate management, and conflicts that may appear as a result of such attempts to 




Global climate finance governance 
 4  
2. Global climate finance governance 
 
This section will give a contextualization of the global climate finance governance field: the 
development of climate change as a global concern; the institutionalization of multilateral 
cooperation on climate change; the development of financial mechanisms as a central part of 
global climate governance; and some general debates and conflicts around global climate 
finance governance. 
Since the late 1800s scientists have understood the relationship between levels of carbon 
dioxide (CO2) in the atmosphere and the temperature. However, it was not until the mid-
1950s that atmospheric scientists began making more systematic measurements of CO2 in the 
atmosphere, which was driven both by the “peculiarities of atmospheric science as a Cold 
War pursuit” with the aim of controlling the atmosphere (Howe, 2014, p. 45), and the devel-
opment of more sensitive measuring instruments. Scientists were not necessarily driven by 
the geopolitical concerns of the Cold War but utilized these anxieties to finance their research 
(Howe, 2014). 
New measuring instruments were developed e.g., by David Keeling who was hired by 
Roger Revelle, an oceanographer, to investigate interactions between oceans and the atmos-
phere. Keeling started his work in 1957 and noticed quite early on an annual rise of CO2 
levels in the atmosphere, which he presented in a report in 1960 (the Keeling curve) (Howe, 
2014, foreword by William Cronon). By 1963, Keeling framed this as an environmental prob-
lem by making connections between CO2 accumulation in the atmosphere and the growing 
concern over pollution, also addressed by marine biologist Rachel Carson in her text Silent 
Spring, an exposé (2002 [1962]), a text which articulated a rising critique against the pro-
posed scientific and technological advancements of modernity (Howe, 2014).  
During the 1970s, more evidence was building up on the connection between increasing 
CO2 levels and the use of fossil energy. It became clear that the CO2 added by human actions 
was accumulating in the atmosphere (Nisbet, 2007). A climate conference organized by the 
World Meteorological Organization (WMO) in 1979 stated that it was plausible that increas-
ing levels of CO2 in the atmosphere will lead to gradual warming and that the effects of this 
could be detectable before the end of the century (Gupta, 2014). The message sent was that 
states must urgently prevent anthropogenic changes to the climate.  
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This WMO event can be seen as the start of global climate governance. In the 1980s several 
conferences were held to discuss the problem. One issue was how much certainty would be 
required before taking collective action on a global level. To provide facts about climate 
change the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) was established by the 
United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP) and the WMO in 1988, thus institutional-
izing global scientific collaboration on climate change (Gupta, 2014; IPCC, 2021). In several 
multilateral conferences and declarations that followed during the late 1980s it was recog-
nized that environmental problems were the result of the industrial patterns of developed 
countries. This attribution of responsibility was not only connected with reducing the emis-
sions of developed countries but also to assist developing countries with limited resources to 
manage climate change effects. The Noordwijk declaration of 1989 encouraged governments 
and international institutions to develop international funding mechanisms to provide new 
and additional resources to developing countries, i.e., resources on top of existing official 
development assistance (ODA) (Gupta, 2014).  
One key event in the development of global climate governance was the establishment 
of the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) in 1992. The 
convention is now a central hub of global climate governance with 197 Parties connected 
with the Convention (UNFCCC, 2021b). It is the UNFCCC that hosts the annual climate 
meetings, the so-called COP meetings. The Convention of 1992 further emphasized the need 
for support to developing countries, and stated: “The developed country Parties and other 
developed Parties included in Annex II shall also assist the developing country Parties that 
are particularly vulnerable to the adverse effects of climate change in meeting costs of adap-
tation to those adverse effects”. (UNFCCC, 1992, art. 4 para. 4). According to the Conven-
tion, this required that developed countries would provide new and additional financial re-
sources and transfer technology to developing countries (UNFCCC, 1992). This is also artic-
ulated in the often-mentioned principle of “common but differentiated responsibilities and 
respective capabilities” (UNFCCC, 1992 art. 3 para. 1). It was decided that the Global Envi-
ronment Facility (GEF) was going to be the interim financial mechanism, or the fund, of the 
UNFCCC. GEF was initiated in 1990 as a pilot programme to assist developing countries 
with environmentally sustainable development (Global Environment Facility, 2021; World 
Bank, 2021) and was managed by the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), the 
United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP), and the World Bank, (Global Environ-
ment Facility, 2021; Gupta, 2014). 
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Over the years there has been a proliferation of climate funds and the funds mentioned below 
are examples and far from a full list. According to Román et al. (2017) there are around 100 
international public funds. Apart from the GEF, there are now additional funds within the 
UNFCCC, such as the Adaptation Fund, the Least Developed Countries Fund, the Special 
Climate Change Fund and the latest addition, the Green Climate Fund. Outside of the UN-
FCCC there are several other funds, such as Climate Investment Funds administered by the 
World Bank, including the Clean Technology Fund and the Strategic Climate Fund. Within 
the World Bank Group there are also the Forest Carbon Partnership Facility and the Partner-
ship for Market Readiness. There are regional multilateral development bank funds as well. 
The African Development Bank administers the Congo Basin Forest Fund and the Africa 
Climate Change Fund, and finally the European Investment Bank has the EU Global Energy 
Efficiency and Renewable Energy Fund (Nakhooda et al., 2015). The upside of this prolifer-
ation is described as giving more options for developing countries to find appropriate climate 
finance sources (Gomez-Echeverri, 2013) and more possibilities for donors to find suitable 
projects, which could increase financial contributions (Román et al., 2017). The downside is 
described as an increasing complexity with a multiplicity of requirements and demands im-
posed on developing countries applying for climate support. This could challenge their bu-
reaucratic capacity and their chances to obtain financial resources (Román et al., 2017; 
Schalatek, 2012). The complexity may also impact on the transparency and accountability of 
public funding flows (Khan et al., 2020; Roberts & Weikmans, 2017). It makes it difficult 
for actors in both donor and recipient countries to have a say about the way funding is “raised, 
governed, allocated and implemented” (Schalatek, 2012, p. 953). Some see the GCF as an 
attempt to centralize global climate finance under the UNFCCC and that the GCF will be-
come the main channel for the distribution of public climate finance (Nakhooda et al., 2015). 
The sheer number of funds does not guarantee the transfer of sufficient resources to de-
veloping countries. There are several issues relating to the mobilization and allocation of 
resources, over which developed and developing countries often have different views. One 
is the balance between mitigation, i.e., actions aimed to reduce CO2 emissions, such as the 
development of energy-efficient technology, and adaptation, which are actions aimed at re-
ducing vulnerability to climate change effects, e.g., strategies to cope with drought. Initially, 
the ultimate objective for the IPCC (Dzebo & Stripple, 2015) and the UNFCCC was to “pre-
vent dangerous anthropogenic interference with the climate system” (UNFCCC, 1992, art. 
2), which meant a focus on mitigation actions. The focus on mitigation was also reflected in 
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early GEF allocations (Gupta, 2014). Mitigation is sometimes described as a global public 
good, whereas adaptation is considered a ‘local’ benefit for developing countries (Brechin & 
Espinoza, 2017; Graham & Thompson, 2015; Markandya et al., 2017). This description is 
obviously based on the interests of developed countries. By emphasizing mitigation in devel-
oping countries, developed countries decrease the pressure on themselves to mitigate their 
own emissions. Developing countries on the other hand are more interested in adaptation 
actions and since the mid-1990s have pushed for more adaptation support from developed 
countries (Brechin & Espinoza, 2017; Graham & Thompson, 2014; Khan et al., 2020). In 
later years there has been a greater commitment in the global climate regime towards adap-
tation, which is reflected in the development of funds targeting adaptation, such as the Ad-
aptation Fund and the Green Climate Fund (Hall, 2017) which is committed to a 50:50 divide 
between mitigation and adaptation. The Paris agreement (UNFCCC, 2015) has somewhat 
ambiguous articulations. The agreement recognizes the importance of adaptation but it also 
states that “the current need for adaptation is significant and that greater levels of mitigation 
can reduce the need for additional adaptation efforts” (UNFCCC, 2015, art. 7 para. 4). 
What counts as climate finance and what is new and additional resources for developing 
countries is another contentious issue. Developing countries want to make sure that there are 
new and additional resources coming from developed countries, on top of existing develop-
ment assistance. The UNFCCC guidelines on reporting climate finance transfers to develop-
ing countries give developed countries considerable freedom to choose accounting practices 
(Roberts & Weikmans, 2017). Some discuss how developed countries may simply relabel 
their ODA as climate finance (Ciplet et al., 2018; Steckel et al., 2017). As an example of this 
conflict, a report by the OECD claimed that developing countries transferred USD 62 billion 
in climate finance in 2014, while an Indian report argued that only USD 2.2 billion was ac-
tually new and additional climate support (Khan et al., 2020; Roberts & Weikmans, 2017). 
Double counting of the same money is an ongoing problem according to Khan et al. (2020). 
The ease of access to climate finance resources versus conditionalities or limiting allo-
cation criteria is a sensitive matter (Prys & Wojczewski, 2015). Present climate finance in-
stitutions often emphasize country ownership, i.e., how climate organizations should be re-
sponsive to the needs articulated by developing countries themselves (Nakhooda et al., 2015; 
UNFCCC, 2015; Urpelainen, 2012). This is a response to the experiences of development 
politics in the Global South that often positioned these countries in the back seat of their own 
development (Khan et al., 2020), often ‘guided’ by organizations such as the World Bank 
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and the International Monetary Fund. One way to enhance the voice of actors in the Global 
South has been to secure balanced representation in climate funds, such as the Green Climate 
Fund, which has 24 board members, equally representing developed and developing coun-
tries (Green Climate Fund, 2011). Another way to strengthen country ownership has been 
through direct access, which the Adaptation Fund introduced and the Green Climate Fund 
now also uses. Direct access means that national entities in developing countries can apply 
for funding directly from climate funds without having to go through international interme-
diary entities such as multilateral development banks or other UN organizations, as is often 
the case with development aid. However, direct access does not necessarily mean less con-
ditionality. According to some research, donor countries and global climate organizations 
have continued to demand ‘good performance’ or ‘good governance’ from developing coun-
tries (Gomez-Echeverri, 2013) but what counts as good performance has been debated. De-
veloping countries “have argued that conditionalities and performance requirements are both 
inequitable and burdensome” (Urpelainen, 2012, p. 14, see also Schulz & Feist, 2020).  
Another matter of concern is what financial sources should be utilized to mobilize the 
resources needed to support countries in the Global South. It is a discussion about what role 
public and/or private sector resources can and should have in financing climate actions. The 
UNFCCC convention of 1992 describes “A mechanism for the provision of financial re-
sources on a grant or concessional basis” (UNFCCC, 1992, art. 11 para. 1), which implies 
public funding as the major source. The Paris Agreement (2015) describes a mixture of 
sources. The agreement declares that Parties should mobilize finance “from a wide variety of 
sources”, but it also notes “the significant role of public funds”, and considers “the need for 
public and grant-based resources for adaptation” (UNFCCC, 2015, art. 9 para. 3–4). Gupta 
(2014) argues that it became increasingly clear in the 2000s that developed countries would 
not, or could not, contribute any significant new and additional resources, and there were 
hopes that the market could fill the funding gap. Developed countries have emphasized the 
private sector more than developing or transitionary countries, which instead have empha-
sized public funding (Feist, 2017; Prys & Wojczewski, 2015; Schalatek, 2012). Nevertheless, 
the private sector is now more or less institutionalized in global climate finance governance, 
as exemplified by the Green Climate Fund and its Private Sector Facility sub-unit, which was 
strongly called for by developed countries in the design of the Green Climate Fund (Pauw, 
2017). Public funding in the GCF is to be used more as a catalyst to incentivize private sector 
investments (Cui & Huang, 2017; Gomez-Echeverri, 2013). There are some concerns 
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regarding this development. One is the funding of adaptation actions which are more difficult 
to make profitable compared to mitigation actions (Betzold & Weiler, 2018; C. Clapp & 
Pillay, 2017; Pauw, 2017). According to Román et al. “Private finance has focused almost 
entirely on mitigation projects in emerging countries” (2017, p. 25, see also Pauw, 2017), 
while adaption funding from mainly public sources has been limited. It is argued that low-
income countries “where adaptation needs are concentrated and mitigation potential is low, 
have problems to access climate finance” (Román et al., 2017, p. 25). There is also a concern 
that markets cannot provide for all the needs in developing countries. A civil society organi-
zation (CSO) representative argues that CSOs’ emphasis on profitability “fails to capture 
such intangible benefits as reduced vulnerability, improved social cohesion, conflict preven-
tion and better future development prospects […] so public investment is essential to improv-
ing the quality of finance and giving priority to the poorest people” (Schalatek, 2012, p. 955). 
At the time of writing, the COP26 climate meeting in Glasgow has just ended and the prob-
lems surrounding the mobilization of resources is once again made visible. The UNFCCC 
writes on long-term finance (2021e, para. 4):  
 
The Conference of the Parties […] Notes with serious concern the gap in relation 
to the fulfilment of the goal of developed country Parties to mobilize jointly USD 
100 billion per year by 2020, including due to challenges in mobilizing finance 
from private sources; 
 
This introduction ends with some numbers presented in the literature about estimates of cli-
mate finance needs, climate pledges and climate finance flows. There are significant uncer-
tainties around these figures but they can still provide some insights on the amount of re-
sources needed. Fankhauser et al. (2016) argue that the main studies suggest a range of USD 
180–540 billion annually between 2010 and 2030 for mitigation actions in developing coun-
tries. Hall (2017) presents a couple of different ranges for mitigation: USD 175–565 billion 
in 2030 or USD 50–625 billion in 2030. Dzebo & Stripple (2015) make references to a World 
Bank estimation of adaptation costs. It ranges between USD 70–100 billion per year between 
2010 and 2050. Fankhauser at al. (2016) describe adaptation-related investments in the range 
of USD 60–100 billion per year by 2030. Román et al. (2017) refer to a United Nations esti-
mate of adaptation costs, ranging between USD 17–100 billion. Another estimation from 
UNEP talks about adaptation costs between USD 140–300 billion per year by 2030 and USD 
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and the International Monetary Fund. One way to enhance the voice of actors in the Global 
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280–500 billion per year by 2050 (Khan et al., 2020). One can compare this with official 
development assistance in 2017 which was USD 120 billion (Hall, 2017).  
At the Copenhagen and Cancún climate conferences in 2009 and 2010, developed coun-
tries pledged almost USD 30 billion as ‘fast start finance’ to developing countries from 2010–
2012 and then USD 100 billion a year by 2020, from a variety of sources (Schalatek, 2012). 
This was also confirmed later at the Paris conference in 2015 (Román et al., 2017). Some 
argue these numbers are too low if they are intended to cover both mitigation and adaptation 
actions, and they are probably more a reflection of what was politically feasible than based 
on estimated needs (Román et al., 2017; Schalatek, 2012). There are challenges in tracking 
actual climate finance flows, especially from the private sector. Data must be compiled from 
different sources, using different timelines and methodologies and different actors use differ-
ent definitions of terms (Román et al., 2017; Ciplet et al., 2018). There are some figures 
though. Román et al. (2017) present public funding flows of USD 35–49 billion per year 
between 2011–2012 and USD 37.9–43.5 billion yearly between 2013–2014. These figures 
are obviously far from the estimated needs described above. Fankhauser et al. (2016) refer to 
climate investments in non-OECD countries which have varied over the past two years (from 
the time of writing of their article) between USD 165–180 billion per year, from both public 
and private investments (mostly from private sources). Ninety percent is devoted to mitiga-
tion and most transfers were between developing countries themselves. Transfers from de-
veloped to developing countries comprised less than 12 percent of non-OECD investments 










The case – the Green Climate Fund 
 11  
 
3. The case – the Green Climate Fund 
 
The GCF is part of the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UN-
FCCC) and was established at the climate meeting in Cancún in 2010 (COP16). However, it 
did not become fully operational until 2015 when the fund approved its first set of climate 
projects. At the time of writing the GCF has approved 181 climate projects in total1 (see 
Appendix B). Its mission is to provide developing countries with climate finance for both 
mitigation and adaptation projects, and to support developing countries in mobilizing private 
sector resources for climate projects. All parties to the UNFCCC that are categorized as de-
veloping countries can receive funding and support from the GCF (Green Climate Fund, 
2011, para. 35).  
Although it is a relatively new organization, the GCF has become one of the major fi-
nancial mechanisms of the UNFCCC and is now the largest climate fund in terms of pledges 
(Heinrich Böll Stiftung, 2020). Due to its central position in global climate governance 
(Mathy & Blanchard, 2016) and the amount of resources it mobilizes and redistributes, it is 
a powerful actor with the potential to achieve structural changes across scales. The GCF 
states that it seeks to become a centre of excellence in climate finance (Green Climate Fund, 
2020b), that it focuses on “being a global thought leader and a climate policy influencer”, 
and aims to “consolidat[e] the Fund’s role as the centre of gravity for climate finance over 
the coming decade” (Green Climate Fund, 2019a, para. 29a, 140). The GCF will most likely 
play a big role in the management of climate change in the years to come and is thus an 
importance actor to examine. 
 
3.1. The rationales for a new fund 
Divergent interests are often a reason for the creation of new institutions (Gómez-Mera et al., 
2020) and the GCF is one example of this. The GCF is one of the later additions to the global 
climate finance governance structure and various reasons are proposed in the literature as to 
why the GCF was established. As mentioned in section 2 above, global climate governance 
was predominantly occupied with mitigation actions in the early years (Chaudhury, 2020) 
but through increasing demands from the Global South, the need for mobilizing adaptation 
 
1 Including projects developed through the Simplified Approval Process (Green Climate Fund, 2021d) 
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1 Including projects developed through the Simplified Approval Process (Green Climate Fund, 2021d) 
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finance gained recognition in the UNFCCC. The GCF commitment to split funding evenly 
between mitigation and adaptation can be seen as a response to this demand (Seo, 2017) and 
the need to build trust between developed and developing countries in climate negotiations 
(Hourcade et al., 2015). Although developed countries wanted to show they were responsive 
to the needs of the Global South, the 50:50 split was also a way to engage developing coun-
tries in mitigation actions so that mitigation was not only the responsibility of developed 
countries (Cui et al., 2014).  
Another matter concerned relations of power between donors and recipient countries. 
Countries in the Global South and civil society organizations siding with the Global South 
criticized the existing climate finance structure, e.g., the Global Environment Facility (GEF) 
(Bruun, 2017; Graham & Serdaru, 2020), for reproducing unequal power relations between 
the Global North and the Global South, characterized by a similar top-down governance as 
found in major development aid organizations, often exemplified by the World Bank and the 
International Monetary Fund. Under this regime, “donors expect to control project selection 
and demand efficient management and measurable results in return for contributions” (Gra-
ham & Serdaru, 2020, p. 687). Weighted votes are sometimes used in such organizations, 
where the biggest contributors, often wealthy countries, are granted more control over the 
way that resources are used in recipient countries (Graham & Serdaru, 2020). Countries in 
the Global South on the other hand do not see climate finance as aid or charity but as repara-
tions for harm done by developed countries, due to their responsibility in causing climate 
change (Prys & Wojczewski, 2015). From this perspective, developed states have “little right 
to dictate their use [the climate finance resources]” (Graham & Serdaru, 2020, p. 687). The 
principle of country ownership was used by CSOs and actors in the Global South to argue 
for a shift in decision-making power between donors and recipient countries (Bruun, 2017; 
Chaudhury, 2020). The principle is that countries in the Global South understand their own 
needs better than global organizations and should therefore own the process of articulating 
these needs and how to meet them. Again, to overcome conflicts and to build trust between 
the Global North and the Global South, the GCF was designed to increase country ownership 
by applying equal votes for board member representatives from developed and developing 
countries and, as mentioned above, by enhancing direct access (Chaudhury, 2020). 
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3.2. Green Climate Fund ambitions and aims 
The Green Climate Fund has an ambitious agenda which seems responsive to a variety of 
actors and their interests. According to the GCF, the fund provides businesses with an oppor-
tunity to capitalize on new economic growth areas following climate change, while protecting 
the planet at the same time (Green Climate Fund, 2021b); the GCF fosters “unprecedented 
coalitions between private investors, development agencies and civil society organizations to 
achieve transformative change and support harmonization of standards and practices” (Green 
Climate Fund, 2021b); the fund embraces the principle of country ownership and provides 
capacity-building support to enable a country-driven approach in which “developing coun-
tries lead GCF programming and implementation” (Green Climate Fund, 2021b); it embraces 
an inclusive approach whereby stakeholders, including developing countries, accredited en-
tities, advisory groups, and observer organizations participate in the development of strategic 
plans (Green Climate Fund, 2021a); it promotes transformational planning that will “maxim-
ize the co-benefits between mitigation, adaptation and sustainable development”; and the 
GCF enables an active and effective engagement for diverse stakeholders in the GCF (Green 
Climate Fund, 2011, 2021c), including indigenous peoples that “have invaluable and critical 
contributions to make to climate change mitigation and adaptation” (Green Climate Fund, 
2019b). This presents the GCF as an all-embracing organization that pieces together different 
aims, norms, and actors into a coherent and working unit. Coherence among interacting ac-
tors, bringing perspectives on policy objectives that are complementary or potentially syner-
gistic, is considered a desirable state in organizations (Stokke, 2020), as is also reflected in a 
statement from Amerasinghe from the World Resource Institute, arguing that “The GCF is 
under pressure to be everything to everyone” (The Economist, 2016). This thesis shows that 
this self-presentation of the GCF as a unified ‘whole’ does not always correspond to what is 
actually going on, and it questions whether the claims made by the GCF can actually be 
achieved or fully realized. The studies included in this thesis show there are several contra-
dictions, ambiguities and conflicts around the claims presented above. 
 
3.3. Procedural arrangements 
Global climate finance governance organizations are situated in rather complex multi-scale 
arrangements, so to get a better understanding of the GCF the following sub-sections will 
describe how the GCF is organized in connection with the UNFCCC, internally, and in rela-
tion to external actors, which include donors from the Global North, recipient countries in 
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the Global South, the private sector, intermediaries such as GCF-accredited entities located 
at different scales, and accredited observers to the fund. 
 
3.3.1. The Green Climate Fund and the Conference of the Parties 
The United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change was established in 1992 and 
has become one of the central entities in global climate governance. 197 countries have now 
ratified the agreement (UNFCCC, 2021b, 2021d). The Conference of the Parties (COP) is 
the decision-making body of the Convention and meets every year, publicly known as the 
annual climate meetings. One of the main tasks is to make decisions on how to globally 
organize the management of climate change, supported by reports provided by the IPCC. 
Another task is to review the actions taken by Parties to the Convention in relation to the 
decision being taken (IPCC, 2021; UNFCCC, 2021a).  
In the Convention, industrialized countries are considered to have a big responsibility for 
cutting emissions and directing resources to developing countries so they can manage climate 
change effects (UNFCCC, 2021d). To enable the transfer of climate resources, the Conven-
tion established the Financial Mechanism under the UNFCCC, which will serve the climate 
agreement. The entities in the Financial Mechanism are the Global Environment Facility 
(GEF), which was the first entity of the mechanism. Other funds have been developed and 
added later, including the Adaptation Fund, the Special Climate Change Fund, the Least De-
veloped Countries Fund and the GCF. The GCF is now considered the major and central 
entity of the Financial Mechanism (Seo, 2017). In addition, the Standing Committee on Fi-
nance was established to assist the COP in its interaction with the Financial Mechanism (UN-
FCCC, 2021c).  
The COP decides overarching policies, priorities, and criteria for funding in the Financial 
Mechanism, including the general framework for the GCF, called the Governing Instrument 
(Green Climate Fund, 2011). The Governing Instrument (Green Climate Fund, 2011) states 
inter alia that the GCF will promote “the paradigm shift towards low-emission and climate-
resilient development pathways” […] taking into account the needs of those developing 
countries particularly vulnerable to the adverse effects of climate change” (para. 2); that the 
fund will “pursue a country-driven approach […] through effective involvement of relevant 
institutions and stakeholders” (para. 3); that the fund will “provide simplified and improved 
access to funding, including direct access” (para. 31); and that financial inputs will come 
from developed countries in the UNFCCC but also from other public and private sources 
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(para. 29–30). To enable an inflow from private sources the fund will establish a private 
sector facility that promotes the participation of private sector actors in developing countries 
(para. 41, 43).  
The GCF is “accountable to and functions under the guidance of the COP to support pro-
jects, programmes, policies and other activities in developing country Parties” (Green Cli-
mate Fund, 2013a, para. 1, 6). The GCF submits annual reports to the COP that shall include 
inter alia information on the implementation of overarching policy priorities and criteria de-
cided by the COP, information on activities financed by the GCF, how the GCF balances 
between mitigation and adaptation activities, how the GCF works to develop mechanisms for 
using and applying suitable expert and technical advice, information on resource mobiliza-
tion, and reports of the GCF Independent Evaluation Unit (Green Climate Fund, 2013a, para. 
11, 13, 14, 15, 17b, 20). 
 
3.3.2. The Green Climate Fund Board and Co-chairs 
The GCF headquarter is situated in Songdo, Incheon City, Republic of Korea and the GCF 
Board meets approximately three times a year, or at least twice a year. The Board consists of 
24 members: 12 members representing developed countries and 12 members representing 
developing countries. Representatives from developing countries come from different re-
gions: three members from the Asia-Pacific States, three members from the African States, 
three members from the Latin American and Caribbean States, one member from small island 
developing States, one member from least developed country Parties and one member posi-
tion rotating between the regions. The members of the Board are elected by their respective 
constituency and serve for a term of three years, with the possibility to serve additional terms, 
if so decided by their constituency. Two-thirds of the Board must be present at meetings to 
make the proceedings of the meetings valid (Green Climate Fund, 2013c). Decisions should 
preferably be taken by consensus but if this is not achieved after all efforts to reach consensus 
have been exhausted, majority voting can be used: 
 
If at least a four-fifths majority of Board members present and voting vote in fa-
vour of the draft decision, the draft decision shall be considered adopted, unless 
four or more developed country Board members or four or more developing coun-
try Board members vote against it (Green Climate Fund, 2021a, p. 527). 
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If at least a four-fifths majority of Board members present and voting vote in fa-
vour of the draft decision, the draft decision shall be considered adopted, unless 
four or more developed country Board members or four or more developing coun-
try Board members vote against it (Green Climate Fund, 2021a, p. 527). 
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Decisions can be made between meetings, if necessary, by inviting board members to ap-
prove sent-out decision proposals on a no-objection basis.  
       Although the GCF works under the guidance of the COP, the GCF Board has the respon-
sibility to make decisions on which projects to approve and to develop the general guidance 
of the COP, e.g., environmental and social safeguards, more precise criteria for investments 
and accreditations, establishing a framework for monitoring and evaluating GCF funded ac-
tivities, and establishing substructures to address specific activities (Green Climate Fund, 
2011). The Board has established a number of committees and panels with appointed mem-
bers from the Board that will support the Board in decision-making, e.g., the Risk Manage-
ment Committee, the Investment Committee, the Appointments Committee, the Budget 
Committee, the Private Sector Advisory Group, and the Accreditation Committee. Panels 
may also use external expertise, such as the Independent Technical Advisory Panel that helps 
the Board to assess funding proposals (Green Climate Fund, 2013c, 2021a). The Board can 
also request the GCF Secretariat to collect and produce knowledge needed to further develop 
the fund. 
       The Board has two Co-chairs: one from a developing country Party and one from a de-
veloped country Party. They are elected by members of the Board and serve for one year. 
They are responsible for ensuring that the procedural rules of the Board and its activities are 
followed. Before the end of meetings, they present a draft to the Board with decisions that 
need approval by the Board (Green Climate Fund, 2013c) 
 
3.3.3. The Green Climate Fund Secretariat, sub-units and mechanisms 
The Board appoints the Executive Director of the GCF Secretariat and the Secretariat is ac-
countable to the Board. The Secretariat is responsible for day-to-day administrative matters 
as well as knowledge production and knowledge management that will serve both the Board 
and developing countries involved with the GCF. The Secretariat has around 220 members 
divided between various divisions and offices. Divisions include inter alia the Division of 
Mitigation and Adaptation, which provides technical expertise and support to developing 
countries in their development of climate projects; the Division of Private Sector Facility, 
which seeks to engage the private sector in climate project investments; and the Division of 
External Affairs, which promotes the GCF as a viable partner in climate finance, e.g., in 
replenishment and other resource mobilization processes. Offices include the Office of Gov-
ernance Affairs, which supports the Board in its decision-making process and in relation to 
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the COP, and the Office of Risk Management and Compliance, which seeks to anticipate, 
identify, and manage potential business risk impacting the GCF. The Office of Risk Manage-
ment and Compliance seeks to provide assurance that GCF investments in projects comply 
with environmental and social safeguards so that projects do not compromise GCFs reputa-
tion (Green Climate Fund, 2021e).  
The GCF has two units that are meant to enhance the accountability of the fund. The first 
is the Independent Evaluation Unit, established by the Board “to provide objective assess-
ments of the performance and results of the Fund” (Independent Evaluation Unit, Green Cli-
mate Fund, 2021). The Independent Evaluation Unit reports to the Board and it also sends 
evaluation reports to the COP, as part of the periodic reviews of the Financial Mechanism of 
the UNFCCC. The second unit is the Independent Integrity Unit, working to deter fraud and 
corruption among “GCF staff, external stakeholders, implementing entities, and intermediar-
ies relating to GCF” (Independent Integrity Unit, Green Climate Fund, 2021). The Independ-
ent Integrity Unit reports to the Board and the Ethics and Audit Committee. The GCF has 
also established the Independent Redress Mechanisms, which is mandated by the Board to 
address complaints from actors affected negatively by GCF projects, e.g., projects failing to 
follow environmental and social safeguards. It also “accepts requests from Developing Coun-
tries seeking reconsideration of funding proposals that were denied by the GCF Board” (In-
dependent Redress Mechanism, Green Climate Fund, 2021). The Independent Integrity Unit 
reports to the Board 
 
3.3.4. Donors and other resource providers 
The GCF Governing Instrument states that “[t]he fund will receive financial inputs from de-
veloped country Parties to the Convention”, but also “from a variety of other sources, public 
and private, including alternative sources” (Green Climate Fund, 2011). There are no obliga-
tions for developed countries in the COP to contribute to the GCF (Seo, 2017) and hence the 
GCF needs to mobilize the resources needed. The GCF has had two resource mobilization 
processes so far. The first, called the Initial Resource Mobilization (IRM), lasted from June 
to November 2014. The Board issued an open invitation to all potential contributors, from 
both public and private sectors, and philanthropic organizations. Some meetings, such as the 
technical sessions, were open to all contributors, including invited non-contributing observ-
ers, while the so-called executive session was only open to GCF staff and contributors. At 
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the High-Level Pledging Conference in Berlin, November 2014, 21 countries pledged USD 
9.3 billion to the GCF.  
At the time of the Initial Resource Mobilization process, the Board recognized the GCF 
needed a more formal replenishment process for the next resource mobilization round, and 
in 2018 the Board endorsed a new process for the replenishment process (Green Climate 
Fund, 2018b). The process is similar to the Initial Resource Mobilization process. For the 
replenishment process, the Co-chairs, as previously, send out an open invitation to all poten-
tial contributors. The process consists of two consultation meetings and a high-level pledging 
conference. GCF accredited observers from civil society, the private sector and a representa-
tive from the UNFCCC will observe technical consultation meetings whereas the executive 
meetings are limited to potential contributors only. In the GCF’s first replenishment, 30 coun-
tries and one country region (Wallonia of Belgium) made pledges to the GCF. As of 21 July 
2020 the announced and confirmed pledges amounted to USD 5.29 billion (Green Climate 
Fund, 2020a). More pledges followed later and in a press release on 17 September 2020 the 
GCF announced it had reached over USD 10 billion (Green Climate Fund, 2020f).  
The replenishment process is first and foremost a way to mobilize resources from devel-
oped countries, even though other actors may contribute. In GCF policy documents there are 
no explicit rules on the possibility for donors to target their contributions for a specific pur-
pose. It has been suggested in GCF discussions that donors may earmark their contributions 
for either mitigation, adaptation, or the Private Sector Facility in the GCF. Developing states 
have not responded well to earmarking since targeted contributions and their use would pos-
sibly reflect the interests of developed countries more than the needs of developing countries. 
As discussed above, developed countries have often been more interested in mitigation and 
developing countries more interested in adaptation (Brechin & Espinoza, 2017). According 
to a study (Graham & Serdaru, 2020), some donor countries still expect to earmark their 
contributions. In GCF contribution arrangements with donor countries one can see, for ex-
ample, that the United States expects at least 50 percent of its contribution will be used to 
support private sector activities. In a similar way, Canada and the United Kingdom have 
targeted their contributions for the Private Sector Facility in the GCF. 
Larger contributions from the private sector are not expected to come from pledges but 
indirectly through market logics and the use of new financial instruments, such as green 
bonds, weather derivatives and other insurance products. The GCF believes that by using 
public resources to de-risk investments, the GCF can catalyse private sector investments in 
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new climate-change-related markets, both for mitigation and adaptation projects. The GCF 
states that “Shifting these wider financial flows managed by the private sector is key to mo-
bilizing the scale of resources – in the trillions – needed to realize developing countries’ 
NDCs, NAPs and other climate strategies” (Green Climate Fund, 2019a, para. 102). For this 
to happen, developing countries need to include new financial instruments for the private 
sector in their project proposals, and the GCF has proposed that the private sector could have 
a more pro-active role in the development of project proposals. According to the GCF, the 
private sector may act as an advisor to developing countries to make sure they understand 
what makes a profitable case for the private sector (Green Climate Fund, 2018a). The GCF 
would act as supporters in these processes through the GCF’s many support and readiness 
programmes that aim to enhance the capacity of developing countries, e.g., regarding project 
development. 
 
3.3.5. Accredited entities and national designated authorities 
The GCF does not develop or implement climate projects itself but works through accredited 
entities. It is also through these entities that developing countries access climate finance. The 
Governing Instrument states that “[a]ccess to Fund resources will be through national, re-
gional and international implementing entities accredited by the Board […]” and “[t]he Board 
will develop, manage and oversee an accreditation process for all implementing entities […]” 
(Green Climate Fund, 2011 para, 49, 45). The GCF says that it currently has a network of 
over 200 accredited entities, including “international and national commercial banks, multi-
lateral, regional and national development finance institutions, equity fund institutions, 
United Nations agencies, and civil society organizations” (Green Climate Fund, 2021b). Ac-
credited entities should annually provide a self-assessment to the Secretariat of their compli-
ance with environmental and social safeguards and gender policy. Accredited entities are also 
responsible for submitting annual performance reports on their funded activities (Green Cli-
mate Fund, 2021a).  
Accredited entities develop project proposals in consultation with National Designated 
Authorities (Green Climate Fund, 2020e). “The Board decided that [developing] countries 
may designate a national designated authority (NDA), in conformity with the Governing In-
strument, or mandate a country focal point to interact with the Fund” (Green Climate Fund, 
2021a, p. 60). The GCF describes NDAs or focal points as the interface between the GCF 
and developing countries engaged with the fund (Green Climate Fund, 2020c). The GCF 
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wants to ensure there is a consistency between proposed climate projects and overarching 
national climate plans in each country, so there is a requirement that accredited entities en-
gage with the NDAs in project development. Based on these interactions, NDAs make rec-
ommendations to the Board on how project proposals relate to their general national climate 
strategies. The GCF sees NDAs as a key to enhancing country ownership in project develop-
ment. It is also a condition of the GCF that NDAs provide a no-objection letter for a project 
to become approved. To attain legitimacy for the no-objection letter, the NDAs need to en-
sure that all relevant stakeholders have been consulted about project proposals (Green Cli-
mate Fund, 2021a). As discussed above, to enhance country ownership, the GCF, like the 
Adaptation Fund, has emphasized direct access, i.e., project proposals from national, regional 
or local accredited entities (Green Climate Fund, 2021a) but projects owned by direct access 
entities are still limited and international accredited entities dominate the GCF project port-
folio (Colenbrander et al., 2018). 
 
3.3.6. Accredited observers 
Civil society organizations and private sector organizations that wish to participate in the 
GCF as observers can apply for observer status and then become accredited observers. Ap-
plicant organizations need to demonstrate a “well-organized and administrative structure and 
relevant competence and experience”, and explain their “specialized scientific and technical 
competence relating to the Fund’s goal […]” (Green Climate Fund, 2013b, para. 6b–c). There 
are two constituencies for observers in the GCF, one civil society group and one private sec-
tor groups. The responsibilities of observers include, inter alia: consistent attendance at meet-
ings; commenting on agenda items upon invitation of the Co-chairs (although they are not 
guaranteed to be invited); consulting with other stakeholders; communicating the views of 
their constituency to the Board; and communicating information from the Board and related 
GCF entities back to observer groups (Green Climate Fund, 2013b). The GCF has decided 
that two civil society representatives and two private sector representatives can attend board 
meetings, as so-called active observers. Each observer constituency chooses its own repre-
sentative and they should aim to get a balanced representation between developing and de-
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4. Previous research  
 
The main focus of this thesis is how governance is performed and it therefore mainly connects 
to research perspectives used to investigate the organization of global climate governance. 
However, the organization of global climate governance becomes difficult to understand 
without also recognizing other focus areas in global climate governance research that are 
integrated elements in the organization of governance. This becomes particularly relevant as 
this thesis focuses on the governance practices of a single organization and its management 
of different issues. Because of this, I will briefly present findings from different research 
areas on global climate governance that are relevant in relation to the GCF. 
 
4.1. The organization of global climate governance 
The organization of global climate governance is discussed in both ‘governmentality’ and 
‘orchestration’ research. Research using governmentality often tries to identify overarching 
‘governmentalities’ that shape governance, such as ‘green governmentality’, which estab-
lished global warming as a major concern and was institutionalized in the form of the IPCC. 
Then came ‘advanced liberal governmentality’, which emphasized market logics and made 
it compatible with sustainable development. It also emphasized decentralized partnerships 
(Rothe, 2015). Accepting that climate governance is fragmented (Pattberg & Zelli, 2015), it 
has been questioned whether one can empirically and methodologically establish overarching 
global governmentalities. Such a perspective makes it difficult to discuss potential contradic-
tions and fissures in global governance arrangements (Rothe, 2015; see also Walters, 2012).  
Orchestration on the other hand is a framework that presupposes fragmentation in global 
governance and how interactions between actors are built on interdependencies among ac-
tors. International governmental institutions are described as lacking many capabilities to 
achieve the goals given by their mandate, “These gaps may involve regulatory authority, 
access to particular targets, forms of expertise, financial resources and other capabilities” 
(Abbot, 2015, p. 488). Hence, climate organizations enlist intermediaries to fill those gaps 
and they ‘orchestrate’ the intermediaries through different incentives and support actions. 
Such support is often cognitive and/or normative, expressed for example through guidelines 
(Abbot et al., 2020). The orchestration framework was originally used as a normative frame-
work that attempted to identify circumstances and opportunities for innovation, learning, 
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work that attempted to identify circumstances and opportunities for innovation, learning, 
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mutual adjustments, and effectivity in governance. However, research has suggested that or-
chestration is often a ‘one-way street’, with weak feedback mechanisms to the orchestrator, 
and the framework has been criticized for not recognizing power dynamics in the orchestra-
tion of governance (Abbot et al., 2020). It is recognized within the framework that conflicts 
may appear because of different interests but interests are often sufficiently aligned to man-
age these conflicts, otherwise the orchestration would cease to exist (Abbot et al., 2015). 
Some have used orchestration as a critical framework to analyse how orchestration is carried 
out and what effects it has, focusing on the “politics and power dynamics of orchestration, 
and the competing efforts undertaken by various actors to exert orchestrating power” (Gor-
don & Johnson, 2017, p. 707). This research identifies different forms of orchestration built 
on different logics of acquiescence, i.e., how orchestration aligns actors with different objec-
tives, e.g., an ‘emergent orchestration’ that establishes competition, bench-marking and 
standards as norms to make actors “observable, comparable and governable in the context of 
climate change” (Gordon & Johnson, 2017, p. 703). 
 
4.2. Democracy and legitimacy 
One major focus area is how to understand democracy and legitimacy in global climate gov-
ernance. The ‘democratic deficit’ in global climate governance has been discussed for quite 
a long time (Bernauer & Betzold, 2012). The starting point in these discussions is both nor-
mative and critical. Some advocate more of a deliberative democracy that could create a more 
inclusive governance (Dryzek & Stevenson, 2011). Others are more sceptical and argue that 
deliberative ideals must be assessed against the actual practices in governance. One problem 
is potential trade-offs between different aims, such as increased engagement and efficient 
governance (Bäckstrand et al., 2010a). Deliberative processes may become ‘sideshows’, 
while “material power, bargaining, threats, coercion, and brute force” shape the world (Ste-
venson, 2015b, p. 102). Another obstacle for more inclusive governance might be how cli-
mate organizations value the contribution of different stakeholders. A lack of human and 
financial resources among stakeholders has had a supposedly negative impact on inclusive-
ness in negotiations concerning sustainable development goals and how this might create a 
hierarchy of legitimacy sources, i.e., different levels of legitimacy are attributed to different 
stakeholders (Bexell, 2019). Some argue that hegemonic knowledge structures hinder the 
inclusion of more pluralistic views in governance. It is believed that western, male, capital-
istic economic knowledge production promises unrealistically quick fixes without a 
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recognition of the deeper socio-economic root causes of environmental problems. Stake-
holder participation is considered an instrumental tool, which conceals the underlying prob-
lem of contradictory aims (Mert, 2019). Some argue that current forms of governance focus 
on consensus and systematically remove irreconcilable conflicts (Blühdorn & Deflorian, 
2019). The reasons for this are allegedly to be found in the basic principles of liberal democ-
racies. Notions of freedom, self-realization and self-determination, together with consumer-
ism, have led to unsustainable societies, but environmental governance continues to enable 
these practices through ideas such as green consumerism and corporate environmental re-
sponsibility, which legitimize the value preferences of western lifestyles and do not address 
the problem of unsustainability. It is suggested that this ‘avoidance’ of the problem can be 
interpreted differently: either as symbolic politics that is intentionally deceptive, a theatrical 
performance by power elites who do not want any disruption of the existing order, or as 
simulative politics that help actors to ‘manage’ dilemmas around lifestyles and environmental 
concerns, through self-deceptive practices, e.g., green consumerism. However, these scholars 
seem to connect the problem to democratic approaches more than consumerism. Their nar-
rative is that politicians do not dare to challenge people’s lifestyle in the West, which in the 




Another democracy-related issue can be found in discussions about the network modes of 
governance, which include a variety of actors from different sectors, often described as pub-
lic-private-partnership (PPP). Discussions of PPPs are often connected with the role of non-
state actors, civil society, and private sector inclusion in climate governance. Research shows 
that global organizations have been important for the expansion of this mode of governance 
(Andonova & Chelminski, 2015). Scholars show how PPPs are sometimes described as a 
more effective and legitimate form of governance, and as win-win arrangements where actors 
collaborate towards global common goods (Bäckstrand, 2010). Research is somewhat polar-
ized regarding the merits of PPPs: “liberal-functionalist perspective […] analyses partner-
ships as win-win instruments that can address the implementation and democratic deficits 
and legitimacy issues, and critical perspectives [argue] that partnerships reinforce market en-
vironmentalism and lack democratic legitimacy” (Mert, 2015, p. 293).  
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Critical research argues that the logic of PPPs is built on consensus and like-minded actors, 
which makes it hard to include conflicting views and interests in PPP governance forms 
(Mert, 2015), and research shows that deliberative possibilities in PPPs are quite limited 
(Bäckstrand et al., 2010b). PPPs are also described as reproducing existing power relations. 
A study of the Global Sustainability Partnerships Database shows that the most vulnerable 
and underrepresented are not included in partnerships and that the balance of representatives 
from the Global North and the Global South is highly skewed towards the former group 
(Bäckstrand, 2010; Mert, 2015). PPPs are also described as biased towards private sector 
involvement (Abbot et al., 2020; Stevenson, 2015a). 
 
4.4. Relations between the Global South and the Global North 
Inclusion is also a focus of research about the relations between the Global South and the 
Global North in global climate governance. Some scholars argue there is an urgent need to 
address imbalances between the Global South and the Global North in environmental gov-
ernance (Gupta et al., 2015; Okereke, 2019), which according to the scholars has privileged 
the priorities of the North. It is argued that governance has attempted to “paint a homogenized 
picture of a common future for North and South” and thus hides “longstanding issues of 
unfairness and inequality” (Okereke, 2019, p. 172). One major problem identified is that 
framings and conceptualizations of problems are mainly defined by representatives from the 
Global North. One reason is that representatives from the Global South are often outnum-
bered at conferences where important decisions are made (Okereke, 2019). An example of 
dominant framings is the emphasis on market logics and growth rate by the Global North 
(Gupta et al., 2015). Developing countries are described as deeply suspicious of entrusting 
the private sector to manage sustainability issues. Developing countries have demanded ad-
equate and predictable financial support, but climate finance governance is described as frag-
mented and overly complicated, making access to climate finance burdensome for develop-
ing countries (Okereke, 2019).  
Attempts have been made in global climate governance to enhance the inclusion of the 
Global South in the development of climate actions, for example by applying the concept of 
country ownership to the design of governance arrangements. Country-owned actions “are 
believed to be informed by country priorities and needs, hence promote climate justice and 
equity by ensuring that countries and groups that are particularly vulnerable to climate change 
are supported to adapt” (Omukuti, 2020, p. 827). The concept is critically assessed in a study 
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showing that projects are often biased towards technocratic solutions and use local actors in 
an instrumental way to advance particular development agendas that lead to a depoliticization 
of vulnerability (Omukuti, 2020). 
 
4.5. Market logics and the private sector 
The growing presence of market logics and the private sector in global climate governance 
(Pattberg & Widerberg, 2015) is a recurring theme in many of the research areas discussed 
here. The role of the private sector has supposedly changed from a reactive role, often op-
posing environmental regulation, to a norm-setting role engaged in the design of climate 
governance, where a market logic is considered central to mobilize sufficient resources for 
climate actions (Pinkse, 2015). Global climate organizations such as the UNEP have contrib-
uted to the expansion of market logics in global climate governance. Some believe this has 
helped developing countries to highlight their needs, while others think that the market logic 
has compromised the relevance of other important norms and values related to environmental 
care (Andonova & Chelminski, 2015). A relatively recent trend in the expansion of market 
logics in global climate governance is the increasing financialization of climate governance. 
There are different views on this development. Some see the access to new financial products 
as a democratization of finance, while others see financialization as a depoliticization of cli-
mate actions (Keucheyan, 2018). Financial products can be traded as products by themselves, 
e.g., weather derivates, meaning that investments are disconnected from the materiality of 
the environment. According to critics, this could lead to financial speculation and volatility 
in financial instruments that are used to mobilize vital resources for climate actions, which 
could in turn increase actors’ vulnerability (Marsden et al., 2019). Some believe that the po-
tential negative effects of such speculation have not been adequately discussed (J. Clapp & 
Stephens, 2019). 
 
4.6. Civil society 
The role of civil society in global climate governance is often discussed in relation to civil 
society actors’ ability to highlight socio-ecological conflicts, to influence agendas and to par-
ticipate in knowledge production, as well as the role of social movement actors in democra-
tizing global climate governance. Some CSOs have challenged the technical and assumedly 
apolitical approach to global climate governance, in which some larger CSOs have 
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participated, and instead articulated political conflicts, e.g. issues about justice and equity in 
relations between the Global North and the Global South (Cassegård & Thörn, 2017).  
It is suggested by both CSOs and scholars that inclusion in climate governance arrange-
ments might lead to a co-option and deradicalization of CSOs (Bäckstrand, 2015; Cassegård 
& Thörn, 2017). Participation in PPPs may seem to support increased participation but the 
emphasis on consensus could also lead to suppression of conflicts and the political dimen-
sions of governance arrangements. The degree of influence in networks is also related to the 
kind of resources that CSOs may contribute (Nasiritousi et al., 2016). CSOs may use their 
moral legitimacy as a resource to influence corporations and the like to act more sustainably 
(Bäckstrand & Lövbrand, 2015) but it also seems that vulnerable and less resourceful stake-
holders are excluded from PPPs (Mert, 2015). When it comes to invited stakeholder partici-
pation in climate funds, this is described as limited to desultory consultations that rarely have 
an impact on the work of climate funds (Schalatek, 2012) 
 
4.7. Science and technology 
Science and technology are central to the practical work of making problems governable in 
global climate organizations. One of the difficulties discussed in applying science and tech-
nology to climate governance is the tension between the seemingly objective, unified, and 
standardized ways of understanding the world that are emphasized in western scientific prac-
tices, and the recognition of “multiple values and sources of knowledge” in the production 
of knowledge (Beck, 2015, p. 239). One dimension of this is the boundary work that goes 
into delineating scientific work from policy aspects, i.e., making political dimensions invisi-
ble by portraying presented knowledge as purely scientific (Lahn & Sundqvist, 2017). An-
other dimension is how scientific practices restrict the form of knowledge that is deemed 
legitimate in knowledge production (Westskog et al., 2017).  
Climate organizations often work across different scales, from the global, to national, 
regional and local levels, and local knowledge has gained somewhat higher status in global 
climate governance, exemplified by the development of indigenous peoples’ policies that aim 
to support, protect and incorporate indigenous knowledge in climate project development. 
However, it is argued that when science is used for managerial or standard-setting purposes, 
it oversimplifies and misrepresents the complexity of a phenomena and “systematically over-
look[s] unorthodox, marginal or non-scientific viewpoints” and the efficiency of climate gov-
ernance is then achieved “at the cost of eliminating some people and their needs and interests 
Previous research 
 27  
 
from the managers’ purview” (Jasanoff & Long Martello, 2004, p. 339). Some argue that 
science needs to re-examine its role in climate knowledge production and climate actions, 
and become more receptive to other forms of knowledge, which is described as a big chal-
lenge for science (Beck, 2015; Jasanoff & Long Martello, 2004) 
 
4.8. Conceptual ambiguities 
Many climate organizations are using different guiding principles in their work and research 
on these principles is often connected with their ambiguity and its consequences. One exam-
ple is ambiguity concerning the concept of vulnerability in climate finance organizations. 
Vulnerability is an allocation principle in the Adaptation Fund but it lacks a formal definition. 
It still becomes implicitly enacted in in the formulation of funding proposals. When analysing 
such proposals, scholars argue that “there is a clear trend towards increased quantification 
and monetization in proposals over time” (Remling & Persson, 2014, p. 28), which leads to 
the exclusion of non-quantifiable dimensions of vulnerability, and there is little evidence that 
the Adaptation Fund prioritizes the most vulnerable countries. Others argue that countries 
exposed to extreme weather events do receive more funding. However, when it comes to 
adaptive capacity, i.e., pre-existing structural vulnerabilities, the poorest countries do not re-
ceive more funding, while donors instead tend to favour middle-income countries, maybe 
because they have greater capacities to utilize funding in an effective way (Betzold & Weiler, 
2017). 
 
4.9. Research on the Green Climate Fund 
The final section of this research review will describe and discuss research on the GCF, linked 
to the various focus areas discussed above. There are mixed findings regarding how well the 
GCF supports country ownership. Some think that the GCF has been generally good in 
strengthening country ownership. Some scholars link the identified problems more closely to 
national circumstances than to problems at the GCF level (Zamarioli et al., 2020). Others 
have investigated the role of intermediaries in the GCF and how they affect country owner-
ship. It is argued that the dominance of international intermediaries in the GCF, such as 
UNEP and the World Bank, skew project proposals towards mitigation, contrary to the needs 
of developed countries that are more interested in adaptation. This is interpreted as a mis-
match between outcomes of GCF decisions and its emphasis on country ownership. 
(Chaudhury, 2020). GCF’s own Independent Evaluation Unit also asks for improvements in 
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the role of intermediaries. According to the Unit, stakeholders in developing countries often 
think that intermediaries promote their own agendas rather than supporting country owner-
ship (Asfaw et al., 2019). A study by Feist (2017), who examines interactions at GCF board 
meetings, may also be related to relations between the Global North and the Global South. 
The study challenges ideas about institutional learning and argues that most communication 
at board meetings, especially between representatives from developed and developing coun-
tries, is hidden strategic communication that uses embedded veiled coercion. Power is thus 
exercised indirectly to influence decision making in the GCF.  
Studies on stakeholder participation and civil society in the GCF have focused on aspects 
that enable or restrict CSO influence. Some discuss in general terms how the ability to influ-
ence is connected with human and financial resources, but also how CSOs may enhance their 
influence by creating alliances with developing countries. The heterogeneity among CSOs, 
including different views on the role of private finance, is interpreted as a reduced ability to 
speak with ‘one voice’ and hence limits their leverage (Prys & Wojczewski, 2015). Bracking 
(2015) argues that CSOs and their views were slowly subordinated in the GCF by a hege-
monic pro-business bloc. Its strategies included: “rendering the process technical and thereby 
limiting open political and democratic deliberation” (2015, p. 289); describing CSO demands 
as something beyond the possible; reframing radical-sounding concepts used by CSOs; and 
threatening with financial withdrawal if ‘wrong’ decisions were made. Bracking (2015) de-
scribes this last strategy as part of a neoliberal environmental governance that depicts markets 
as the only solution. Like Bracking, Bruun (2017) emphasizes processes that subordinate 
CSOs and their views, particularly their political perspectives. He argues that the engagement 
of CSOs was shaped by structural barriers that were built on the creation of boundaries. Spe-
cific problematizations were used to create an ‘intelligible field’ that defined what was rele-
vant and what was not. Things that were deemed non-relevant became ‘overflows’ and were 
dismissed as non-realistic, not constructive or not allowed according to procedural rules. To 
increase their influence, CSOs slowly adopted a technical role. Bruun argues that “Several 
sources pointed out that replacing broader political arguments with technical and concrete 
textual edits had the upside of increasing the agency of CSOs in the eyes of decision makers” 
(2015, p. 123). 
There are some studies analysing the guiding principle of transformational change in the 
GCF , which is connected with studies about conceptual ambiguities in climate governance. 
There is no formal definition of transformational change in the GCF and the studies analyse 
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how transformational change is used in practice and how it relates to the needs of the Global 
South and their self-determination, often described as country ownership. Winkler & Dubash 
(2016) find tension in how the concept is connected with both low emissions, which suggest 
a focus on mitigation actions, and climate-resilient development. They argue there is a po-
tential trade-off between these directions and they see a risk that the GCF leans on the support 
of donors that are more interested in what might be a public good, i.e., mitigation, whereas 
developing countries are more concerned with adaptation and development issues. If trans-
formational change becomes primarily connected with mitigation, this could restrict devel-
oping countries in defining their own needs. Winkler & Dubash (2016) argue that the mean-
ing of transformational change should encompass different ideas about what constitutes 
transformational change, and that the concept should be defined and ‘owned’ by developing 
countries themselves. Boodoo et al. (2018) think that defining transformational change in 
line with what is ‘nationally appropriate’ could lead to transformational change becoming 
yet another political concept that is scientifically ungrounded and used to circumvent formal 
mitigation targets. Boodoo et al (2018) suggest using Transition Management and continuous 
learning in developing Nationally Appropriate Mitigation Actions (NAMAs). In that way the 
concept can be continuously developed and hence avoid becoming disconnected from the 
needs of developing countries. Their suggestion reflects more of a positivist perspective on 
how to identify needs. Kasdan et al. (2020) argue that the concept, despite the lack of formal 
definition, is still imbued with meaning. Transformational change is often connected with 
market transformations, how the use of new financial instruments from the private sector can 
help developing countries to finance mitigation and adaptation projects. Kasdan et al. (2020) 
also identifies other major themes, such as scalability, i.e., the creation of climate project 
models that can be applied to different contexts, Kasdan et al. (2020) argue that scalability 
as a criterion might conflict with adaptation needs that are specific and difficult to scale. If 
scalability were to become conditional for funding, this could hinder developing countries 
from defining their own needs, their exercise of country ownership. 
 
4.10. Concluding remarks on previous research  
As discussed in previous research, governmentality has identified overarching governmen-
talities and those findings are still valuable to understand major patterns in governance styles. 
The findings in this thesis can be related to an advanced liberal governmentality with its 
emphasis on market logics and partnerships. The orchestration framework is also useful in 
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the role of intermediaries. According to the Unit, stakeholders in developing countries often 
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the way it emphasizes interdependencies and shows how organizations orchestrate enrolled 
partners, e.g., through guidelines, which are frequently used in the GCF to steer the design 
of funding proposals. However, none of the frameworks call attention to contradictions and 
contradiction management in the organization of governance. The orchestration framework 
recognizes the existence of conflicts but concludes that successful orchestration means there 
is a sufficient alignment of interests. How this ‘alignment’ happens and the power relations 
that play a part in this are not discussed. Some have developed the orchestration framework 
(Gordon & Johnson, 2017) and identified logics used to create alignment. The difference 
between the use of logics in Gordon & Johnson (2017) and in study 1 in this thesis is that 
they focus on logics that align interests, while I focus on conflicting logics connected with 
the realization of different valued resources, which also highlight how contradictions and 
conflicts emerge in governance. 
I argue that contradictions and contradiction management need to be emphasized more 
in global climate governance research because they are an integral part of governance prac-
tices, and will multiply with increased demands for more inclusive governance. As men-
tioned, previous approaches to understand the making of governance are useful but need to 
be supplemented by tools that enable analyses of contradictions and contradiction manage-
ment. This is where this thesis can make a contribution. 
I think immanent critique is a fruitful tool to further explore how contradictions emerge 
and how they are managed in governance. The studies in the thesis try to highlight exactly 
this. The analytical framework presented in study 1 is a practical tool for an immanent cri-
tique, here used to show how resource dependencies and institutional logics interact in the 
design of the GCF stakeholder participation arrangement. The GCF portrays stakeholder par-
ticipation as the active engagement of a diversity of stakeholders. In practice however, con-
flicting logics connected with the realization of various valued resources leads to a prioriti-
zation of certain resources and stakeholders that contribute to the realization of those re-
sources. This framework could be useful not only for analysing participatory arrangements 
but also for critically analysing public-private partnerships and other arrangements promising 
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5. Analysing contradictions, ambiguities and 
conflicts in climate governance  
 
In this section, I present the overarching framework of immanent critique which I use to 
connect and discuss the different studies in the thesis, what they have in common and the 
differences between them. 
 
5.1. Overarching framework – immanent critique 
A general description of immanent critique is that it problematizes the relationship between 
the idealized representation of objects and the material world they supposedly represent (Cas-
segård, 2021). Idealized objects can be a social system, such as capitalism, or an organization 
as in this thesis. These idealized representations are defined as ‘totalities’ since they make 
implicit or explicit claims to represent objects in the world as a ‘whole’– undivided and log-
ically coherent. However, there are almost always potentially contradictory representations 
of a system or an organization that may threaten the idealized representation. Contradictions 
can be managed through the concealment of contradictions, which may take the form of a 
pretence or simulative recognition of different representations (Jaeggi, 2015) but which in 
practice subsume and pacify some of these representations. An example of this is how capi-
talism is faced with critique for not being compatible with environmental sustainability, that 
continuous economic growth and associated consumption will lead to a degradation of nature 
and the climate. As a response, capitalism reinvents itself through the concept of green 
growth (Hickel & Kallis, 2020), which is the idealized representation of capitalism in the 
climate change era. Corporations adopt values and norms such as ‘sustainability’ and frame 
themselves as ‘green’, but in practice this involves either symbolic gestures by individual 
businesses, so-called greenwashing, or insufficient actions at the economic systemic level to 
meet the needs of the environment (Rockström, 2019). This concealment makes it possible 
to represent capitalism and its relationship to the environment as a harmonious totality, which 
despite environmental concerns legitimizes capitalism as a sustainable functional system, and 
this is the ideological dimension of contradiction concealment. Cassegård (2021) cites 
Adorno, arguing that “the whole is the false” and it can only be viewed as a unit by concealing 
its own contradictions, and Gunderson describes ideology as a “reconciliation of real 
The Governance of Global Climate Finance 
 30  
the way it emphasizes interdependencies and shows how organizations orchestrate enrolled 
partners, e.g., through guidelines, which are frequently used in the GCF to steer the design 
of funding proposals. However, none of the frameworks call attention to contradictions and 
contradiction management in the organization of governance. The orchestration framework 
recognizes the existence of conflicts but concludes that successful orchestration means there 
is a sufficient alignment of interests. How this ‘alignment’ happens and the power relations 
that play a part in this are not discussed. Some have developed the orchestration framework 
(Gordon & Johnson, 2017) and identified logics used to create alignment. The difference 
between the use of logics in Gordon & Johnson (2017) and in study 1 in this thesis is that 
they focus on logics that align interests, while I focus on conflicting logics connected with 
the realization of different valued resources, which also highlight how contradictions and 
conflicts emerge in governance. 
I argue that contradictions and contradiction management need to be emphasized more 
in global climate governance research because they are an integral part of governance prac-
tices, and will multiply with increased demands for more inclusive governance. As men-
tioned, previous approaches to understand the making of governance are useful but need to 
be supplemented by tools that enable analyses of contradictions and contradiction manage-
ment. This is where this thesis can make a contribution. 
I think immanent critique is a fruitful tool to further explore how contradictions emerge 
and how they are managed in governance. The studies in the thesis try to highlight exactly 
this. The analytical framework presented in study 1 is a practical tool for an immanent cri-
tique, here used to show how resource dependencies and institutional logics interact in the 
design of the GCF stakeholder participation arrangement. The GCF portrays stakeholder par-
ticipation as the active engagement of a diversity of stakeholders. In practice however, con-
flicting logics connected with the realization of various valued resources leads to a prioriti-
zation of certain resources and stakeholders that contribute to the realization of those re-
sources. This framework could be useful not only for analysing participatory arrangements 
but also for critically analysing public-private partnerships and other arrangements promising 





Analysing contradictions, ambiguities and conflicts in climate governance 
 31  
 
5. Analysing contradictions, ambiguities and 
conflicts in climate governance  
 
In this section, I present the overarching framework of immanent critique which I use to 
connect and discuss the different studies in the thesis, what they have in common and the 
differences between them. 
 
5.1. Overarching framework – immanent critique 
A general description of immanent critique is that it problematizes the relationship between 
the idealized representation of objects and the material world they supposedly represent (Cas-
segård, 2021). Idealized objects can be a social system, such as capitalism, or an organization 
as in this thesis. These idealized representations are defined as ‘totalities’ since they make 
implicit or explicit claims to represent objects in the world as a ‘whole’– undivided and log-
ically coherent. However, there are almost always potentially contradictory representations 
of a system or an organization that may threaten the idealized representation. Contradictions 
can be managed through the concealment of contradictions, which may take the form of a 
pretence or simulative recognition of different representations (Jaeggi, 2015) but which in 
practice subsume and pacify some of these representations. An example of this is how capi-
talism is faced with critique for not being compatible with environmental sustainability, that 
continuous economic growth and associated consumption will lead to a degradation of nature 
and the climate. As a response, capitalism reinvents itself through the concept of green 
growth (Hickel & Kallis, 2020), which is the idealized representation of capitalism in the 
climate change era. Corporations adopt values and norms such as ‘sustainability’ and frame 
themselves as ‘green’, but in practice this involves either symbolic gestures by individual 
businesses, so-called greenwashing, or insufficient actions at the economic systemic level to 
meet the needs of the environment (Rockström, 2019). This concealment makes it possible 
to represent capitalism and its relationship to the environment as a harmonious totality, which 
despite environmental concerns legitimizes capitalism as a sustainable functional system, and 
this is the ideological dimension of contradiction concealment. Cassegård (2021) cites 
Adorno, arguing that “the whole is the false” and it can only be viewed as a unit by concealing 
its own contradictions, and Gunderson describes ideology as a “reconciliation of real 
The Governance of Global Climate Finance 
 32  
contradictions in consciousness, but not in reality” (2017, p. 268). Such reconciliation in 
mind but not in practice obviously privileges those that benefit from such concealments of 
contradictions (Gunderson, 2017), which means that immanent critique is also a method for 
analysing power relations and domination (Cassegård, 2021). Finlayson refers to Adorno and 
says that “The unity of the whole is achieved at the price of violence perpetrated against the 
particulars and that violence, as we shall see, is not just an innocent conceptual violence” 
(2014, p. 1159).  
Within Marxism, the object of analysis by immanent critique has been the capitalistic 
system and its contradictory internal logic. Some also discuss the need to expand the idea of 
possible contradictions in relation to capitalism. Jaeggi (2015) argues that ideology critique 
can no longer be limited to one central contradiction but must take into consideration the 
multiplication of contradictions, and Fraser (Fraser & Jaeggi, 2018) makes a distinction be-
tween intra-realm contradictions that are internal to the capitalistic system, and inter-realm 
contradictions that also include ‘lifeworlds’ that contain their own characteristic and, at least 
partly, independent norms and ideals. As a result, contradictions may also appear between 
the economic system and the non-economic spheres. The contradictions and conflicts that are 
discussed in this thesis are inter-realm contradictions where different logics collide in the 
governance of the GCF. 
By problematizing such concealments of contradictions, the criteria for judging social 
systems or organizations become the internal standards set up by the social system or organ-
ization itself, its ability or inability to meet its claims to represent an object. Finlayson cites 
Hegel, arguing that “The genuine refutation must penetrate the opponent’s stronghold and 
meet him on his own ground. No advantage is gained by attacking him somewhere else and 
meeting him where he is not” (2014, p. 1148). Thus, immanent critique does not use external 
principles to evaluate social systems. The argument is that such principles cannot fully cap-
ture the particularities of specific situations. Instead, it relies on the actual principles used in 
particular social processes that are investigated (Stahl, 2017). However, Cassegård (2021) 
warns against applying the criteria of only using internal principles too strictly. To avoid 
simply replicating the inside of systems and risk portraying them as more coherent than they 
are, critique also has to transcend this strict internal sphere, not by incorporating external 
principles, but by allowing the object, i.e., the system, the organization or whatever object is 
represented, to become visible in other ways, through other felt experiences of the object than 
those represented in a reductive ‘totality’. This leads into the ontological and epistemological 
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perspectives of immanent critique. There are different views on this but I sympathize with 
the perspective discussed and developed by Cassegård (2021) in his discussion of the Frank-
furt School, and particularly Adorno. 
According to Cassegård (2021), Adorno rejects a naïve realism, presuming that the con-
cepts used to describe reality also represent reality, the true rendering of an object. Such 
realism dismisses the idea that our understanding of the world is in any way mediated by the 
social and the historical context. At the same time, Adorno rejects a strict constructivism. We 
cannot convincingly describe the world completely as we please, or make it as we please, 
and so “concepts are not everything” (Cassegård, 2021, p. 51). To relate to both these dimen-
sions, i.e., the world as something real and at the same time socially constructed, Adorno 
developed the notions of the primacy of the object and natural history. The first notion de-
scribes nature as something more than the concept used to depict it, i.e., the independent 
material properties and material force of nature that can never be fully captured in systems 
of thought. The second notion describes our relationship with nature as socially constructed 
(Cassegård, 2021). Again, the concepts of economic growth and green growth can be used 
as an example of how these two dimensions meet and become intertwined. Economic growth 
has legitimized an exploitation of nature which has created many of the problems mentioned 
above. When nature ‘strikes back’ against this exploitation, clearly visible through climate 
change, the idea of green growth is used to portray capitalism as having a more functional 
relationship with nature, which is debatable (Gunderson, 2017; Hickel & Kallis, 2020). This 
new economic discourse might hinder or at least delay necessary changes (Rockström, 2019), 
which will have material consequences for the environment. This is an example of how the 
social world of discourse and the material world are constantly interweaving. 
At the beginning of this section, I described idealized representations of objects, which 
could be a social system such as capitalism, or an organization. Objects can be almost any-
thing according to Cassegård (2021). He mentions artwork, incidents, phenomena such as 
climate change and even immaterial things such as memories. The meaning of objects is 
mediated through conceptual chains, and as they expand, so too does our understanding of 
an object. Cassegård (2021) gives the example of mercury poisoning. His understanding is 
influenced by a variety of things, e.g., medical definitions, the different experiences of vic-
tims and mourning survivors, struggles in court, desperate protesters, dead fish and poverty-
stricken fisherman. All these parts or concepts, based on experiences of the object, play a 
role in the understanding of mercury poisoning and should be recognized to do justice to such 
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an object (Cassegård, 2021). As vital as these parts or concepts are for our understanding, 
they could also make the object complex, so that it loses its coherence and even becomes 
contradictory. The way climate governance organizations handle such events is often by re-
ducing the complexity and downplaying perspectives that might challenge perspectives that 
are preferred or taken for granted, and so it turns into an idealized representation of the object. 
One reason is to create easily demarcated regulatory objects that can be governed with pre-
dictable results (Taylor, 2014). Making these contradictions visible is central to Adorno. 
They reveal both power and domination, and how contradictions can act as destabilizers and 
prevent attempts at closure of an object, which would limit our understanding of the object. 
You might argue that it is impossible to capture all dimensions of an object and that it is 
necessary to simplify it in order to enable governance. That is true, but the problem is when 
alternative perspectives are removed from consideration right from the start. 
The emphasis on the felt experience of objects, e.g., suffering, pain or shock, is important 
for Adorno according to Cassegård (2021). As I interpret this, the emphasis on experience 
protects against relativism and reductive conceptual abstractions of objects. Climate change 
is already causing felt experiences and will increasingly do so, but this is not necessarily 
reflected in calculative methodologies used in climate governance, e.g., incremental cost cal-
culations (study 3) that exclude pre-existing vulnerabilities such as poverty, which greatly 
affect people’s adaptive capacity and suffering. The point is not that felt experiences are more 
important than other representations of an object. Cassegård (2021) argues that scientific 
contributions are important but the problem is when dominant logics are used as the only 
legitimate sources for making representations of objects: Cassegård writes: “Epistemologi-
cally, experience of the object provides a way to see through the lie of identity [absolute or 
idealized representations of objects] and break through the closure of the system” (2021, p. 
56). The world cannot be fully captured by conceptual thinking according to Adorno but by 
adding more pieces, more experiences of an object, it can become more real, or less reduced, 
which leads to Adorno’s concept of constellations (Cassegård, 2021).  
 
Constellations are made up of concepts that encircle the object, illuminating it 
from various directions without being fixed in a logical relationship to each other. 
What keeps them together is their ability to illuminate the contradictory nature of 
the object […] The movement between the heterogeneous elements in a constel-
lation may be destructive from the standpoint of the criticized system but has the 
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positive aim of doing justice to the experience of the object in a way that doesn’t 
relinquish conceptual thinking (Cassegård, 2021, pp. 24, 126) 
 
This can be connected with the example that Cassegård (2021) gives about a fuller under-
standing of mercury poisoning by incorporating more experiences of the object. So, although 
the heterogenous elements and felt experiences are not necessarily recognized by dominant 
logics, they can still be considered internal principles in the sense that they relate to the object 
itself. It is organizations and their reliance on dominant logics that makes these experiences 
invisible through the concealment of contradictions. The object is the key here and that is 
why Adorno talks about the ‘primacy of the object’. It is the object and the concealment of 
contradictions connected with the representation of an object that can tell us something about 
the making of totalities, and the role or power and domination. 
 
5.2. The Green Climate Fund in the light of immanent critique 
In this section I will discuss how the studies in the thesis can be read in the light of immanent 
critique. A common feature of the studies is that they all discuss what I consider to be prob-
lematic representations of objects in the GCF, e.g., how the representation of stakeholder 
participation or vulnerability privilege certain aspects and subsume others. This can be re-
lated to the idea of criticizing ‘totalities’ in immanent critique, the idealized representation 
of objects that conceals the contradictions that exist around different objects. The aim has 
been to deconstruct and problematize these representations. Since this thesis focuses on the 
governance practices of one single organization and its management of different issues, it 
uses slightly different analytical tools to capture what is happening in the empirical material. 
It is still conceptually coherent in the sense that all theories and analytical approaches are 
chosen because they can help to break down or deconstruct these totalities and reveal the 
concealment of contradictions and its effects. Below I will discuss the different studies in 
more detail.  
The theoretical framework in study 1 uses a combination of dependency theory (Rhodes, 
2007) and institutional logics, the latter defined as a set of principles that tell actors how to 
act in order to accomplish favourable results in a social sphere (Greenwood et al., 2011). I 
argue that dependencies and institutional logics are two basic mechanisms that introduce 
contradictions and conflicts into organizations.  
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an object (Cassegård, 2021). As vital as these parts or concepts are for our understanding, 
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positive aim of doing justice to the experience of the object in a way that doesn’t 
relinquish conceptual thinking (Cassegård, 2021, pp. 24, 126) 
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The GCF is dependent on different stakeholders as they provide the fund with resources it 
cannot produce itself, both material and immaterial. Democratic legitimacy as an immaterial 
and normative resource for the GCF can be realized through stakeholder representation and 
organizational transparency so stakeholders can perform a watchdog function. Stakeholder 
representation and organizational transparency are then institutional logics that help to realize 
democratic legitimacy in the GCF. Financial means, as a material resource, can be realized 
with the help of private sector stakeholders using market logics. However, the logics con-
nected with the realization of valued resources are not always compatible with each other and 
they might interfere with the realization of other resources. This can be related to Fraser’s 
(Fraser & Jaeggi, 2018) discussion about inter-realm contradictions mentioned in the previ-
ous section.  
       Both democratic legitimacy and financial means are obviously important resources for 
the GCF, but in the organization of stakeholders in the GCF, financial means, market logics 
and private sector stakeholder are clearly more valued, which affects how stakeholders are 
organized in the GCF. The GCF is part of the UNFCCC but replaced the UNFCCC’s estab-
lished nine-constituency model for stakeholder participation and reduced it to two. The pri-
vate sector was the only constituency left alone and all other stakeholder groups were assem-
bled into a ‘civil society’ constituency. This clearly privileges private sector stakeholders and 
makes it more difficult for other stakeholder groups to get their particular perspectives 
through in the larger civil society group. A broad representation of stakeholders would en-
hance democratic legitimacy and move towards Adorno’s idea of constellations (Cassegård, 
2021), whereby a variety of different felt experiences from various actors can contribute to a 
more comprehensive representation of the objects discussed in the GCF. This is not to say 
that contradiction concealment would cease to exist by reintroducing the nine-constituency 
model in the GCF, but the reduction of constituencies raises yet another obstacle to making 
different felt experiences visible. 
       A broad representation of stakeholders through several constituency groups would likely 
increase political demands on the GCF and challenge the institutional efficiency and the op-
erationalization of the fund. It could also increase the critique against the role of private sector 
in GCF, of which many CSOs are critical. A private sector representative in the GCF has 
openly criticized the fund for being overly political and has advocated a depoliticized man-
agement of the fund. Hence, the GCF does not want to jeopardize the exchange with the 
private sector, so to control potential conflicts that would challenge the private sector 
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involvement, the GCF subsumes and pacifies stakeholders from civil society in the larger 
CSO group. The GCF statement that “The active engagement of diverse stakeholders is in 
the DNA of the Green Climate Fund” (Green Climate Fund, 2021c) is a form of contradiction 
concealment since the GCF actually reduces the possibility for diverse stakeholders to artic-
ulate their particular concerns by creating a two-constituency model.  
       In study 2, we analyse the guiding principle of transformational change in the GCF, 
using the analytical concept of empty signifier (Laclau, 2005; Laclau & Mouffe, 2001). A 
signifier is empty in the sense that it is not fixed and sometimes incorporates ambiguous 
elements that allow a variety of actors to gather around something but without changing the 
power relations that exist in a social order. It acts as a stabilizer by absorbing and dampening 
potential conflicts. In this sense it is similar to the way immanent critique describes contra-
diction concealment and how the ‘big picture’ of unity prevails, despite heterogeneity, con-
tradictions and conflicts.  
      Although there is no formal definition of transformational change in the GCF it is often 
connected with discussions about the need for applicants (countries in the Global South) to 
include new and innovative financial instruments in their funding proposals that can incen-
tivize investments from the private sector. Financial support in the form of grants and con-
cessional loans are instead described as business-as-usual. The GCF solution is to provide 
clearer guidance and capacity-building to developing countries which could improve the 
‘quality’ of proposals and enhance their transformational potential. Developing countries re-
act by accusing the GCF of being overly prescriptive towards developing countries and high-
lighting how this violates another embraced principle in the GCF, country ownership, i.e., it 
is developing countries themselves that should define their needs in project proposals.  
The GCF finds itself in an awkward position between top-down governance and the em-
bracement of country ownership. The concealment of this contradiction appears through as-
surances about the transformational objective as not conflicting with country ownership. An-
other more elaborate strategy to conceal the contradiction is to portray a financialization of 
developing countries, not only as compatible with country ownership, but as a flexible re-
sponse to the needs of developing countries, although there is no evidence that developed 
countries have asked for these new financial instruments. 
In study 3 I analyse how vulnerability is turned into a regulatory object and the dominant 
perspectives that shape which aspects of vulnerability become visible and invisible in the 
GCF. The study uses Jasanoff’s co-production approach, which can be used to problematize 
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that which becomes repressed and subsumed in the representation of objects, often by domi-
nant logics such as science, which according to Jasanoff continues to separate “nature, facts, 
objectivity, reason and policy from those of culture, values, subjectivity, emotion and poli-
tics” (2004, p. 3).  
One of the major tasks for the GCF is to provide support for those that are particularly 
vulnerable to climate change, but the emphasis on calculative logics in the GCF subsumes 
important aspects of vulnerability, including the normative, ethical and political dimensions. 
One example is the use of insurance, which is based on risk management and the quantifica-
tion of vulnerability aspects. Other non-quantifiable aspects of vulnerability become invisi-
ble. The economic logic of insurance could also conflict with the GCF’s commitment to sup-
port those particularly vulnerable to climate change. If climate change leads to more frequent 
and worsening weather effects, the insurance premiums become too expensive for those seek-
ing insurance and it becomes less profitable for the insurance companies, leading to the with-
drawal of the insurance business from such affected areas and populations, which is recog-
nized as a risk by the GCF. This would obviously leave those particularly vulnerable to cli-
mate change without protection. Concealment can take many forms and one approach is 
simply to ignore contradictions (Gunderson, 2017), which seems to be the case here. Despite 
the risks of relying on insurance, the GCF continues to promote insurance as a good adapta-
tion strategy.  
Finally, in study 4 we analyse the role of indigenous peoples in the GCF and the potential 
for epistemic belonging. Epistemic belonging describes the mutual recognition among expert 
communities and the circumstances that enable them to enact their epistemic practices, espe-
cially those whose knowledge contributions have been devalued, e.g., indigenous knowledge. 
This can be related to Cassegård’s (2021) discussion on Adorno’s constellations. Cassegård 
(2021) argues that a broad representation of objects, enabled by different outlooks and dif-
ferent felt experiences, makes objects more complex and potentially contradictory, but also 
richer and truer to the complexity of the object. 
We analyse the possibilities of epistemic belonging in relation to the development of and 
use of the GCF Indigenous Peoples Policy (IPP). The policy emphasizes the importance of 
recognizing the traditional knowledge and practices of indigenous peoples, but in other doc-
uments the GCF emphasizes the foundational role of evidence-based and scientific practices 
in the work of the GCF. These different outlooks on knowledge and the relevance of different 
sorts of knowledge could potentially lead to contradictions and conflicts. Some of these 
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conflicts are visible in the development of the policy. Indigenous knowledge is described 
more as something static, exemplified by wordings such as ‘traditional knowledge’, which 
the GCF should help to protect. Representatives of indigenous peoples on the other hand see 
a more active role for indigenous knowledge, but this is also constrained by epistemic differ-
ences. Western scientific perspectives are dominant and indigenous peoples have difficulty 
introducing a more holistic view of nature. This tension is not discussed by the GCF.  
In the second part of the analysis, we examine the application of the IPP. We think the 
IPP is a potential tool for indigenous peoples to exert their influence but it can only work if 
the IPP is actually used. Our analysis of funding proposal assessments shows that the IPP is 
sparsely used in the GCF, which is frequently pointed out by indigenous peoples’ represent-
atives at board meetings. Indigenous peoples argue that the IPP highlights evaluative dimen-
sions that other frameworks and safeguards used in these proposals do not. It sounds contra-
dictory to develop a policy that representatives of indigenous peoples prefer, but then not use 
it. We argue that there are few incentives for the GCF to apply the stricter IPP in assessing 
funding proposals, which could force accredited entities to reassess their proposals or lead to 
their proposals being rejected. The GCF’s dependency on accredited entities for planning and 
implementing climate projects creates a conflict between accredited entities, which could 
provide established safeguards, although not as strict as the IPP, and help the GCF to plan, 
implement and manage climate projects, and indigenous peoples, who could disturb project 
development by using the IPP. The strategy for the GCF is to portray the safeguards used by 
the accredited entities as equivalent to the IPP, which indigenous peoples argue they are not. 
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6. Methods and material 
 
This thesis is focused on contradictions, ambiguities and conflicts in GCF governance. The 
process of meaning making or sense making around governance issues is to a large degree 
mediated through language, making qualitative methods more suitable than quantitative. The 
thesis is mainly based on document analyses. Documents in all forms are at the centre of 
almost all GCF activities. They hold together and constitute the GCF as an entity, both inter-
nally and to the outside. This is exemplified by the GCF Handbook (Green Climate Fund, 
2021a), which is a compilation of important GCF documents. The handbook runs up to a 
sizable 761 pages in the latest version. Three of the four studies also include complementary 
interviews (studies 1, 2 and 4). Interviews have been used as ‘reality checks’ that confirm 
and support findings in the document analyses. Below I will discuss methods and material in 
more detail. I begin with the empirical material and then discuss how the material has been 
analysed.  
Regarding research ethics: all documents are publicly available and hence do not contain 
any sensitive content. Prior to the interviews all interviewees were informed in a written 
document about the four ethical rules developed by the Swedish Research Council. Partici-
pants were informed about: 1) what the research is about: 2) consent; 3) confidentiality; and 
4) how the research material will be used. All interviewees are anonymized in the articles. 
 
6.1. Documents 
Some might argue that documents are poor sources for analysing contradictions, ambiguities, 
and conflicts, that organization documents are controlled and well-arranged black-box rep-
resentations that do not reveal anything about potential conflicts surrounding their making. 
This is true; often we do not know anything about the discussions preceding the publication 
of a document2 but the absence of an explicit conflict does not exclude the existence of con-
tradictions, ambiguities and potential conflicts in documents, especially not in a complex 
organization such as the GCF, which tries to respond to and incorporate a variety of different 
perspectives (see section 3.2.). These organizational circumstances make GCF-related 
 
2 Sometimes GCF documents do make conflicts explicit, particularly board meeting reports where different 
actors may debate and show the conflicting dimensions in global climate finance governance. External GCF-
related documents from civil society organizations also often articulate conflicts explicitly.   
The Governance of Global Climate Finance 
 41  
 
documents rich sources for identifying contradictions, ambiguities, and conflicts. Apart from 
GCF documents, I also use external documents from civil society organizations, private sec-
tor organizations, and other international organizations engaged with the GCF or in other 
ways involved in climate finance. All types of documents that can enhance the picture of the 
object of study are interesting, which means there is often a mixture of different types of 
documents in the studies, although some may occur more frequently than others. If you find 
consistent patterns across a variety of organization documents it is likely to be an indication 
of persistent and dominant views within an organization. In the following subsections I will 
present the different forms of documents used and what information they contain. 
 
6.1.1. Green Climate Fund documents 
Here I will briefly mention what kind of GCF documents are used in the thesis. For a more 
thorough description of the different types of GCF documents, see Appendix A. Broadly, 
GCF documents are categorized as Operational Documents or Board Documents, which are 
then further divided into different subtypes within the broader categories. The category of 
Operational Documents consists of 28 subtypes of documents. The GCF writes that these 
documents, e.g. proposals, agreements and reports, “facilitate and formalize working ar-
rangements and ensure that activities are done properly and smoothly” (Green Climate Fund, 
2020d). Sometimes the subtypes seem to overlap. The documents used from the category of 
Operational Documents in the thesis are policies, guidelines, publications, and templates.  
The majority of the documents used in this thesis are from the latter category of Board 
documents that describe the work of the Board and other GCF units and actors supporting 
the work of the Board. These documents are divided into seven subtypes by the GCF: Agen-
das, Board Meeting Reports, Action Items, Co-chairs Notes, Decisions, Information, and 
Submissions. Most of the material used in the analyses comes from Board Meeting Reports, 
Action Items, Information documents, and Submissions. The three last types of documents 
are found in connection with agenda items, often included in annexes to GCF meeting reports. 
These may be technical reports from experts and working groups, policy drafts, strategic 
plans, annual reports, decision proposals, guideline drafts, policy drafts, and submissions 
from external actors, e.g., civil society organizations. In turn, these documents may contain 
further references to other associated documents.  
The selection of GCF documents was obviously based on the relevance of the documents 
in relation to the object of analysis in the different studies. When the object of analysis 
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consistent patterns across a variety of organization documents it is likely to be an indication 
of persistent and dominant views within an organization. In the following subsections I will 
present the different forms of documents used and what information they contain. 
 
6.1.1. Green Climate Fund documents 
Here I will briefly mention what kind of GCF documents are used in the thesis. For a more 
thorough description of the different types of GCF documents, see Appendix A. Broadly, 
GCF documents are categorized as Operational Documents or Board Documents, which are 
then further divided into different subtypes within the broader categories. The category of 
Operational Documents consists of 28 subtypes of documents. The GCF writes that these 
documents, e.g. proposals, agreements and reports, “facilitate and formalize working ar-
rangements and ensure that activities are done properly and smoothly” (Green Climate Fund, 
2020d). Sometimes the subtypes seem to overlap. The documents used from the category of 
Operational Documents in the thesis are policies, guidelines, publications, and templates.  
The majority of the documents used in this thesis are from the latter category of Board 
documents that describe the work of the Board and other GCF units and actors supporting 
the work of the Board. These documents are divided into seven subtypes by the GCF: Agen-
das, Board Meeting Reports, Action Items, Co-chairs Notes, Decisions, Information, and 
Submissions. Most of the material used in the analyses comes from Board Meeting Reports, 
Action Items, Information documents, and Submissions. The three last types of documents 
are found in connection with agenda items, often included in annexes to GCF meeting reports. 
These may be technical reports from experts and working groups, policy drafts, strategic 
plans, annual reports, decision proposals, guideline drafts, policy drafts, and submissions 
from external actors, e.g., civil society organizations. In turn, these documents may contain 
further references to other associated documents.  
The selection of GCF documents was obviously based on the relevance of the documents 
in relation to the object of analysis in the different studies. When the object of analysis 
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coincided with formal governance areas in the GCF, the GCF Handbook (2021a) turned out 
to be a good starting point for finding relevant documents, e.g., the processes surrounding 
the development of the Indigenous Peoples Policy or the review of observer participation in 
the GCF, which are easily identifiable in the GCF Handbook. Most GCF documents are num-
bered using the GCF document register system which makes them relatively easy to find3.  
Individual GCF documents are accessed through the GCF website where you can search by 
register number or words. You can also apply different filter functions in your search. In 
some of the studies, the objects of analyses did not coincide with formal standalone govern-
ance areas in the GCF Handbook. To find relevant documents I searched for keywords related 
to the analysed issue in the GCF Handbook and on the GCF website, where all public GCF 
documents can be found using various search filters. The website also has search filters to 
find more specific documents. 
 
6.1.2. Transitional Committee documents 
The Transitional Committee was set up by the UNFCCC to design the GCF, so documents 
from the Transitional Committee are not technically GCF documents but are found on the 
UNFCCC website (UNFCCC, 2011a). During 2011, the Transitional Committee had four 
meetings and three workshops. Participants included country representatives from develop-
ing and developed countries, United Nations organs such as the UNDP, the World Bank and 
other development banks, non-governmental actors from civil society and private sector or-
ganizations. Other actors involved in the work of the Transitional Committee work included 
members of the Technical Support Unit who assisted the Transitional Committee Board. 
Members of the Technical Support unit were staff recruited from existing UN organs for the 
special purpose of designing the GCF. The types of documents that were used in the Transi-
tional Committee include Information Notes, Agendas, Meeting Summaries, Background 
Notes, Reports, Presentations, Scoping Papers, Working Papers, Drafts, Information Notes 
and Submissions. For a more detailed description of the different types of documents see 
Appendix A. 
 
3 The somewhat easy access to GCF documents does not mean that the GCF is always transparent. For study 
1, I requested information from the GCF not found on the GCF website. This concerned the Secretariat’s rec-
ommendations to the Board regarding which organizations that applied for observer status in the GCF should 
be accredited by the GCF. This was denied by the Secretariat. It was argued that such disclosure would affect 
the legitimate privacy of organization representatives applying on behalf of their organization. This infor-
mation would not have been difficult to remove and this non-disclosure makes it impossible to investigate on 
what grounds some civil society and private sector organizations become accredited while others are denied 
observer status in the GCF. 
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The selection of Transitional Committee documents was somewhat easier than for GCF doc-
uments. TC documents are related to a particular event, the design of the GCF, which also 
limits the number of documents. Of course, not all Transitional Committee documents were 
relevant, and based on the object of analysis in study 1, the selection of documents focused 
on the existence of discussions about the role of stakeholders and observers in the upcoming 
GCF. 
 
6.1.3. Other external documents 
External documents in the thesis come from civil society organizations discussing the GCF, 
e.g. Jubilee South, and documents from other climate governance organizations such as the 
Climate Investment Fund. They are not connected with any formal submission process within 
the Transitional Committee or the GCF and are often used in the introductions and back-
ground descriptions of the studies, except in study 4 where they are also part of the analytical 
material. These documents are not described in any more detail. 
 
6.2. Interviews 
There are 10 interviews in total (one of the interviewees from the Global South was inter-
viewed twice): one GCF Board member, representing a developed country in the GCF; three 
civil society organization representatives from the Global North – all accredited observers to 
the GCF; three civil society organization representatives from the Global South – all accred-
ited observers to the GCF; one civil society organization representative working for devel-
oping country representatives in the GCF; and one private sector representative from the 
Global South, also an accredited observer to the GCF. Within their own organizations the 
interviewees have the roles and responsibilities of climate finance specialist and GCF spe-
cialist. Often, they are responsible for engaging directly with the GCF, e.g., as an accredited 
observer. The Board member interviewee is affiliated with a ministry in the home country, 
which is common among GCF board members. 
       I did expect to collect more interview material but access was a recurring problem. At-
tempts were made to interview members from the GCF Secretariat but with no success. There 
have been discussions about the Secretariat being understaffed (Bruun, 2017), which was 
confirmed by our interaction with the Secretariat in relation to study 2. Me and my co-author 
Håkan Thörn made a request to interview members of the Secretariat. The Secretariat re-
sponded that it received a high volume of queries daily and that it probably would not be able 
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to respond in a timely manner. Instead, the Secretariat provided links to GCF documents it 
thought could be useful. We sent a reminder to the Secretariat about the interview request 
later but we did not receive any answer. I also made several attempts to interview board 
members but with very limited success. Those who were most willing to be interviewed are 
members from civil society organizations, which may also reflect relations of power. It is 
likely that those who feel that their concerns are less well represented in the GCF will have 
a greater incentive to voice their concerns through other channels. Nevertheless, the reply 
frequencies for our interview requests were also quite low for this group. One can only spec-
ulate as to why. Previous research has shown that participation in the GCF is demanding for 
many civil society organizations. The amount of reading they need to do to prepare for Board 
meetings is described as very extensive (Bruun, 2017). 
       Two of the interviews were carried out face to face and audio-recorded. The other inter-
views were accomplished using social media platforms such as FaceTime or Zoom. These 
interviews were both audio- and video-recorded, except one, and this was a condition put 
forward by the interviewee. For this interview I made notes during and right after the inter-
view. The reason for doing interviews using social media platforms was because of large 
geographical distances. It did not feel justifiable to travel very long distances to conduct a 
few interviews. My experience of doing interviews using social media platforms is that they 
do not differ that much from a face-to-face interview. The interviews lasted between 40 and 
60 minutes. For the interviews I used semi-structured interview guides that allowed the in-
terviewee to expand on what the interviewee thought was interesting and also ensured that 
certain themes were covered. The interviews were usually transcribed verbatim, including 
pauses, emotional responses, and restarts. 
 
6.3. Analysing data 
The general analytical approach used in this thesis can be defined as abduction, i.e., the merg-
ing of deductive and inductive reasoning. The risk of putting too much emphasis on deductive 
reasoning is that the empirical data may be forced into pre-existing theoretical concepts that 
poorly reflect what is going on in the empirical field. This can be balanced against a more 
grounded approach that is more sensitive to the empirical material. Tavory and Timmer-
manns (2014) discuss how it is possible to ground the analysis in the empirical material while 
recognizing the social embeddedness of meaning making. They argue that meaning making 
is not only driven by our ideas but “the object [of analysis] must be understood as an active 
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part of the puzzle of meaning-making” (Tavory & Timmermans, 2014, p. 25). By recognizing 
the “affordances that the objects itself provides” (ibid, 26), analyses can become more 
grounded and better reflect the objects of analysis. Abduction then, as used in this thesis, was 
an iterative analytical process in which I constantly tried to be conscious of the resistance in 
the empirical data and allowed this resistance to shape my interpretations while developing 
theoretical abstractions, which in turn has helped me to see the data in new ways. Below I 
will describe a general picture of my analytical processes. 
 
6.3.1. Coding and interpretation 
Compared to interviews that often apply some sort of purposeful design, such as a semi-
structured interview, organizational documents do not necessarily fit one’s purposes or re-
search concerns neatly, so it is obviously necessary to find keywords that can help to identify 
text passages that are relevant for your purposes (Auerbach & Silverstein, 2003). Keywords 
can be general concepts, concepts from previous research but also concepts more specific to 
the organizational context. In study 1, the purpose was to examine stakeholder participation 
in the GCF and words such as ‘stakeholder’, ‘participation’ were obvious choices, but ‘ob-
servers’ and ‘active observers’ also became important keywords, as these are particular con-
cepts used by the GCF to describe formal stakeholder roles in the GCF. The more I familiar-
ized myself with the material in each study the more useful keywords I was able find. Due to 
the sometimes extensive material I often used the auto-coding function in Atlas.ti, which is 
the Computer-Assisted Qualitative Data Analysis Software (CAQDAS), used in all the stud-
ies. The auto-coding function simply traces all occurrences of selected keywords in the ma-
terial, which obviously speeds up the process of finding relevant text passages. Apart from 
the keyword search described above, the interviews were analysed in the same way as the 
documents described below. 
After having identified relevant text passages, the early coding was often based on a more 
inductive approach. I basically used ‘in vivo’ coding, using the words and concepts occurring 
in the text and related to discussions around my keywords. The keyword of transformational 
change in study 2, for example, was connected with discussions about ‘new financial instru-
ments’, ‘innovative’, ‘private sector’, ‘project proposals’, ‘good quality’, ‘guidelines’ and 
‘country ownership’. Right from the beginning I used memos to collect my ideas appearing 
during the coding process. At this early stage I did not categorize them as particular types of 
memos and they had no other function than to collect whatever ideas appeared in my head 
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when reading the texts. Many of them withered as the analysis developed but some could be 
further developed as new understandings emerged through the analyses.  
As the coding process evolved, ‘in vivo’ coding was replaced by more descriptive cod-
ing. GCF documents have several layers of actors I had to be aware of. Questions such as 
who wrote the text, which actors figure in the text, who says or does what, who is implied 
but not explicitly mentioned, what roles are attributed and by whom, were used to code and 
make sense of relevant interactions and relations. Scale is another example of a common 
descriptive code I used, this because the GCF is situated in a rather complex cross-scale 
structure.  
In the later stages of analysis, I focused more on finding patterns in the material, how the 
codes related to each other, and on identifying any more interpretive and theoretical codes 
that could be applied to make sense of these patterns. During this stage memos were also 
further elaborated. They often contained longer discussions as I was trying to grasp the ma-
terial at a more abstract level. This is also where the abductive approach was most obvious 
as I moved between ideas from previous research, existing theoretical perspectives, and the 
empirical material. In some of the studies, for example in study 2, the theoretical concept of 
empty signifier seemed to work well right from the beginning and did not change during the 
analytical process. At other times the initial theoretical concepts were partly replaced. In 
study 4, we elaborated on a few different theoretical ideas before deciding what captured the 
material in the best way, which was also a response to expansion of the empirical material. 
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7. The studies 
 
Study I 
Bertilsson, J. (Manuscript). Organizing Stakeholder Involvement in Global Climate 
Governance: The Effects of Resource Dependencies and Institutional Logics in the 
Green Climate Fund (revised and re-submitted to Environmental Values). 
 
Stakeholder participation has been strongly advocated in environmental governance, espe-
cially on a global scale where it has been seen as a remedy to the ‘democratic deficit’ in 
global climate governance. The GCF claims that active engagement of a diverse set of stake-
holders is central to the GCF. The study applies a critical perspective on stakeholder partici-
pation and investigates what stakeholder roles are enabled or restricted in the GCF, and the 
mechanisms shaping this organization. The study is based on a document analysis with sup-
port from interviews with stakeholder representatives in the Green Climate Fund (GCF).  
Previous research on stakeholder participation in climate governance has often focused 
on either ideational dimensions or resource aspects that affect stakeholder participation. This 
study suggests that our understanding of stakeholder organization can benefit from an explo-
ration of the interconnectedness between ideational and resource dimensions.  
The study shows how resource dependencies and the institutional logics connected with 
the realization of resources determine which stakeholder roles become privileged or subor-
dinated. The reliance of the GCF on the inflow of money and limited pledges from developed 
countries has led to an emphasis on private sector investment. It is argued in the study that 
the arrangement of stakeholder constituencies in the GCF was affected by the presence of 
this market logic. The nine-constituency model established by the UNFCCC was reduced to 
only two in the GCF, with the private sector constituency unchanged. Many CSOs criticized 
the privileged role of private sector stakeholders and interpreted the two-constituency model 
as an attempt to single out the private sector because they can help to develop private sector 
investments for GCF climate projects. Collecting all other stakeholders and their diverse in-
terests into a single civil society group limits their ability to express their particular views 
and they can only make general statements. This is interpreted in the study as a way to control 
politically oriented stakeholders. Fewer conflicts mean that the GCF can satisfy the private 
sector’s preference for a depoliticized management of the fund. 
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The GCF is also dependent on large, resourceful and technically oriented partners in the 
planning, implementing, and monitoring of climate projects. This partnership logic is re-
flected in GCF’s criteria for becoming an accredited stakeholder in the GCF. In the applica-
tion, organizations have to declare their specialized scientific and technical competences, 
together with descriptions of their well-organized administrative structure. Smaller, less re-
sourceful and politically oriented stakeholders have difficulties meeting these criteria, despite 
being already poorly represented in the GCF, according to civil society critique. Broad rep-
resentativity is then subordinated by this partnership logic. Politically oriented stakeholders 
that critically examine GCF’s partners are controlled at board meetings to prevent them from 
challenging the collaboration with important partners.  
The claim that the GCF seeks the active engagement of diverse stakeholders can be ques-
tioned. The GCF is mainly interested in stakeholders that can bring certain resources to the 
fund, in other words private sector stakeholders and large, resourceful and technically ori-
ented stakeholders. Smaller, less resourceful and mainly politically oriented stakeholders, 
especially from the Global South, face restrictions. 
 
Study II 
Bertilsson, J., & Thörn, H. (2021). Discourses on transformational change and para-
digm shift in the Green Climate Fund: the divide over financialization and country 
ownership. Environmental Politics, 30 (3), 423-441.   
 
This study analyses how the governing principles of transformational change and paradigm 
shift are used in the GCF. The concept of transformational change in particular has become 
institutionalized in both scientific and policy communities discussing environmental govern-
ance, especially climate change governance. However, there is little consensus on what the 
concept actually means. Also, critical research on the underlying premises and assumptions 
about transformational change and how it is applied in governance has been limited. The 
analysis uses GCF documents and interviews as empirical material.  
We argue that the GCF charges transformational change with a meaning that enables a 
top-down financialization of recipient countries, while still describing it as country owner-
ship. To assist in understanding these seemingly contradictory discursive practices we apply 
the analytical concept of empty signifier.  
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Some board members and the Private Sector Advisory Group (a sub-unit within the Green 
Climate Fund) argue that public funding will be limited, which makes it crucial to incentivize 
investments from the private sector. The Green Climate fund needs to go beyond grants and 
concessional loans and offer a wider palette of financial products, e.g., green bonds and in-
surance products. The problem is that many project proposals lack an engagement with the 
private sector and hence recipient countries need further guidance. This guidance should pro-
vide clarity on the expectations of co-financing (e.g., the private sector). In argumentations 
for better guidance, private sector inclusion is equated with transformational change and par-
adigm shift. Some civil society representatives and board members challenge the argument 
that financialization of the Green Climate Fund is inevitable and a primary goal. They argue 
that financial instruments should be judged on their effectiveness at meeting the needs of 
recipient countries, as articulated by the countries themselves, not the ability to mobilize 
funds from the private sector.  
The GCF is caught between different commitments. The Green Climate Fund embraces 
the principle of country ownership and recognizing the needs articulated by recipient coun-
tries, but at the same time there are many actors in the Green Climate Fund pushing for fi-
nancialization of the Green Climate Fund, despite limited interest from recipient countries. 
The Green Climate Fund tries to overcome this conflict by equating the needs of recipient 
countries with financialization of global climate governance. The Green Climate Fund argues 
that as the needs in recipient countries evolve as a consequence of climate change the Green 
Climate Fund will need to respond flexibly, e.g., with increasingly innovative financing 
mechanisms. Financialization of the Green Climate Fund is thus not a challenge to the needs 
in recipient countries, rather a flexible response to their needs. This can be seen as an attempt 
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The GCF is also dependent on large, resourceful and technically oriented partners in the 
planning, implementing, and monitoring of climate projects. This partnership logic is re-
flected in GCF’s criteria for becoming an accredited stakeholder in the GCF. In the applica-
tion, organizations have to declare their specialized scientific and technical competences, 
together with descriptions of their well-organized administrative structure. Smaller, less re-
sourceful and politically oriented stakeholders have difficulties meeting these criteria, despite 
being already poorly represented in the GCF, according to civil society critique. Broad rep-
resentativity is then subordinated by this partnership logic. Politically oriented stakeholders 
that critically examine GCF’s partners are controlled at board meetings to prevent them from 
challenging the collaboration with important partners.  
The claim that the GCF seeks the active engagement of diverse stakeholders can be ques-
tioned. The GCF is mainly interested in stakeholders that can bring certain resources to the 
fund, in other words private sector stakeholders and large, resourceful and technically ori-
ented stakeholders. Smaller, less resourceful and mainly politically oriented stakeholders, 
especially from the Global South, face restrictions. 
 
Study II 
Bertilsson, J., & Thörn, H. (2021). Discourses on transformational change and para-
digm shift in the Green Climate Fund: the divide over financialization and country 
ownership. Environmental Politics, 30 (3), 423-441.   
 
This study analyses how the governing principles of transformational change and paradigm 
shift are used in the GCF. The concept of transformational change in particular has become 
institutionalized in both scientific and policy communities discussing environmental govern-
ance, especially climate change governance. However, there is little consensus on what the 
concept actually means. Also, critical research on the underlying premises and assumptions 
about transformational change and how it is applied in governance has been limited. The 
analysis uses GCF documents and interviews as empirical material.  
We argue that the GCF charges transformational change with a meaning that enables a 
top-down financialization of recipient countries, while still describing it as country owner-
ship. To assist in understanding these seemingly contradictory discursive practices we apply 
the analytical concept of empty signifier.  
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In recent discussions, vulnerability has been connected with discussions in social science and 
policy about the need for more profound social changes in order to adapt, often discussed as 
transformative adaptation. The discussion is mainly normative and few studies apply a crit-
ical perspective on transformational change in relation to vulnerability, which this study aims 
to do. This study explores how the meaning of vulnerability is shaped in the GCF and how 
the concept of transformational change is implicated in this. The empirical material consists 
of GCF documents. 
The analysis uses Jasanoff’s co-production approach and shows how dominant logics 
such as science, market logics, and other economic logics are used to measure and finance 
the management of vulnerability. The scientific approach reduces vulnerability to those as-
pects that preferably can be quantified. This makes for an easily demarcated regulatory object 
that can be governed in a predictable way but it also reduces those aspects of vulnerability 
that will not be easily quantifiable, such as the normative, ethical and political aspects of 
vulnerability.  
The GCF works hard to make adaption actions compatible with market logics and tries 
to support the development of ‘innovative financing’ in adaptation. Developing countries 
also need to be educated on how to make a business case for adaptation; they need to learn 
to speak the language of the private sector and make themselves bankable according to the 
GCF. This obviously reduces vulnerability to those aspects that can be made profitable for 
the private sector. The insurance business is described as a natural partner for the GCF that 
can provide high-impact interventions. The insurance business is based on risk management 
and also requires quantifiable data, which also reduces the aspects of vulnerability that are 
made visible.  
The GCF discourse on transformational change does not have the radical connotations 
sometimes found in research. Transformational change in the GCF is closely connected with 
private sector inclusion and the expansion of new financial products for adaptation. It is as-
sumed that an expansion of private sector funding is essential in order to achieve transforma-
tional adaptation that addresses urgent vulnerabilities. The private sector is described as hav-
ing a transformational role by helping societies adapt to a rapidly changing environment, and 
is often seen as the only actor with the flexibility needed to meet these challenges. Funding 
proposals are required to discuss their transformational impact, and if transformational 
change is equated with private sector involvement, then aspects of vulnerability that may be 
articulated are, again, only those that can be profitable for the private sector. 
The studies 
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Study IV 
Bertilsson, J., & L. Soneryd (Manuscript). Indigenous peoples in the Green Climate 
Fund (submitted to Environmental Sociology). 
 
The study investigates the role of indigenous peoples in the GCF. The GCF emphasizes the 
importance of indigenous knowledge and at the same time the GCF stresses the scalability of 
projects, how they can become standardized models that are transferable to other contexts. 
This contradiction between generalizability and the particular and local is a potential conflict 
and we want to know how and to what degree indigenous knowledge and perspectives are 
included and recognized in the GCF, and if they matter in practice. We analyse this by inves-
tigating the development of the GCF Indigenous Peoples Policy and how this policy is used 
in GCF discussions about funding proposals that include indigenous peoples. The empirical 
material consists of both documents and interviews with civil society organizations repre-
senting indigenous peoples in the GCF. Documents include material such as policies, reports 
from the GCF, funding proposals to the GCF, and civil society organization opinion papers 
and reports. 
One analytical concept used in the study is epistemic belonging, which emphasizes the 
mutual recognition of expert communities, and the circumstances that exist and may be cre-
ated to support the use of their special knowledge. We also connect this to ideas about organ-
izational dependency, which influences the type of partner organizations that are valued most 
highly, and which may affect the degree of inclusion and epistemic belonging for indigenous 
peoples in the GCF  
There are somewhat contradictory accounts of the process of developing the IPP. Some 
believe the process was inclusive while others thought the GCF Secretariat mainly organized 
the process. However, some are quite satisfied with the outcome. The policy emphasizes the 
positive contribution of indigenous knowledge in mitigation and adaptation actions. The real 
test though, as some of the interviewees argued, is how the policy is implemented.  
When it comes to discussions on knowledge forms, there are some tensions. The policy 
uses the term ‘traditional knowledge’ but an interviewee prefers indigenous knowledge. ‘Tra-
ditional’ might imply that indigenous knowledge is static and not flexible enough to contrib-
ute to new forms of knowledge. The policy often talks about protecting traditional 
knowledge, which also underlines the static dimension. Indigenous peoples also express how 
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they struggle to make their holistic view more relevant for climate organizations, which is 
dominated by western science perspectives.  
The policy is sparsely used in funding proposal assessments. This is repeatedly com-
mented on by indigenous peoples who argue that the policy protects the interests of indige-
nous peoples better than other safeguards used to assess the protection and inclusion of in-
digenous peoples in climate projects. It seems contradictory that the GCF does not prioritize 
the use of its own policy. The GCF instead attempts to portray the policies used by the ac-
credited entities as equivalent to the IPP. We explain this by the GCFs dependency on ac-
credited entities. There are no incentives for the GCF to apply their own and supposedly 
stricter policy to assess the funding proposals designed by the same accredited entities that 
help the GCF to plan, implement and manage climate projects. This means that the GCF 
policy becomes subordinated, and representatives of indigenous peoples in the GCF are thus 


























So, what patterns in global climate governance are reproduced or challenged in the GCF, or 
are there any new trajectories? One clear pattern that the GCF reproduces or even enhances 
is the influence of market logics and the private sector in the organization of the GCF. This 
permeates many areas of the GCF. In study 1, I argue that market logics affected the design 
of stakeholder constituencies. A contradiction arises when the GCF emphasizes the active 
engagement of diverse stakeholders while at the same designing a participation arrangement 
that clearly privileges private sector stakeholders. Stakeholders who are committed to high-
lighting the political dimensions of climate finance become subordinated to stakeholders that 
can bring in money from the private sector and/or help the GCF to plan and implement pro-
jects. The GCF has not made any comments on the design of the participation arrangement 
and thus simply ignores the logical inconsistency between stated commitments and the pro-
cedural arrangements. In study 2 we show how the GCF enhances the financialization of 
climate finance through the governing principle of transformational change, which is equated 
to the use of new and supposedly innovative financial instruments in the design of climate 
projects. An emphasis on new financial instruments means that countries in the Global South 
must make themselves bankable if they wish to receive climate funding, which contradicts 
the principle of country ownership, i.e., that project design should be based on the needs 
experienced by countries in the Global South. The GCF tries to overcome this conflict by 
describing a financialization of climate finance as a flexible response to the needs of devel-
oping countries, although there is no evidence that countries in the Global South have asked 
for these financial instruments. On the contrary, many actors in the Global South are sceptical 
of using market solutions to finance climate actions. The market logic also affects what as-
pects of vulnerability become eligible for support. In study 3, I argue that the use of market 
logics in addressing those particularly vulnerable to climate change limits the dimensions of 
vulnerability that are recognized, which may actually contradict the GCF commitment to 
support those that are particularly vulnerable to the adverse effects of climate change. The 
contradiction surrounding the use of insurances is one example. Worsening climate effects 
might lead to such high insurance premiums that vulnerable people could not afford them 
and they are no longer profitable for the insurance business. Although this risk is recognized 
by the GCF, it is by and large ignored and the promotion of new and innovative insurance 
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products is still described as a good adaptation strategy and invaluable for building 
knowledge on climate resilience and risk management.  
Another distinct pattern that is reproduced is the dominance of scientific and technical 
approaches to climate finance governance. Using ‘facts’ in governance makes it easier to 
create measurable and controllable regulatory objects. However, this reduces other important 
dimensions, such as moral, ethical, and political aspects that are difficult to translate into 
measurable and controllable units. In study 1, I show how the technical perspective on gov-
ernance in the GCF affects which stakeholders are privileged in the GCF. In the application 
form for becoming an accredited observer in the GCF, CSOs must specify their specialized 
scientific and technical competences. Politically oriented stakeholders become subordinated 
in this accreditation process, and this contradicts the GCF claim of supporting an active en-
gagement of a diverse set of stakeholders. Scientific practices and their reductive tendency 
are also present in GCF’s management of vulnerability discussed in study 3. Those aspects 
of vulnerability that can be measured and quantified are clearly favoured and reduce other 
dimensions of vulnerability. The western scientific perspective is also present in relation to 
other forms of knowledge contributions, e.g., indigenous knowledge as discussed in study 4. 
Although indigenous peoples are included and their particular perspectives celebrated, they 
have difficulty getting across their more holistic views on nature. 
Does the GCF challenge any structures or develop any new directions? Inclusion in its 
many forms is a recurring theme in previous research, and demands for more inclusive and 
responsive governance are also reflected in the GCF. The GCF likes to portray itself as an 
inclusive organization that is responsive to the needs and interests of a variety of actors, ex-
emplified by the stated ambitions and aims in section 3.2. This may appear as a challenge to 
previous forms of top-down governance. However, inclusive governance also poses a poten-
tial problem as different needs and interests are not necessarily compatible with each other. 
Demands for more and better inclusion will most likely lead to more contradictions and con-
flicts, while at the same time climate organizations want to be perceived as logically coherent 
(Stokke, 2020) and efficient organizations that can achieve what their mandate expects of 
them. Contradictions will of course always exist but the major problem, I argue, is that they 
are not discussed as contradictions. Instead, organizations such as the GCF portray inclusive 
governance as just ‘more and better’, without recognizing the tacit superordination and sub-
ordination of interests, and the power relations and dominant perspectives that affect these 
prioritizations. This is similar to Blühdorn and Deflorian’s (2019) ideas about ‘symbolic 
Conclusion 
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politics’ or ‘simulative politics’.4 Translated into the context of the GCF: the GCF practices 
analysed in the studies of this thesis can be described as ‘simulative governance’, a pretence 
of inclusive governance that claims to be responsive to all needs without any major conflicts, 
but at the same time subordinates those elements that are not compatible with dominant 
logics. 
Does the GCF fail in every way? No, it does not, but given the crucial position that the 
GCF has in the governance of global climate finance, it is important to critically analyse the 
GCF’s mandate, which is to support the Global South with the resources needed to manage 
climate change effects, based on the needs of the Global South. Many stakeholders, especially 
CSOs from both the Global North and the Global South, had high hopes that the GCF would 
be a different organization, one that would be responsive to the needs of the Global South 
(Bruun, 2017). The studies in this thesis show that established dominant structures and power 
relations make this difficult. The patterns of ‘old’ top-down development politics may not be 
as explicit as before but they are still present under portrayals of inclusive governance. 
The fact that this thesis is not policy oriented does not mean it is not constructive, it all 
depends on your time perspective. There is an analogy between critical research and the way 
some social movements work. Critical research and social movement critique of society is 
about social change in the longer perspective, it is about raising questions that do not have 
an immediate answer, it is about providing critique without having to deliver practical solu-
tions, which inevitably would need to connect with established dominant structures that 








4 I think the concepts capture important aspects of governance but I believe that Blühdorn and Deflorian 
(2019) conflate the practices of liberal democracies and their embeddedness in a capitalistic system with dem-
ocratic principles. They argue that “the prevailing and sacrosanct notions of freedom, self-determination, and 
self-realization are firmly based on the principle of unsustainability” (p. 34). China is an example of how a 
capitalistic style and market-based system contribute to unsustainability without being connected with princi-
ples such as freedom, self-determination or self-realization. If so, freedom, self-determination and self-realiza-
tion in China would be limited to being a consumer within a capitalistic style system, which is not (yet) the 
case in liberal democracies. I think there is a danger in conflating these principles with the unsustainable prac-
tices of liberal democracies. This could feed arguments for authoritarianism. I believe that unsustainability is 
better explained by the effects of capitalism and how these principles are utilized in the service of capitalism. 
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Sammanfattning på svenska [Summary in 
Swedish] 
 
Klimatförändringarna är en av vår tids viktigaste frågor och kanske också den mest kompli-
cerade eftersom den utmanar många djupt rotade sociala strukturer, som inte är förenliga med 
ett hållbart förhållningssätt till jorden vi lever på. Hanteringen av klimatförändringarna, både 
att minska utsläppen och att anpassa sig till klimateffekterna, kommer också kräva stora re-
surser. Detta gör att finansieringen av klimatåtgärder och distributionen av dessa resurser ofta 
ger upphov till konflikter i den globala klimatstyrningen, vilket inte minst visar sig vid de 
årliga klimatmötena, de så kallade COP-mötena som sker genom Förenta Nationernas ram-
verk för klimatförändringar, UNFCCC (United Nations Framework Convention on Climate 
Change). Konflikterna gäller frågor om vilka som är mest ansvariga för klimatförändring-
arna, vilka som ska bidra med mest resurser, vilka som behöver resurserna mest, vilka insat-
ser man ska satsa resurserna på, ska resurserna komma från allmänna medel eller ska mark-
naden och den privata sektorn lösa det så kallade finansieringsgapet? Ofta utspelar sig dessa 
konflikter mellan länderna i det globala Nord och det globala Syd. Det globala Nord menar 
att alla har ett ansvar för att minska utsläppen, även de så kallade utvecklingsländerna, vilket 
gör att det globala Nord oftare betonar utsläppsminskningar mer än anpassningsåtgärder.  Det 
globala Nord menar också att allmänna medel inte kommer räcka för att täcka behoven av 
klimatåtgärder, vilket gör den privata sektorn central i mobiliseringen av finansiella medel. 
Det globala Syd hävdar att det är de så kallade utvecklade länderna som har orsakat klimat-
förändringarna och att de därför är skyldiga att minska sina utsläpp mest, samt bistå med ett 
pålitligt och kontinuerligt överförande av resurser till det globala Syd, framförallt till anpass-
ningsåtgärder. Det globala Syd är generellt skeptiska till marknadslösningar för att finansiera 
klimatåtgärder, inte minst på grund av svårigheterna att göra anpassningsåtgärder vinstgi-
vande för den private sektorn. De kräver också att globala Syd själva ska få bestämma hur de 
ska använda resurserna, utifrån sina egna upplevda behov.  
Svårigheten att komma överens kring dessa frågor gör att många problem skjuts på fram-
tiden och indirekt delegeras till organisationer inom den globala klimatstyrningen som ska 
omsätta den globala klimatpolitiken till praktiska åtgärder, såsom klimatfonder som är i fokus 
i den här avhandlingen. Avhandlingens empiriska studieobjekt är Green Climate Fund (GCF) 
som är den största klimatfonden och en av de viktigaste finansiella enheterna inom UNFCCC. 
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Det är klimatfonderna som ska mobilisera de resurser som krävs till olika klimatåtgärder och 
fördela dessa resurser till de länder som behöver dem bäst och som har de mest effektiva 
förslagen på klimatåtgärder.  
GCF ärver således många av spänningarna från den globala klimatpolitiken samtidigt 
som fonden förväntas operationalisera effektiva klimatåtgärder. Svårigheten är att operation-
aliseringen av klimatåtgärder ofta blir inriktad på tekniska frågor, samtidigt som de innehåller 
många politiska dimensioner, vilket gör att det sällan finns en självklar ”objektiv” lösning. 
Detta skapar motsägelser, mångtydigheter och konflikter kring operationaliseringen av kli-
matåtgärder. Dessa spänningar ökar också med krav på att klimatstyrningen ska vara mer 
inkluderande och ta in perspektiv och erfarenheter från flera aktörer i utformandet och ge-
nomförandet av klimatåtgärder. Kraven på inklusion kommer från aktörer från det globala 
Syd som har negativa erfarenheter från toppstyrda åtgärder inom utvecklingspolitiken där 
stora globala organisationer, som t.ex. Världsbanken, dikterade de åtgärder som skulle ge-
nomföras i de så kallade utvecklingsländerna, och sällan utifrån de behov som länderna i det 
globala Syd själva artikulerade.  
  De fyra delstudierna i avhandlingen fokuserar på olika styrningsområden i GCF men det 
gemensamma för studierna är att de på olika sätt granskar hur GCF hanterar de olika krav 
som ställs på organisationen från olika intressen, och de motsägelser och konflikter som upp-
står som ett resultat av det. Avhandlingens övergripande frågor är: 1) Vilka huvudsakliga 
motsägelser, mångtydigheter och konflikter kan identifieras i GCF? 2) Hur hanteras dessa 
motsägelser, mångtydigheter och konflikter av GCF? 3) Hur formar hanteringen av motsä-
gelser, mångtydigheter och konflikter representationen av frågor och aktörer i GCF, vilka 
aspekter blir framträdande och vilka underordnas?  
Avhandlingen bygger på kvalitativa analyser av dokument, framförallt från GCF men 
även andra aktörers dokument, samt intervjuer med aktörer som på olika sätt är involverade 
i GCF, såsom representanter från civilsamhälleorganisationer och den privata sektorn vilka 
är ackrediterade av GCF att delta som observatörer i GCF. I de fyra studierna används olika 
teoretiska verktyg för att fånga det partikulära i studierna men det gemensamma för de ana-
lytiska verktygen är att de kan användas för att dekonstruera och kritiska ifrågasätta GCF:s 
framställningar av en enhetlig och inkluderande klimatstyrning, som gör dess motsägelser, 
mångtydigheter och konflikter osynliga. I avhandlingens kappa appliceras immanent kritik 
som ett övergripande analytiskt ramverk för att diskutera studiernas gemensamma aspekter 
kring enhetliga representationer och underliggande motsägelser och konflikter i GCF.  
Sammanfattning på svenska 
 56  
Sammanfattning på svenska [Summary in 
Swedish] 
 
Klimatförändringarna är en av vår tids viktigaste frågor och kanske också den mest kompli-
cerade eftersom den utmanar många djupt rotade sociala strukturer, som inte är förenliga med 
ett hållbart förhållningssätt till jorden vi lever på. Hanteringen av klimatförändringarna, både 
att minska utsläppen och att anpassa sig till klimateffekterna, kommer också kräva stora re-
surser. Detta gör att finansieringen av klimatåtgärder och distributionen av dessa resurser ofta 
ger upphov till konflikter i den globala klimatstyrningen, vilket inte minst visar sig vid de 
årliga klimatmötena, de så kallade COP-mötena som sker genom Förenta Nationernas ram-
verk för klimatförändringar, UNFCCC (United Nations Framework Convention on Climate 
Change). Konflikterna gäller frågor om vilka som är mest ansvariga för klimatförändring-
arna, vilka som ska bidra med mest resurser, vilka som behöver resurserna mest, vilka insat-
ser man ska satsa resurserna på, ska resurserna komma från allmänna medel eller ska mark-
naden och den privata sektorn lösa det så kallade finansieringsgapet? Ofta utspelar sig dessa 
konflikter mellan länderna i det globala Nord och det globala Syd. Det globala Nord menar 
att alla har ett ansvar för att minska utsläppen, även de så kallade utvecklingsländerna, vilket 
gör att det globala Nord oftare betonar utsläppsminskningar mer än anpassningsåtgärder.  Det 
globala Nord menar också att allmänna medel inte kommer räcka för att täcka behoven av 
klimatåtgärder, vilket gör den privata sektorn central i mobiliseringen av finansiella medel. 
Det globala Syd hävdar att det är de så kallade utvecklade länderna som har orsakat klimat-
förändringarna och att de därför är skyldiga att minska sina utsläpp mest, samt bistå med ett 
pålitligt och kontinuerligt överförande av resurser till det globala Syd, framförallt till anpass-
ningsåtgärder. Det globala Syd är generellt skeptiska till marknadslösningar för att finansiera 
klimatåtgärder, inte minst på grund av svårigheterna att göra anpassningsåtgärder vinstgi-
vande för den private sektorn. De kräver också att globala Syd själva ska få bestämma hur de 
ska använda resurserna, utifrån sina egna upplevda behov.  
Svårigheten att komma överens kring dessa frågor gör att många problem skjuts på fram-
tiden och indirekt delegeras till organisationer inom den globala klimatstyrningen som ska 
omsätta den globala klimatpolitiken till praktiska åtgärder, såsom klimatfonder som är i fokus 
i den här avhandlingen. Avhandlingens empiriska studieobjekt är Green Climate Fund (GCF) 
som är den största klimatfonden och en av de viktigaste finansiella enheterna inom UNFCCC. 
The Governance of Global Climate Finance 
 57  
 
Det är klimatfonderna som ska mobilisera de resurser som krävs till olika klimatåtgärder och 
fördela dessa resurser till de länder som behöver dem bäst och som har de mest effektiva 
förslagen på klimatåtgärder.  
GCF ärver således många av spänningarna från den globala klimatpolitiken samtidigt 
som fonden förväntas operationalisera effektiva klimatåtgärder. Svårigheten är att operation-
aliseringen av klimatåtgärder ofta blir inriktad på tekniska frågor, samtidigt som de innehåller 
många politiska dimensioner, vilket gör att det sällan finns en självklar ”objektiv” lösning. 
Detta skapar motsägelser, mångtydigheter och konflikter kring operationaliseringen av kli-
matåtgärder. Dessa spänningar ökar också med krav på att klimatstyrningen ska vara mer 
inkluderande och ta in perspektiv och erfarenheter från flera aktörer i utformandet och ge-
nomförandet av klimatåtgärder. Kraven på inklusion kommer från aktörer från det globala 
Syd som har negativa erfarenheter från toppstyrda åtgärder inom utvecklingspolitiken där 
stora globala organisationer, som t.ex. Världsbanken, dikterade de åtgärder som skulle ge-
nomföras i de så kallade utvecklingsländerna, och sällan utifrån de behov som länderna i det 
globala Syd själva artikulerade.  
  De fyra delstudierna i avhandlingen fokuserar på olika styrningsområden i GCF men det 
gemensamma för studierna är att de på olika sätt granskar hur GCF hanterar de olika krav 
som ställs på organisationen från olika intressen, och de motsägelser och konflikter som upp-
står som ett resultat av det. Avhandlingens övergripande frågor är: 1) Vilka huvudsakliga 
motsägelser, mångtydigheter och konflikter kan identifieras i GCF? 2) Hur hanteras dessa 
motsägelser, mångtydigheter och konflikter av GCF? 3) Hur formar hanteringen av motsä-
gelser, mångtydigheter och konflikter representationen av frågor och aktörer i GCF, vilka 
aspekter blir framträdande och vilka underordnas?  
Avhandlingen bygger på kvalitativa analyser av dokument, framförallt från GCF men 
även andra aktörers dokument, samt intervjuer med aktörer som på olika sätt är involverade 
i GCF, såsom representanter från civilsamhälleorganisationer och den privata sektorn vilka 
är ackrediterade av GCF att delta som observatörer i GCF. I de fyra studierna används olika 
teoretiska verktyg för att fånga det partikulära i studierna men det gemensamma för de ana-
lytiska verktygen är att de kan användas för att dekonstruera och kritiska ifrågasätta GCF:s 
framställningar av en enhetlig och inkluderande klimatstyrning, som gör dess motsägelser, 
mångtydigheter och konflikter osynliga. I avhandlingens kappa appliceras immanent kritik 
som ett övergripande analytiskt ramverk för att diskutera studiernas gemensamma aspekter 
kring enhetliga representationer och underliggande motsägelser och konflikter i GCF.  
Sammanfattning på svenska 
 58  
 
Studie I 
I den här studien analyseras hur GCF organiserar deltagandet av intressenter (stakeholders) i 
GCF:s deltagararrangemang på den organisatoriska globala nivån. Studien bygger på ana-
lyser av dokument från GCF och olika civilsamhälleorganisationer, samt intervjuer med re-
presentanter för civilsamhälleorganisationer och den privata sektorn.  
GCF hävdar att ett aktivt deltagande av olika typer av intressenter är en del av GCF:s 
”DNA”. Analysen visar dock att man kan ifrågasätta detta påstående. En till synes inklude-
rande diskurs kring deltagande krockar med praktiker som privilegierar vissa intressenter 
över andra. Intressenter som får störst inflytande är representanter för den privata sektorn, 
samt tekniskt orienterade civilsamhälleorganisationer med stor organisatorisk kapacitet. In-
tressenter som underordnas och ges mindre inflytelserika roller är små civilsamhälleorgani-
sationer, som i första hand är politiskt orienterade och som i huvudsak bidrar med sina erfa-
renheter från det globala Syd. Detta visas i omvandlingen av representationsgrupper i GCF 
där UNFCCC:s etablerade modell med nio grupper frångicks och ersattes av endast två grup-
per där den privata sektorn är den enda grupp som får behålla sin egen specifika representat-
ion. Detta påverkar andra gruppers förmåga att artikulera sina åsikter i GCF. Det visas också 
genom att GCF, redan i ansökningsformuläret för att bli ackrediterad som organisation i GCF, 
privilegierar stora tekniskt orienterade organisationer som är viktiga för att hjälpa GCF med 
att planera och implementera klimatprojekt. Det visas till sist genom att GCF försöker kon-
trollera organisationer som kritiskt granskar GCF:s ackreditering av utvecklingsbanker med 
en historia av att bryta mot mänskliga rättigheter i sina projekt.     
Resultaten av studien förklaras genom en kombination av analytiska perspektiv från te-
orier om resursberoende och institutionell logik. Organisationer som GCF är beroende av 
både materiella och immateriella resurser såsom pengar och demokratisk legitimitet. Många 
av dessa resurser kan inte produceras av GCF själva utan kräver deltagande av olika partners. 
Samtidigt bygger realisering av olika resurser på olika institutionella logiker som föreskriver 
hur aktörer ska agera för att uppnå resultat, och dessa logiker är inte nödvändigtvis kompa-
tibla med varandra. GCF eftersträvar både ökade investeringar från den privata sektorn och 
ett mer inkluderande deltagande. Ett utökat deltagande kan dock skapa mer politiska konflik-
ter kring finansieringen av klimatprojekt i GCF och minska intresset hos den privata sektorn. 
Investeringar från den privata sektorn värderas högre och ett mer inkluderat deltagande 
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underordnas och kontrolleras för att inte störa relationen till den privata sektorn. Denna pri-
oritering är inte explicit och detta för att inte störa bilden av en inkluderande organisation.   
 
Studie II 
Begrepp som beskriver behovet av omfattande samhällsomvandling för att hantera klimat-
kriser blir allt vanligare i både samhällsvetenskaplig forskning och i policyutveckling. Be-
greppen transformativ förändring (transformational change) och paradigmskifte (paradigm 
shift) är centrala styrningsprinciper i GCF. Studien söker med hjälp av GCF-dokument och 
intervjuer analysera hur GCF använder dessa begrepp. Trots sin centrala roll i GCF är be-
greppen inte formellt definierade vilket gör dem mångtydiga i många diskussioner. Ett argu-
ment i denna artikel är att begreppens mångtydighet är en viktig del av deras funktion. Teo-
retiskt förstås begreppen som empty signifiers (tomma betecknare). I GCF möjliggör det glid-
ningar av begreppen mot betydelser som är kompatibla med specifika intressen i GCF. Mång-
tydigheten innebär dock att det uppstår konflikter kring begreppens användning utifrån olika 
intressen, en konflikt som GCF på olika sätt försöker överbrygga och göra osynlig. 
Begreppen blir synliga i diskussioner kring projektansökningar till GCF som vissa sty-
relsemedlemmar anser vara av otillräcklig kvalitet, att projekten inte uppfyller kraven på att 
vara ”transformational” (transformerande). Vad som menas initialt är dock inte helt klart men 
begreppet används ändå som ett skäl för implicera behovet av en toppstyrning där GCF:s 
sekretariat ska ta ansvar för definitionen av begreppet samt ge vägledning om vad som är 
transformativt till de som skriver projektansökningar. Detta möter motstånd och kritiken 
handlar om att GCF inte är lyhörda mot de behov som artikuleras av lokala intressenter och 
vilka kan stärka länders egenansvar (country ownership), det vill säga deras rätt att själva äga 
frågor. GCF försöker värja sig mot kritiken och hävdar att man inte utmanar ägandet av frå-
gan utan tillåter tillräcklig flexibilitet kring specifika behov. Senare blir det tydligare att trans-
formativ förändring ofta kopplas till användandet av nya finansiella instrument som ska locka 
den privata sektorn att investera i klimatåtgärder. Detta handlar om att gå bortom en mer 
traditionell finansiering byggd på allmänna medel. Detta möter också motstånd och vissa 
påpekar att GCF inte är en bank som ska maximera vinster till den privata sektorn utan att 
dess roll är att tillfredsställa de behov finns i utvecklingsländerna.  
GCF står mellan olika intressen. Dels vill man stå fast vid sitt engagemang för länders 
egenansvar samtidigt som många förespråkar en finansialisering av GCF och ett större fokus 
på marknadslösningar för att mobilisera resurser till klimatprojekt. GCF försöker överbrygga 
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den konflikten genom att beskriva utvecklandet av nya finansiella instrument i GCF som en 
flexibel respons mot de behov som växer fram i utvecklingsländerna, trots att det inte finns 
några bevis för att dessa instrument efterfrågas av utvecklingsländerna. 
 
Studie III 
Förståelsen och hanteringen av sårbarhet (vulnerability) mot klimateffekter är en central del 
av globala klimatorganisationers arbete. Förståelsen av sårbarhet har förändrats över tid, från 
att ha fokuserat på den direkta påverkan av klimateffekter, ett så kallat risk-effektperspektiv 
(hazard-impact perspective), till att inkludera mer sociala dimensioner såsom människors in-
bäddning i sociala strukturer och hur det påverkar deras anpassningsförmåga. En senare dis-
kussion handlar också om behovet av mer djupgående sociala förändringar för att kunna an-
passa sig till klimatförändringarna, vilket ibland beskrivs som transformativ anpassning 
(transformational adaptation). Som betonas även i studie II, så har begrepp som formulerats 
i anslutning till transformativa processer och klimatförändringarna fått en ökad betydelse 
både inom forskning och policyutveckling. Mycket av tidigare forskning kring transformativ 
anpassning är normativ, dvs. den fokuserar på hur man på bästa sätt kan möjliggöra transfor-
mativa anpassningar. Få tillämpar ett kritiskt perspektiv på begreppet. Den här studien ana-
lyserar hur begreppet används i en policymiljö såsom GCF, som har ett uppdrag att stödja de 
som är särskilt sårbara för klimateffekter.  
Studien bygger på analyser av olika typer av GCF-dokument. Teoretiskt används ansat-
ser från vetenskapsstudier (STS, science and technology studies) och studier av styrning (go-
vernmentality) för att se hur sårbarhet görs till ett avgränsat och hanterbart regleringsobjekt. 
Först identifierar analysen vilka avgränsningar som görs och som har ett stort inflytande på 
vilka aspekter av sårbarhet som betonas i GCF. Det vetenskapliga perspektivet som syftar till 
att göra sårbarhet mätbart, reducerar synen på sårbarhet till de aspekter av sårbarhet som lätt 
kan kvantifieras. Normativa, etiska och politiska dimensioner kring sårbarhet blir därmed 
mindre synliga. Även GCF:s val av metodologier kring kostnadsberäkning för att få finansi-
ellt stöd utesluter effekter av existerande sociala strukturer, t.ex. fattigdom och dess påverkan 
på anpassningsförmåga. En annan dominerande styrningslogik är baserad på ett ekonomiskt 
tänkande och mer specifikt en marknadslogik. GCF söker skapa marknader för anpassnings-
projekt där den privata sektorn kan investera och göra vinster. GCF söker också få länder i 
det globala Syd att förstå vikten av att ha med nya finansiella lösningar i sina projektansök-
ningar som ska locka den privata sektorn att investera. Detta innebär ett fokus på sårbarheter 
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som är marknadskompatibla och att andra sårbarheter som är svåra att omsätta i vinstgivande 
projekt blir underordnade.   
I den andra delen av analysen undersöks hur begreppet transformativ förändring (se 
också studie II), som är en viktig styrningsprincip i GCF, kopplas till kvantifierbarheten och 
marknadslogiken och vilka implikationer det har för vilka aspekter av sårbarhet som betonas 
i GCF. Transformativ förändring kopplas starkt till GCF:s betoning av marknadslogik i ut-
vecklandet av nya anpassningsprojekt. GCF menar att den privata sektorn har en transforma-
tiv roll i anpassningarna till klimateffekter och GCF skriver att ökningen av andelen projekt 
med inriktning mot den privata sektorn kommer möjliggöra transformativa anpassningar som 
adresserar brådskande sårbarheter. Denna diskursiva koppling mellan transformativ föränd-
ring och den privata sektorn konsoliderar marknadslogiken i GCF, vilket också reducerar 




Studien undersöker hur representanter för ursprungsbefolkningar inkluderas i GCF:s arbete. 
GCF betonar betydelsen av de specifika perspektiv som ursprungsbefolkningar kan bidra 
med i utvecklingen av klimatprojekt. Samtidigt betonas ofta generaliserbar kunskapsprodukt-
ion i GCF som kan stå i motsats till det lokala och partikulära. Vi undersöker detta närmare 
i GCF:s utvecklande av sin egen Indigenous Peoples Policy och på vilket sätt den kan vara 
en resurs för ursprungsbefolkningar i att skydda sina intressen och utöka sitt inflytande i 
global klimatstyrning. Studien använder dokument från GCF och organisationer för ur-
sprungsbefolkningar som är involverade i GCF, samt intervjuer av representanter för dessa 
organisationer. För att förstå på vilket sätt och i vilken grad som representanter från ur-
sprungsbefolkningar inkluderas i GCF används begreppet epistemisk tillhörighet (epistemic 
belonging), vilket betonar ett ömsesidigt erkännande av olika kunskapsperspektiv. Detta 
kopplas också till idéer om organisatoriskt beroende (organizational dependency) som be-
skriver hur organisationer är beroende av olika partners men också hur de prioriterar vissa 
partners, vilket kan ha inverkan på hur ursprungsbefolkningar inkluderas i GCF.  
Analysen visar att processer kring utvecklandet av policyn var begränsad vad gäller in-
kluderingen av perspektiv från ursprungsbefolkningar. Policyn uttrycker synsätt på ur-
sprungsbefolkningar som antyder att de ses som bärare av oföränderlig ”traditionell kun-
skap”, vilket kan begränsa möjligheterna för olika kunskapsperspektiv att kunna mötas och 
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den konflikten genom att beskriva utvecklandet av nya finansiella instrument i GCF som en 
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utvecklas i relation till varandra. Trots dessa begränsningar var representanter för ursprungs-
befolkningar relativt nöjda med policyn.  
Analysen undersöker också i vilken grad policyn används i utvärderingar av projektan-
sökningar till GCF som involverar ursprungsbefolkningar. Representanter för ursprungsbe-
folkningar i GCF uttrycker frustration över att policyn inte används av de organisationer som 
utformar projektansökningarna och inte heller av GCF själva när de utvärderar dessa projekt. 
Istället används andra policys som av GCF beskrivs som likvärdiga den egna policyn, vilket 
representanterna för ursprungsbefolkningarna inte håller med om. Vi ser detta som ett uttryck 
för GCF:s beroende av de organisationer som utvecklar klimatprojekten, och som också im-
plementerar och hanterar projekten i praktiken. GCF vill inte kräva att den egna, i delvis 
striktare policyn, måste tillämpas, vilket kan leda till att projekten behöver omprövas eller 
inte ens godkänns. 
 
Slutsatser 
Motsägelser, mångtydigheter och konflikter är oundvikliga i komplexa organisationer som 
hanterar komplexa frågor, men problemet i GCF är att denna komplexitet sällan görs synlig 
som just motsägelser, mångtydigheter eller konflikter. Detta innebär att maktrelationer, i 
form av dominanta perspektiv och ojämlika beroenderelationer, mer eller mindre i tysthet 
över- och underordnar frågor, perspektiv och aktörer. Genom en immanent kritik av GCF har 
dessa motsägelser gjorts mer synliga. De blir synliga när GCF talar om ett aktivt deltagande 
av olika intressenter samtidigt som man privilegierar intressenter från den privata sektorn och 
stora, resursstarka och tekniskt orienterade intressenter. Dessa kommer sällan från fattiga 
länder vars behov GCF har i uppgift att stödja. De blir också synliga när GCF betonar länders 
egenansvar och samtidigt utformar en toppstyrd finansialisering av GCF som få i det globala 
Syd har efterfrågat. Motsägelserna blir vidare synliga i åtgärder som ska stödja dem som är 
särskilt sårbara i förhållande till klimatförändringar, men där åtgärderna samtidigt avgränsar 
aspekter av sårbarhet till de som går mäta med vetenskapliga kvantitativa metoder, de som 
går att begränsa till endast klimateffekter och de som går göras vinstgivande för den privata 
sektorn. Motsägelserna blir också synliga när GCF omfamnar ursprungsbefolkningars bidrag 
till hanteringen av klimatåtgärder men sedan inte beaktar den input som de ger till GCF i 
utvärderingen av projektansökningar.  
Hanteringen av motsägelser sker på olika sätt. Ibland ignorerar GCF dem. Begränsningen 
av representationsgrupper i studie I har aldrig kommenterats av GCF trots att det väcker 
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frågor kring möjligheterna för en rad olika intressenters aktiva deltagande. Detsamma gäller 
de begränsningar som finns med att använda försäkringar för att hantera sårbarhet mot kli-
matförändringar.. Även om begränsningen av försäkringar erkänns så fortsätter GCF att be-
tona vikten av försäkringar som ett sätt att hantera sårbarhet. Ibland söker GCF överbrygga 
motstridiga berättelser – till exempel genom att hävda att  finansialisering är en flexibel re-
spons mot de behov som växer fram i det globala Syd, trots att få länder i denna del av värl-
denhar efterfrågat användandet av nya finansiella instrument för den privata sektorn, vilket 
visas i studie II. Som jag visat i avhandlingen sker försök till överbryggning genom att GCF 
framställer andra organisationers policys för ursprungsbefolkningar som lika bra som dess 
egen policy, trots att representanter för ursprungsbefolkningar hävdar att GCF:s egen policy, 
som de också varit med att utveckla, svarar bättre mot deras behov.  
Perspektiv, aktörer och frågor som framhävs i implicita prioriteringar är ofta de som kan 
hjälpa till att göra saker regleringsbara och relativt lätthanterliga. Vetenskapliga och tekniska 
perspektiv på klimatfrågan och marknadslogik är exempel på dominerande mönster i den 
globala klimatstyrningen som GCF reproducerar eller till och med förstärker, framförallt 
marknadslogiken. I motsats till dessa står perspektiv, aktörer och frågor som försöker lyfta 
fram de normativa, etiska och politiska aspekterna av klimatfinansieringen, vilka är svåra att 
kvantifiera, reglera och inordna i kalkulativa logiker. I avhandlingen har jag visat hur GCF 
söker minimera potentiella politiska konflikter genom att minska antalet representationsgrup-
per i GCF, vilket begränsar möjligheterna för många aktörer att artikulera sina intressen. 
Samtidigt privilegieras representanter för den privata sektorn som kan hjälpa till att mobili-
sera privat kapital. GCF privilegierar också tekniskt orienterade organisationer som kan bistå 
med planering och implementering av projekt medan politiska och kritiska organisationer 
underordnas. Studie II lyfter fram att I avhandlingen har jag också pekat på hur länders ege-
nansvar är en fråga om maktrelationer där det globala Syd ska ges inflytande över sin egen 
situation, samtidigt som GCF ser finansialisering som en överordnad princip som kraftigt 
begränsar ett sådant egenansvar. Både det vetenskapliga perspektivet och marknadsperspek-
tivet i GCF bidrar till en snäv syn på sårbarhet, vilket innebär att normativa, etiska och poli-
tiska dimensioner av sårbarhet undertrycks. Det är tydligt att det västerländska vetenskapliga 
perspektivet dominerar och att GCF anser ursprungsbefolkningars kunskap vara relevant 
endast som ett komplement.   
GCF framställer sig själv som en lyhörd organisation som svarar mot de behov och in-
tressen som artikuleras av olika aktörer och intressen. Utan en explicit diskussion om de 
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motsägelser, mångtydigheter, och konflikter som finns i GCF är det dock svårt att tala om 
en inkluderande styrning. Det blir en skenbart inkluderande styrning som tjänar de vars in-


































Types of documents used in the thesis. 
 
5 Here is an example of retold comments:  
“Two Board members expressed concern that other GCF policy standards were not being followed by AEs. For 
example, one noted that even though the Indigenous Peoples Policy had been adopted a year earlier, it was 
difficult to identify it in some funding proposals. They urged the Secretariat and the independent TAP to help 
ensure that the Information Disclosure Policy and other GCF policies were adhered to in the funding proposals, 
and that the funding proposals be negatively assessed if these policies were not followed. The concern about 
the absence of attention to the Indigenous Peoples Policy was also highlighted by an active observer for CSOs.” 
(GCF/B.22/25, para. 299). 
 






Policies provide formal statements about positions taken by the 
GCF on certain matters, e.g. the Governing Instrument describ-
ing the overarching arrangement for the GCF and social safe-
guards such as the Indigenous Peoples Policy describing how 
the GCF and its partners should interact with indigenous peo-





Guidelines contain information on how GCF and partners to the 
GCF implement policies or provide information to developing 
countries on how to approach the GCF in the different steps of 
project development. Guidelines are interesting since they show 
more of the practices involved in operationalizing overarching 
principles stated in policies. . Examples of guidelines are Oper-
ational guidelines for the Indigenous Peoples Policy and the 





Publications can be directed to both applicants, GCF partners 
and the general public, Documents can describe e.g. how the 
GCF Private Sector Facility entity works or be technical guide-





Templates are sometimes included in guidelines and can be for-
malized and standardized ways for the GCF to collect infor-





Board Meeting Reports usually end up somewhere between 
250-350 pages. In total, thirteen Bord Meeting Reports are in-
cluded in analyses across the studies and some reaper in sev-
eral studies. The Agendas are included in the meeting reports 
and will not be discussed in any detail. Board Meeting Reports 
do not contain verbatim accounts but comments by meeting par-
ticipants are presented in a retold fashion (see footnote 5). Ac-
tors making comments in Board Meeting Reports include inter 
alia Co-chairs, board members, members from the GCF Secre-
tariat, accredited observers from civil society and private sector, 
members from GCF sub-units such as the Independent Tech-
nical Advisory Panel and members from the Private Sector Fa-
cility Group, members from temporary work groups and some-
times invited experts. Board meeting reports are good sources 
in order to understand what issues are important for the GCF 
and what different views there are on these issues. which helps 
to identify potential contradictions, ambiguities and conflicts. 
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One limitation in board meeting reports is the lack of speaker 
identification. The meeting reports do state if the speaker is a 
board member, observer, member from Secretariat etc., but 
they do mention if Board members or Observers making com-
ments represent developed or developing countries. It is a bit 
peculiar considering the emphasis on equal representation in 
the GCF and the conflictual field of climate finance, especially 
between developed and developing countries. One can specu-





Action Items  describe matters that need to be dealt with in some 
ways, e.g. making a final decision on a policy or making a deci-
sion on how to continue working with an issue. In Action Item 
documents the Secretariat and some of its sub-units may pre-
sent a summary of a report to the Board. Building on the report, 
the Secretariat recommend the Board to adopt the decision pro-
posed by the Secretariat, often found in an Annex to the docu-
ment. The Board may take a final decision or request the Sec-
retariat to investigate the issue further. Funding proposals are 
also categorized as action items but no particular funding pro-
posals are used in the analyses in the studies. The analyses in 
some of the studies are focused on more general processes 
around the development of funding proposals. Action Items and 
affiliated documents such as reports are key documents for un-
derstanding knowledge production in the GCF. There you see 
what matters are important in GCF governance, the problemati-
zations of issues and proposed solutions reflect ontological as-
sumptions and epistemological preferences in the GCF 




Documents defined as Information is a varied subtype of docu-
ment. They can be more descriptive, e.g. they can describe the 
status of the GCF project portfolio, but they can also present 
analyses made by the Secretariat and recommendations to the 
Board based on those analyses. The difference between more 
analytical Information documents and Action Items seems to be 
there is no immediate need to make a decision based on the 
information. The relevance and usefulness of these documents 




Submissions are documents containing input from internal 
(Board members and  accredited observers) as well as outside 
actors. Calls for submissions is a way for the GCF to collect the 
views of different actors on certain matters. Connected to these 
submissions are also documents discussing the terms of refer-
ence for the submissions. The submissions used in the thesis 
are connected to the early design process of the Green Climate 
Fund and the design and review of the GCF accredited observer 
arrangement. Technically it is the latter ones that are GCF doc-
uments and the former ones are documents from the UNFCCC 
Transitional Committee. GCF submissions include joint state-
ments by 35 civil society organizations regarding the review for 
the GCF accredited observer arrangement. Submissions are 
useful as they contain more substantial discussions from differ-
ent actors compared to retellings in Board meeting reports. Dif-
ferent positions and conflicts are also more easily identified in 




Information notes  Information notes are from the UNFCCC secretariat and they 
clarify COP decisions, terms of references for the design of the 
GCF, the mandate of the Transitional Committee, arrangements 
for the Technical Support Unit,  and the working arrangements 















The Meeting Summaries are rather short, 2-8 pages long and 
summarized by the Co-chairs. The summaries are paragraphs 
retelling what was discussed under each agenda item. Refer-
ences are made to other documents, sometimes included in An-
nexes to the summaries. The actions taken be by Transitional 
Committee Board are concluded at the end of each paragraph, 
i.e. the Transitional Committee decides on something or re-
quests something to be further investigated. 
 
Scoping papers Scoping papers aim to define the issue at hand, i.e. to create a 
common understanding of a problem and to define the key ob-
jects for a certain issue. Scoping papers include retellings of dis-
cussions and range from 4-58 pages depending on the com-
plexity of the matter.  
 
Background notes Background Notes provide information for discussing agenda 
items, e.g. overviews how other existing climate funds have 
solved certain issues such as fiduciary standards and evaluation 
mechanisms. The length of these documents vary from 2-15 
pages depending on the complexity of the issue. Like Action 
Items in the GCF, these documents are import for understand-
ing the knowledge production in the TC process, i.e. what and 
how things are problematized. 
 
Reports Reports are more elaborate papers than Background Notes. 
The content is not only collected from other sources as in Back-
ground Notes but also partly analysed. Authors of these reports 
are often members from the Technical Support Unit. The num-
ber of pages varies here as well, from 4-10 pages and these 
documents are central in the TC knowledge making process.   
Presentations 
from co-facilitators 
Presentations from co-facilitators are documents from members 
of the Transitional Committee board that with help from the 
Technical Support Unit produce material for the Transitional 
Committee workshops. They are preliminary suggestions for the 
initial discussions on each workshop. 
 
Submissions Submissions to the Transitional Committee provide views on the 
design of the GCF from a range of actors, including members of 
the Transitional Committee, international organs such as UNDP, 
UNEP, civil society groups (single organizations of joint submis-
sions) and private sector organizations. Submissions were 
made in relation to various issues during the design the GCF 
(UNFCCC, 2011b). As, with GCF submissions, these docu-
ments contain longer texts about actors views that you do not 
find in other documents. Conflicts are more visible here as well. 
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Appendix B 
 
GCF approved projects to 11 October 2021. Data source: https://www.greencli-
mate.fund/projects 
 
No. Name Region Type Finance 
FP001 Building the Resilience of Wetlands in the 
Province of Datem del Marañós, Peru 
Latin America  





FP002 Scaling up the use of Modernized Climate in-
formation and Early Warning Systems in Ma-
lawi 
Africa Adaptation Public 
FP003 Increasing the resilience of ecosystems and 
communities through the restoration of the pro-
ductive bases of salinized lands 
Africa Adaptation Public 
FP004 Climate Resilient Infrastructure Mainstreaming 
(CRIM) 
Asia-Pacific Adaptation Public 






FP007 Supporting vulnerable communities in Mal-
dives to manage climate change-induced wa-
ter shortages 
Asia-Pacific Adaptation Public 
FP008 Fiji Urban Water Supply and Wastewater Man-
agement Project 
Asia-Pacific Adaptation Public 
FP009 Energy Savings Insurance (ESI) for private en-
ergy efficiency investments by Small and Me-
dium-Sized Enterprises 
Latin America  
and the  
Caribbean 
Mitigation Public 
FP010 De-Risking and Scaling-up Investment in En-
ergy Efficient Building Retrofits 
Eastern Europe Mitigation Public 
FP011 Large-scale Ecosystem-based Adaptation in 
The Gambia: developing a climate-resilient, 
natural resource-based economy 
Africa Adaptation Public 
FP012 Africa Hydromet Program – Strengthening Cli-
mate Resilience in Sub-Saharan Africa: Mali 
Country Project 
Africa Adaptation Public 
FP013 Improving the resilience of vulnerable coastal 





FP014 Climate Adaptation and Mitigation Program 
For the Aral Sea Basin (CAMP4ASB) 
Asia-Pacific Adaptation Public 
FP015 Tuvalu Coastal Adaptation Project (TCAP) Asia-Pacific Adaptation Public 
FP016 Strengthening the resilience of smallholder 
farmers in the Dry Zone to climate variability 
and extreme events through an integrated ap-
proach to water management 
Asia-Pacific Adaptation Public 
FP017 Climate action and solar energy development 
programme in the Tarapacá Region in Chile 
Latin America  




FP018 Scaling-up of Glacial Lake Outburst Flood 
(GLOF) risk reduction in Northern Pakistan 
Asia-Pacific Adaptation Public 
FP019 Priming Financial and Land Use Planning In-
struments to Reduce Emissions from Defor-
estations 
Latin America  
and the  
Caribbean 
Mitigation Public 
FP020 Sustainable Energy Facility for the Eastern 
Caribbean 
Latin America  
and the  
Caribbean 
Mitigation Public 
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FP021 Senegal Integrated Urban Flood Management 
Project 
Africa Adaptation Public 
FP022 Development of arganiculture orchards in de-




FP023 Climate Resilient Agriculture in three of the 
Vulnerable Extreme northern crop growing re-
gions (CRAVE) 
Africa Adaptation Public 
FP024 Enpower to Adapt: Creating Climate-Change 
Resilient Livelihoods through Community-
Based Natural Resource Management 
(CBNRM) in Namibia 
Africa Adaptation Public 
FP025 GCF-EBRD SEFF Co-financing Programme 
[deliver climate finance to the private sector at 
scale through Partner Financial Institutions 














FP027 Universal Green Energy Access Programme 
(UGEAP) 
Africa Mitigation Private 
sector 
FP028 MSME [micro, small and medium enterprises] 
Business Loan Program for GHG Emission 
Reduction 
Asia-Pacific Mitigation Private 
sector 
FP033 Accelerating the transformational shift to a low-
carbon economy in the Republic of Mauritius 
Africa Mitigation Public 
FP034 Building Resilient Communities, Wetland Eco-
systems and Associated Catchments in 
Uganda 
Africa Adaptation Public 
FP035 Climate Information Services for Resilient De-
velopment Planning in Vanuatu (Van-CIS-
RDP) 
Asia-Pacific Adaptation Public 





FP037 Integrated Flood Management to Enhance Cli-
mate Resilience of the Vaisigano River Catch-
ment in Samoa 
Asia-Pacific Adaptation Public 
FP039 GCF-EBRD Egypt Renewable Energy Financ-
ing Framework 
Africa Mitigation Private 
sector 
FP040 Tajikistan: Scaling Up Hydropower Sector Cli-
mate Resilience 
Asia-Pacific Adaptation Public 
FP041 Simiyu Climate Resilient Project Africa Adaptation Public 
FP042 Irrigation development and adaptation of irri-
gated agriculture to climate change in semi-
arid Morocco 
Africa Adaptation Public 
FP043 The Saïss Water Conservation Project Africa Adaptation Public 
FP044 Tina River Hydropower Development Project Asia-Pacific Cross- 
cutting 
Public 
FP045 Ground Water Recharge and Solar Micro Irri-
gation to Ensure Food Security and Enhance 
Resilience in Vulnerable Tribal Areas of Od-
isha 
Asia-Pacific Adaptation Public 
FP046 Renewable Energy Program #1 - Solar [Mon-
golia] 
Asia-Pacific Mitigation Private 
sector 
FP047 GCF-EBRD Kazakhstan Renewables Frame-
work 
Asia-Pacific Mitigation Private 
sector 
FP048 Low Emissions and Climate Resilient Agricul-
ture Risk Sharing Facility 
Latin America  






FP049 Building the climate resilience of food insecure 
smallholder farmers through integrated man-
agement of climate risk (R4) 
Africa Adaptation Public 
FP050 Bhutan for life [preventing deforestation and 
preserving resources] 
Asia-Pacific Adaptation Public 
FP051 Scaling-up Investment in Low-Carbon Public 
Buildings [Bosnia-Herzegovina] 
Eastern Europe Mitigation Public 
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FP053 Enhancing climate change adaptation in the 
North coast and Nile Delta Regions in Egypt 
Africa Adaptation Public 
FP056 Scaling up climate resilient water management 
practices for vulnerable communities in La Mo-
jana 
Latin America  
and the  
Caribbean 
Adaptation Public 
FP058 Responding to the increasing risk of drought: 
building gender-responsive resilience of the 
most vulnerable communities 
Africa Adaptation Public 
FP059 Climate Resilient Water Sector in Grenada (G-
CREWS) 
Latin America  
and the  
Caribbean 
Adaptation Public 
FP060 Water Sector Resilience Nexus for Sustainabil-
ity in Barbados (WSRN S-Barbados) 
Latin America  





FP061 Integrated physical adaptation and community 
resilience through an enhanced direct access 
pilot in the public, private, and civil society sec-
tors of three Eastern Caribbean small island 
developing states 
Latin America  
and the  
Caribbean 
Adaptation Public 
FP062 Poverty, Reforestation, Energy and Climate 
Change Project (PROEZA) 
Latin America  





FP063 Promoting private sector investments in en-
ergy efficiency in the industrial sector and in 
Paraguay 
Latin America  
and the  
Caribbean 
Mitigation Public 
FP064 Promoting risk mitigation instruments and fi-
nance for renewable energy and energy effi-
ciency investments 
Latin America  
and the  
Caribbean 
Mitigation Public 
FP066 Pacific Resilience Project Phase II for RMI Asia-Pacific Adaptation Public 
FP067 Building climate resilience of vulnerable and 
food insecure communities through capacity 
strengthening and livelihood diversification in 
mountainous regions of Tajikistan 
Asia-Pacific Adaptation Public 
FP068 Scaling-up Multi-Hazard Early Warning Sys-
tem and the Use of Climate Information in 
Georgia 
Eastern Europe Adaptation Public 
FP069 Enhancing adaptive capacities of coastal com-
munities, especially women, to cope with cli-
mate change induced salinity 
Asia-Pacific Adaptation Public 
FP070 Global Clean Cooking Program – Bangladesh Asia-Pacific Cross- 
cutting 
Public 
FP071 Scaling Up Energy Efficiency for Industrial En-
terprises in Vietnam 
Asia-Pacific Mitigation Public 
FP072 Strengthening climate resilience of agricultural 
livelihoods in Agro-Ecological Regions I and II 
in Zambia 
Africa Adaptation Public 
FP073 Strengthening Climate Resilience of Rural 




FP074 Africa Hydromet Program – Strengthening Cli-
mate Resilience in Sub-Saharan Africa: 
Burkina Faso Country Project 
Africa Adaptation Public 
FP075 Institutional Development of the State Agency 
for Hydrometeorology of Tajikistan 
Asia-Pacific Adaptation Public 





FP077 Ulaanbaatar Green Affordable Housing and 




FP078 Acumen Resilient Agriculture Fund (ARAF) 
[Supporting  agribusinesses that enhance the 
climate resilience of smallholder farmers] 
Africa Adaptation Private 
sector 
FP080 Zambia Renewable Energy Financing Frame-
work 
Africa Mitigation Private 
sector 
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FP081 Line of Credit for Solar rooftop segment for 
commercial, industrial and residential housing 
sectors 
Asia-Pacific Mitigation Private 
sector 
FP082 Catalyzing Climate Finance (Shandong Green 
Development Fund) [Catalysing private finance 




SAP001* Improving rangeland and ecosystem manage-
ment practices of smallholder farmers under 
conditions of climate change in Sesfontein, 
Fransfontein, and Warmquelle areas of the 
Republic of Namibia 
Africa Adaptation Public 
FP083 Indonesia Geothermal Resource Risk Mitiga-
tion Project 
Asia-Pacific Mitigation Public 





FP085 Green BRT Karachi [Building a zero-emissions 
bus rapid transit (BRT) system] 
Asia-Pacific Mitigation Public 
FP086 Green Cities Facility [Enabling the transition of 
cities to low-carbon, climate-resilient urban de-
velopment] 






FP087 Building livelihood resilience to climate change 
in the upper basins of Guatemala’s highlands 
Latin America  
and the  
Caribbean 
Adaptation Public 
FP089 Upscaling climate resilience measures in the 
dry corridor agroecosystems of El Salvador 
(RECLIMA) 
Latin America  





FP090 Tonga Renewable Energy Project under the 
Pacific Islands Renewable Energy Investment 
Program 
Asia-Pacific Mitigation Public 
FP091 South Tarawa Water Supply Project Asia-Pacific Cross- 
cutting 
Public 
FP092 Programme for integrated development and 





FP093 Yeleen Rural Electrification Project in Burkina 
Faso 
Africa Mitigation Public 
FP094 Ensuring climate resilient water supplies in the 
Comoros Islands 
Africa Adaptation Public 
FP095 Transforming Financial Systems for Climate Africa, Latin 






FP096 DRC Green Mini-Grid Program [development 
of three solar green mini-grid pilot projects] 
Africa Mitigation Private 
sector 
FP097 Productive Investment Initiative for Adaptation 
to Climate Change (CAMBio II) 
Latin America 








FP099 Climate Investor One [Providing financing to 
develop renewable energy projects in regions 
with power deficits] 
Africa, Asia-Pa-
cific/Latin Amer-




SAP002* Climate services and diversification of climate 
sensitive livelihoods to empower food insecure 
and vulnerable communities in the Kyrgyz Re-
public. 
Asia-Pacific Adaptation Public 
SAP003* Enhancing climate resilience of the water sec-
tor in Bahrain 
Asia-Pacific Adaptation Public 
SAP004* Energy Efficient Consumption Loan Pro-
gramme [loans to energy efficiency heating ap-
pliances and housing products] 
Asia-Pacific Mitigation Private 
sector 
FP100 REDD-PLUS results-based payments for re-
sults achieved by Brazil in the Amazon biome 
in 2014 and 2015 
Latin America  
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FP053 Enhancing climate change adaptation in the 
North coast and Nile Delta Regions in Egypt 
Africa Adaptation Public 
FP056 Scaling up climate resilient water management 
practices for vulnerable communities in La Mo-
jana 
Latin America  
and the  
Caribbean 
Adaptation Public 
FP058 Responding to the increasing risk of drought: 
building gender-responsive resilience of the 
most vulnerable communities 
Africa Adaptation Public 
FP059 Climate Resilient Water Sector in Grenada (G-
CREWS) 
Latin America  
and the  
Caribbean 
Adaptation Public 
FP060 Water Sector Resilience Nexus for Sustainabil-
ity in Barbados (WSRN S-Barbados) 
Latin America  





FP061 Integrated physical adaptation and community 
resilience through an enhanced direct access 
pilot in the public, private, and civil society sec-
tors of three Eastern Caribbean small island 
developing states 
Latin America  
and the  
Caribbean 
Adaptation Public 
FP062 Poverty, Reforestation, Energy and Climate 
Change Project (PROEZA) 
Latin America  





FP063 Promoting private sector investments in en-
ergy efficiency in the industrial sector and in 
Paraguay 
Latin America  
and the  
Caribbean 
Mitigation Public 
FP064 Promoting risk mitigation instruments and fi-
nance for renewable energy and energy effi-
ciency investments 
Latin America  
and the  
Caribbean 
Mitigation Public 
FP066 Pacific Resilience Project Phase II for RMI Asia-Pacific Adaptation Public 
FP067 Building climate resilience of vulnerable and 
food insecure communities through capacity 
strengthening and livelihood diversification in 
mountainous regions of Tajikistan 
Asia-Pacific Adaptation Public 
FP068 Scaling-up Multi-Hazard Early Warning Sys-
tem and the Use of Climate Information in 
Georgia 
Eastern Europe Adaptation Public 
FP069 Enhancing adaptive capacities of coastal com-
munities, especially women, to cope with cli-
mate change induced salinity 
Asia-Pacific Adaptation Public 
FP070 Global Clean Cooking Program – Bangladesh Asia-Pacific Cross- 
cutting 
Public 
FP071 Scaling Up Energy Efficiency for Industrial En-
terprises in Vietnam 
Asia-Pacific Mitigation Public 
FP072 Strengthening climate resilience of agricultural 
livelihoods in Agro-Ecological Regions I and II 
in Zambia 
Africa Adaptation Public 
FP073 Strengthening Climate Resilience of Rural 




FP074 Africa Hydromet Program – Strengthening Cli-
mate Resilience in Sub-Saharan Africa: 
Burkina Faso Country Project 
Africa Adaptation Public 
FP075 Institutional Development of the State Agency 
for Hydrometeorology of Tajikistan 
Asia-Pacific Adaptation Public 





FP077 Ulaanbaatar Green Affordable Housing and 




FP078 Acumen Resilient Agriculture Fund (ARAF) 
[Supporting  agribusinesses that enhance the 
climate resilience of smallholder farmers] 
Africa Adaptation Private 
sector 
FP080 Zambia Renewable Energy Financing Frame-
work 
Africa Mitigation Private 
sector 
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FP081 Line of Credit for Solar rooftop segment for 
commercial, industrial and residential housing 
sectors 
Asia-Pacific Mitigation Private 
sector 
FP082 Catalyzing Climate Finance (Shandong Green 
Development Fund) [Catalysing private finance 




SAP001* Improving rangeland and ecosystem manage-
ment practices of smallholder farmers under 
conditions of climate change in Sesfontein, 
Fransfontein, and Warmquelle areas of the 
Republic of Namibia 
Africa Adaptation Public 
FP083 Indonesia Geothermal Resource Risk Mitiga-
tion Project 
Asia-Pacific Mitigation Public 





FP085 Green BRT Karachi [Building a zero-emissions 
bus rapid transit (BRT) system] 
Asia-Pacific Mitigation Public 
FP086 Green Cities Facility [Enabling the transition of 
cities to low-carbon, climate-resilient urban de-
velopment] 






FP087 Building livelihood resilience to climate change 
in the upper basins of Guatemala’s highlands 
Latin America  
and the  
Caribbean 
Adaptation Public 
FP089 Upscaling climate resilience measures in the 
dry corridor agroecosystems of El Salvador 
(RECLIMA) 
Latin America  





FP090 Tonga Renewable Energy Project under the 
Pacific Islands Renewable Energy Investment 
Program 
Asia-Pacific Mitigation Public 
FP091 South Tarawa Water Supply Project Asia-Pacific Cross- 
cutting 
Public 
FP092 Programme for integrated development and 





FP093 Yeleen Rural Electrification Project in Burkina 
Faso 
Africa Mitigation Public 
FP094 Ensuring climate resilient water supplies in the 
Comoros Islands 
Africa Adaptation Public 
FP095 Transforming Financial Systems for Climate Africa, Latin 






FP096 DRC Green Mini-Grid Program [development 
of three solar green mini-grid pilot projects] 
Africa Mitigation Private 
sector 
FP097 Productive Investment Initiative for Adaptation 
to Climate Change (CAMBio II) 
Latin America 








FP099 Climate Investor One [Providing financing to 
develop renewable energy projects in regions 
with power deficits] 
Africa, Asia-Pa-
cific/Latin Amer-




SAP002* Climate services and diversification of climate 
sensitive livelihoods to empower food insecure 
and vulnerable communities in the Kyrgyz Re-
public. 
Asia-Pacific Adaptation Public 
SAP003* Enhancing climate resilience of the water sec-
tor in Bahrain 
Asia-Pacific Adaptation Public 
SAP004* Energy Efficient Consumption Loan Pro-
gramme [loans to energy efficiency heating ap-
pliances and housing products] 
Asia-Pacific Mitigation Private 
sector 
FP100 REDD-PLUS results-based payments for re-
sults achieved by Brazil in the Amazon biome 
in 2014 and 2015 
Latin America  
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FP101 Resilient Rural Belize (Be-Resilient) Latin America  
and the  
Caribbean 
Adaptation Public 
FP102 Mali solar rural electrification project Africa Mitigation Public 
FP103 Promotion of Climate-Friendly Cooking: Kenya 
and Senegal 
Africa Mitigation Public 
FP105 BOAD Climate Finance Facility to Scale Up 
Solar Energy Investments in Francophone 
West Africa LDCs 
Africa Mitigation Private 
sector 
FP106 Embedded Generation Investment Programme 
(EGIP) [support the implementation of renewa-
ble energy projects] 
Africa Mitigation Private 
sector 
SAP005* Enhanced climate resilience of rural communi-
ties in central and north Benin through the im-
plementation of ecosystem-based adaptation 
(EbA) in forest and agricultural landscapes 
Africa Adaptation Public 
SAP006* Building resilience of communities living in 
landscapes threatened under climate change 
through an ecosystems-based adaptation ap-
proach 
Africa Adaptation Public 
FP107 Supporting Climate Resilience and Transfor-
mational Change in the Agriculture Sector in 
Bhutan 
Asia-Pacific Adaptation Public 
FP108 Transforming the Indus Basin with Climate Re-
silient Agriculture and Water Management 
Asia-Pacific Adaptation Public 
FP109 Safeguarding rural communities and their 
physical and economic assets from climate in-
duced disasters in Timor-Leste 
Asia-Pacific Adaptation Public 
FP110 Ecuador REDD-plus RBP for results period 
2014 
Latin America  
and the  
Caribbean 
Mitigation Public 
FP111 Promoting climate-resilient forest restoration 
and silviculture for the sustainability of water-
related ecosystem services 
Latin America  





FP112 Addressing Climate Vulnerability in the Water 
Sector (ACWA) in the Marshall Islands 
Asia-Pacific Adaptation Public 
FP113 TWENDE: Towards Ending Drought Emergen-
cies: Ecosystem Based Adaptation in Kenya’s 
Arid and Semi-Arid Rangelands 
Africa Adaptation Public 
FP114 Program on Affirmative Finance Action for 
Women in Africa (AFAWA): Financing Climate 





FP115 Espejo de Tarapacá [Providing stable, 24-hour 
baseload energy] 
Latin America  






SAP007* Integrated Climate Risk Management for Food 
Security and Livelihoods in Zimbabwe focusing 
on Masvingo and Rushinga Districts 
Africa Adaptation Public 
FP116 Carbon Sequestration through Climate Invest-





FP117 Implementation of the Lao PDR Emission Re-
ductions Programme through improved gov-
ernance and sustainable forest landscape 
management 
Asia-Pacific Mitigation Public 





FP119 Water Banking and Adaptation of Agriculture 




FP120 Chile REDD-plus results-based payments for 
results period 2014-2016 
Latin America  
and the  
Caribbean 
Mitigation Public 
FP121 REDD+ Results-based payments in Paraguay 
for the period 2015-2017 
Latin America  
and the  
Caribbean 
Mitigation Public 
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FP122 Blue Action Fund (BAF): GCF Ecosystem 
Based Adaptation Programme in the Western 
Indian Ocean 
Africa Adaptation Public 
SAP008* Extended Community Climate Change Project-
Flood (ECCCP-Flood) 
Asia-Pacific Adaptation Public 
SAP009* Building resilience of urban populations with 
ecosystem-based solutions in Lao PDR 
Asia-Pacific Adaptation Public 
SAP010* Multi-Hazard Impact-Based Forecasting and 
Early Warning System for the Philippines 
Asia-Pacific Adaptation Public 
SAP011* Climate-resilient food security for women and 
men smallholders in Mozambique through inte-
grated risk management 
Africa Adaptation Public 
SAP012* Inclusive Green Financing for Climate Resilient 




FP124 Strengthening Climate Resilience of Subsist-
ence Farmers and Agricultural Plantation 
Communities residing in the vulnerable river 
basins, watershed areas and downstream of 
the Knuckles Mountain Range Catchment of 
Sri Lanka 
Asia-Pacific Adaptation Public 
FP125 Strengthening the resilience of smallholder ag-
riculture to climate change-induced water inse-
curity in the Central Highlands and South-Cen-
tral Coast regions of Vietnam 
Asia-Pacific Adaptation Public 
FP126 Increased climate resilience of rural house-
holds and communities through the rehabilita-
tion of production landscapes in selected local-
ities of the Republic of Cuba (IRES) 
Latin America  





FP127 Building Climate Resilience of Vulnerable Agri-
cultural Livelihoods in Southern Zimbabwe 
Africa Adaptation Public 
FP128 Arbaro Fund – Sustainable Forestry Fund Latin America  





SAP013 Scaling Smart, Solar, Energy Access Mi-
crogrids in Haiti 
Latin America  






FP129 Afghanistan Rural Energy Market Transfor-
mation Initiative – Strengthening Resilience of 
Livelihoods Through Sustainable Energy Ac-
cess 
Asia-Pacific Mitigation Public 
FP130 Indonesia REDD-plus RBP for results period 
2014-2016 
Asia-Pacific Mitigation Public 
FP131 Improving Climate Resilience of Vulnerable 
Communities and Ecosystems in the Gandaki 




FP132 Enabling Implementation of Forest Sector Re-
form in Georgia to Reduce GHG Emissions 
from Forest Degradation 
Eastern Europe Mitigation Public 
FP133 Resilience to hurricanes in the building sector 
in Antigua and Barbuda 
Latin America  
and the  
Caribbean 
Adaptation Public 
FP134 Colombia REDD+ Results-based Payments for 
results period 2015-2016 
Latin America  
and the  
Caribbean 
Mitigation Public 
FP135 Ecosystem-based Adaptation in the Indian 
Ocean – EBA IO 
Africa Adaptation Public 
FP136 Resilient Landscapes and Livelihoods Project Africa Cross- 
cutting 
Public 
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FP133 Resilience to hurricanes in the building sector 
in Antigua and Barbuda 
Latin America  
and the  
Caribbean 
Adaptation Public 
FP134 Colombia REDD+ Results-based Payments for 
results period 2015-2016 
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and the  
Caribbean 
Mitigation Public 
FP135 Ecosystem-based Adaptation in the Indian 
Ocean – EBA IO 
Africa Adaptation Public 
FP136 Resilient Landscapes and Livelihoods Project Africa Cross- 
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FP138 ASER Solar Rural Electrification Project Africa Mitigation Public 
FP139 Building resilience in the face of climate 
change within traditional rain fed agricultural 
and pastoral systems in Sudan 
Africa Adaptation Public 







SAP014* Forest resilience of Armenia, enhancing adap-
tation and rural green growth via mitigation 
Eastern Europe Cross- 
cutting 
Public 
SAP015* Promoting zero-deforestation cocoa production 
for reducing emissions in Côte d’Ivoire (PRO-
MIRE) 
Africa Mitigation Public 
SAP016* Fiji Agrophotovoltaic Project in Ovalau Asia-Pacific Mitigation Private 
sector 
FP141 Improving Adaptive Capacity and Risk Man-
agement of Rural communities in Mongolia 
Asia-Pacific Adaptation Public 
FP142 Argentina REDD-plus RBP for results period 
2014-2016 
Latin America  
and the  
Caribbean 
Mitigation Public 
FP143 Planting Climate Resilience in Rural Communi-
ties of the Northeast (PCRP) 
Latin America  





FP144 Costa Rica REDD-plus Results-Based Pay-
ments for 2014 and 2015 
Latin America  
and the  
Caribbean 
Mitigation Public 
FP145 RELIVE – REsilient LIVElihoods of vulnerable 
smallholder farmers in the Mayan landscapes 
and the Dry Corridor of Guatemala 
Latin America  
and the  
Caribbean 
Adaptation Public 
FP146 Bio-CLIMA: Integrated climate action to reduce 
deforestation and strengthen resilience in 
BOSAWÁS and Rio San Juan Biospheres 
Latin America  
and the  
Caribbean 
Mitigation Public 
FP147 Enhancing Climate Information and 
Knowledge Services for resilience in 5 island 
countries of the Pacific Ocean 
Asia-Pacific Adaptation Public 
FP148 Participation in Energy Access Relief Facility 
("EARF") 
Africa Mitigation Private 
sector 
FP149 Green Climate Financing Facility for Local Fi-
nancial Institutions in Latin-America 
Latin America  




FP150 Promoting private sector investment through 
large scale adoption of energy saving technol-
ogies and equipment for Textile and Ready-
made Garment (RMG) sectors of Bangladesh 
Asia-Pacific Mitigation Private 
sector 
FP151 Global Subnational Climate Fund (SnCF 
Global) – Technical Assistance (TA) Facility 
Eastern Europe, 
Latin America 






FP152 Global Subnational Climate Fund (SnCF 
Global) – Equity [to catalyze long-term climate 
investment primarily from the private sector] 
Africa, Asia-Pa-
cific,  
Latin America  





FP153 Mongolia Green Finance Corporation [de-
creasing CO2 emissions at the household and 
business level] 
Asia-Pacific Mitigation Private 
sector 
SAP107* Climate proofing food production investments 
in Imbo and Moso basins in the Republic of 
Burundi 
Africa Adaptation Public 
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SAP108* Enhancing Climate Information Systems for 
Resilient Development in Liberia (Liberia CIS) 
Africa Adaptation Public 
SAP109* Gums for Adaptation and Mitigation in Sudan 
(GAMS): Enhancing adaptive capacity of local 
communities and restoring carbon sink poten-
tial of the Gum Arabic belt, expanding Africa’s 




FP154 Mongolia: Aimags and Soums Green Regional 




FP155 Building resilience to cope with climate change 
in Jordan through improving water use effi-
ciency in the agriculture sector (BRCCJ) 
Asia-Pacific Adaptation Public 
FP156 ASEAN Catalytic Green Finance Facility 
(ACGF): Green Recovery Program [recovery 
following COVID-19] 
Asia-Pacific Mitigation Public 
FP157 Coastal Resilience to Climate Change in Cuba 
through Ecosystem Based Adaptation - "MI 
COSTA" 
Latin America  
and the  
Caribbean 
Adaptation Public 
FP158 Ecosystem-Based Adaptation and Mitigation in 




FP159 PREFOREST CONGO - Project to reduce 
greenhouse gas emissions from forests in five 
departments in the Republic of Congo 
Africa Mitigation Public 
FP160 Monrovia Metropolitan Climate Resilience Pro-
ject 
Africa Adaptation Public 
FP161 Building Regional Resilience through Strength-
ened Meteorological, Hydrological and Climate 
Services in the Indian Ocean Commission 
(IOC) Member Countries 
Africa Adaptation Public 
FP162 The Africa Integrated Climate Risk Manage-
ment Programme: Building the resilience of 
smallholder farmers to climate change impacts 





FP163 Sustainable Renewables Risk Mitigation Initia-




FP164 Green Growth Equity Fund Asia-Pacific Mitigation Private 
sector 
SAP020* Climate resilient food security for farming 
households across the Federated States of Mi-
cronesia (FSM) 
Asia-Pacific Adaptation Public 
SAP021* Community-based Landscape Management 
for Enhanced Climate Resilience and Reduc-
tion of Deforestation in Critical Watersheds 
Asia-Pacific Mitigation Public 
SAP022* Enhancing Multi-Hazard Early Warning Sys-
tem to increase resilience of Uzbekistan com-
munities to climate change induced hazards 
Asia-Pacific Adaptation Public 
SAP023* River Restoration for Climate Change Adapta-
tion (RIOS) 
Latin America  





FP165 Building Climate Resilient Safer Islands in the 
Maldives 
Asia-Pacific Adaptation Public 
FP166 Light Rail Transit for the Greater Metropolitan 
Area (GAM) [Costa Rica] 
Latin America  
and the  
Caribbean 
Mitigation Public 
FP167 Transforming Eastern Province through Adap-




FP168 Leveraging Energy Access Finance (LEAF) 
Framework [renewable energy solutions to 
Sub-Saharan Africa] 
Africa Mitigation Private 
sector 
FP169 Climate change adaptation solutions for Local 
Authorities in the Federated States of Microne-
sia 
Asia-Pacific Adaptation Public 
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FP170 Enhancing climate resilience in Thailand 
through effective water management and sus-
tainable agriculture 
Asia-Pacific Adaptation Public 
FP171 Enhancing Early Warning Systems to build 
greater resilience to hydro-meteorological haz-
ards in Timor-Leste 
Asia-Pacific Adaptation Public 
FP172 Mitigating GHG emission through modern, effi-
cient and climate friendly clean cooking solu-
tions (CCS) [Nepal] 
Asia-Pacific Mitigation Public 
FP173 The Amazon Bioeconomy Fund: Unlocking pri-
vate capital by valuing bioeconomy products 
and services with climate mitigation and adap-
tation results in the Amazon 
Latin America  





FP174 Ecosystem-based Adaptation to increase cli-
mate resilience in the Central American Dry 
Corridor and the Arid Zones of the Dominican 
Republic 
Latin America  
and the  
Caribbean 
Adaptation Public 
FP175 Enhancing community resilience and water se-
curity in the Upper Athi River Catchment Area, 
Kenya 
Africa Adaptation Public 
FP176 Hydro-agricultural development with smart ag-












FP178 Desert to Power G5 Sahel Facility [enabling 
environment to facilitate private sector funding 
for solar technological innovations and to en-
sure sustainability of the clean energy sector in 
five African countries] 
Africa Mitigation Private 
sector 
FP179 Tanzania Agriculture Climate Adaptation Tech-
nology Deployment Programme (TACATDP) 
Africa Adaptation Private 
sector 
FP180 Global Fund for Coral Reefs Investment Win-
dow [aims to address critical financing and pri-









FP181 CRAFT - Catalytic Capital for First Private In-
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Global climate governance is characterised by many contentious issues that 
are difficult to agree on. The climate organizations mandated by the United 
Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change to manage climate is-
sues are still expected to operationalize climate actions in a satisfying way, 
which means that many contentious issues are passed along to these organ-
izations. However, climate organizations often take on a technical role, mak-
ing the contentiousness of climate issues invisible. The present thesis inves-
tigates one of the major organizations within the United Nations Framework 
Convention on Climate Change, the Green Climate Fund. The aim of the 
thesis is to make the contradictions, ambiguities and conflicts around the op-
erationalization of different issues in the Green Climate Fund visible and to 
analyse how the management of these contradictions, ambiguities and con-
flicts by the Green Climate Fund affects which aspects of global climate fi-
nance governance issues are emphasized or subordinated.   
  
 
 
